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Pour Pepe, Paco et Fanny.
“Mucha gente pequeña en lugares pequeños, haciendo cosas pequeñas, pueden cambiar el
mundo. ”
Eduardo Galeano
“Climate change is the single biggest thing that humans have ever done on this planet. The
one thing that needs to be bigger is our movement to stop it. ”
Bill McKibben
iii
Abstract
Technology Choices under Emissions Policy and Technology Diffusion
constraints: the case of Passenger Vehicles
Policy instruments on passenger vehicle emissions aim at reducing negative envi-
ronmental externalities from vehicles use. To regulate CO2 emissions, fuel economy
standards have been put in place in Europe and in the US, among others. These
standards are made more stringent over time. This thesis analyzes how automotive
firms anticipate and prepare their future technology portfolio to comply with ex-
pected future standards. To do so, we develop a model of optimal technology choice
that captures technology diffusion constraints.
With this framework, this thesis investigates three policy questions. First, we
ask how the form of anticipation can affect near- and long-term technology choices.
We find that focusing solely on near-term objectives can lead to failure to comply
with a long-term target. In fact, meeting the near-term target is not a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to satisfy long-term compliance. Moreover, when there is partial
anticipation, as in a myopic view of the future, technology choices will be stuck
with low abatement technologies creating a path dependency that limits long-term
abatement potential.
Second, we ask how much indexing fuel economy standard to mass (as in Eu-
rope or China) changes the optimal technology. We show that, for the same emission
target, there is no significant difference in the social cost of mobility for an average
vehicle with and without mass index. Thus a heavier vehicle fleet has the same cost
than a lighter one. However, the technology choices are different, and mass indexed
fuel economy standards lead to sidestepping lightweight technologies despite being
cost effective from a CO2 emissions abatement point of view.
Third, we ask how technology choices change when policies with multiple
objectives overlap. We focus on two externalities associated with mobility: CO2
emissions and local air pollution. We show three type of effects of overlapping poli-
cies. First, a technology specific policy such as the Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate in
combination with a fuel economy standard induces carmakers to develop more ex-
pensive green technologies and prevents cheap, dirty technologies from disappear-
ing compared to the case of a fuel economy standard alone. Second, the combination
of policies can lead to very high costs when technologies adapted to each policy are
very different. Third, we find an ambiguous effect of overlapping policies relative
to single-objective policy in terms of emissions performance.
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Résumé de la Thèse
Le secteur des transports est un des principaux contributeurs de gaz à effet de
serre (GES). Les véhicules légers (VL) et lourds sont responsables de la plupart de
ces émissions. La tendance à une plus forte motorisation des pays émergents fait que
ce secteur va être d’autant plus important dans les émissions de GES dans le futur.
De nombreux leviers d’actions existent pour réduire les émissions du sec-
teur des transports. Les solutions sont différentes dans le type d’acteurs engagés,
le temps d’implémentation et le potentiel d’abattement. Dans ce secteur, il y a eu un
accent pus important aux solutions de type offre comme l’amélioration de l’effica-
cité énergétique des modes de transport ou l’usage de combustibles bas carbone. La
majorité des efforts de mitigation se concentrent sur un changement technologique.
Cette thèse se centre sur la transition des VL à des technologies qui améliore
la consommation de carburant.
Les externalités générées par les véhicules à combustibles fossiles ne sont pas
limitées au réchauffement climatique. Elles impactent aussi la pollution de l’air, le
bruit sonore, la sécurité routière et la congestion. Les niveaux actuels de pollution de
l’air dans les grandes aires urbaines de la planète dépassent les niveaux acceptables
pour une qualité d’air propre pour la santé des habitants. Des villes comme Paris,
Madrid, Beijing, New Delhi, Santiago de Chile et beaucoup d’autres souffrent de
nombreux décès liés à la pollution de l’air. Les décideurs publics à l’échelle locale et
nationale, inquiets par la qualité de l’air, prennent des actions pour introduire des
mesures pour limiter la pollution de l’air. L’attention principale de cette thèse porte
sur l’externalité liée au réchauffement climatique mais elle couvre aussi l’ externalité
liée à la pollution de l’air dans le Chapitre 5.
Cette thèse étudie les instruments politiques "push" qui agissent sur l’offre de
véhicules des constructeurs automobiles. Le centre d’attention de cette thèse est la
réglementation des émissions CO2 (CAFE dans la littérature en anglais) qui régulent
la moyenne des émissions CO2 des ventes de nouveaux véhicules d’un construc-
teur automobile à ne dépasser une cible réglementaire. Les plus grandes économies
mondiales ont toutes adoptées une version de la réglementation CAFE, notamment
la Chine, les Etats-Unis, l’UE et le Japon. Dans tous les cas, ces politiques imposent
une cible des émissions CO2 qui donnent un certain temps d’anticipation aux socié-
tés automobiles pour adapter leur portefeuille.
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Pour répondre à des cibles réglementaires contraignantes dans le futur, les
constructeurs automobiles doivent déployer des technologies bas carbone pour ré-
duire les émissions de dioxyde de carbone. Cependant l’adoption de nouvelles tech-
nologies fait face à plusieurs défis socio-techniques qui se traduisent par de l’iner-
tie économique. Par exemple, l’introduction de véhicules électriques a besoin d’un
changement de l’écosystème du véhicule qui va au-delà des technologies à l’inté-
rieur du véhicule. La transition du vecteur d’énergie qui passe des combustibles
fossiles à l’électricité a démontré d’être plus difficile que prévue à cause d’un éco-
système dominant basé sur les énergies fossiles qui a formé le comportement du
consommateur, l’infrastructure et les moyens de production qui prennent du temps
pour développer l’environnement du véhicule électrique. Ce processus est similaire
à des transitions socio-techniques vues dans le passé dans le secteur des transports
telles que la diffusion des automobiles pour remplacer les carrosses à cheval (GEELS,
2012). Notre approche est compatible avec les stratégies des sociétés qui ne font pas
souvent le pari d’investir massivement mais elles étalent les investissements dans le
temps pour développer une technologie d’une façon progressive.
L’objectif principal de cette thèse est d’analyser le choix du portefeuille de tech-
nologies d’un constructeur automobile qui anticipe les futures cible réglementaires
plus contraignantes. La première question de recherche est comment représenter
l’inertie économique? L’estimation de la vitesse de pénétration des technologies est
la clé pour déterminer à quelle vitesse un secteur peut se transformer. Dans cette
thèse, nous proposons un nouveau type de contrainte de diffusion qui limite la crois-
sance des parts de ventes d’une technologie en fonction des part des ventes passées
et d’une courbe de diffusion en "S". Nous traitons des scénarios de politiques envi-
ronnementales sur les émissions de VL d’un point de vue de l’offre où un construc-
teur choisit un mix technologique parmi un ensemble de technologies disponibles
pour répondre aux contraintes réglementaires de chaque scénario dans un environ-
nement où la demande résiste au changement.
Sur cette base, cette thèse examine l’effet de trois caractéristiques de la régle-
mentation CO2 sur la transformation du portefeuille technologique. Premièrement,
nous analysons l’impact de cibles réglementaires consécutives et la sévérité de la
contrainte sur les sentiers technologiques. Les cibles à court terme sont typiquement
connues, alors que les cibles à long terme sont souvent incertaines ou inconnues. Un
constructeur peut choisir d’anticiper parfaitement la cible à long terme, ou de procé-
der pas-à-pas en préparant seulement le court terme. Nous posons deux questions :
quelles sont les implications de différents types de stratégies pour préparer une ré-
glementation CO2 future? Et, une stratégie d’anticipation est-elle un facteur limitant
sur le potentiel d’abattement futur?
Nous montrons qu’une anticipation du futur focalisée sur les objectifs de court
terme peut empêcher l’atteinte de la cible à long terme. Respecter la cible à court
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terme n’est une condition ni nécessaire ni suffisante pour permettre le niveau d’émis-
sions requis par la cible à long terme. De plus si l’anticipation du futur n’est pas par-
faite, les choix technologiques vont être verrouillés dans des technologies à faible
potentiel d’abattement créant ainsi une dépendance au sentier qui limite l’abatte-
ment potentiel à long terme.
Deuxièmement, nous augmentons le détail de représentation de la réglementa-
tion CO2 avec l’introduction du paramètre d’indexation. Un paramètre d’indexation
donne un niveau d’exigence différent de la cible réglementaire selon une caracté-
ristique physique du véhicule telle que la masse ou l’emprunte au sol. L’objectif de
cette partie est de quantifier l’effet sur le portefeuille de technologies et le coût éco-
nomique d’une telle politique si elle n’est pas technologiquement neutre. Nous nous
interrogeons : Comment l’introduction du paramètre d’indexation impacte les choix
technologiques? Et, quelles sont les implications d’une réglementation CO2 basée
sur le mécanisme d’indexation sur la réduction des émissions?
Nous montrons qu’il n’existe pas de différence significative dans le coût social
de la mobilité entre les deux mécanismes de réglementation CO2 avec et sans in-
dexation sur la masse pour une même cible d’émissions. Cependant les choix tech-
nologiques entre ces mécanismes sont différents, la réglementation CO2 indexée à la
masse ne développe en aucun cas les technologies d’allègement.
Troisièmement, nous élargissons le périmètre de l’ensemble des instruments
politiques de cette étude pour inclure différents instruments qui régulent les exter-
nalités de réchauffement climatique et de pollution de l’air. Mise à part la réglemen-
tation CO2, nous modélisons quatre autres politiques sur les VL pour montrer la
diversité des mécanismes : un mandat de véhicule à zéro émissions (ZEV Mandate
en anglais), une réglementation sur les polluants locaux et deux types de zones à
faible émissions (LEZ en anglais). L’objectif est de montrer les interactions entre les
politiques pour identifier l’effet indépendant et combiné de l’application des poli-
tiques. Nous insistons sur : Quel est l’impact de la superposition de politiques sur
les choix technologiques? Comment l’interaction entre les politiques s’expriment et
dans quelle direction le portefeuille de technologies va-t-il évoluer? Quel est la per-
formance de l’ensemble de politiques sur deux dimensions des externalités des VL?
Nous montrons trois types d’impacts de la superposition de politiques. Pre-
mièrement, une politique technologiquement spécifique tel que le Mandat de Véhi-
cule à Zéro Émission en combinaison avec la réglementation CO2 provoque le dé-
veloppement de technologies vertes coûteuses et empêche les technologies sales et
peu coûteuses de disparaître. Dans le cas de l’application de la réglementation CO2
seule nous n’observons pas ce comportement. Deuxièmement, la superposition de
politiques peut mener à un coût élevé quand les technologies adaptées à chacune
des politiques sont très différentes. Troisièmement, nous trouvons un effet ambigu
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de la superposition de politiques relative à l’application d’une politique seule sur la
performance environnementale.
La réglementation CO2 joue le rôle central de cette thèse mais sous des pers-
pectives différentes pour montrer les implications de l’anticipation des cibles, les
failles du mécanisme de la réglementation et l’effet sur d’autres politiques dans
l’automobile. Chaque application de cette thèse partage deux aspects : elles traitent
toutes la réglementation CO2 et elles sont toutes basées sur le même modèle.
Le modèle de cette thèse n’est pas construit pour prédire comment un construc-
teur doit choisir les technologies, le modèle veut mettre en garde sur les aspects
de certains mécanismes des politiques qui peuvent mener une société à choisir une
mauvaise stratégie bas carbone.
La communauté scientifique a longtemps étudié les politiques bas carbone ap-
pliquées aux VL, nous contribuons à cette littérature en traitant trois points qui ont
été moins étudiés. Premièrement, la dynamique du choix technologique nous donne
les clefs pour identifier quand une solution technologique n’est pas assez compéti-
tive pour être développer et va être abandonner à posteriori. La sévérité et le timing
des politiques sont déterminants au moment de donner un signal fort aux socié-
tés à agir. Deuxièmement, la création de réglementations automobiles est le résultat
des discussions entre l’industrie, les autorités réglementaires et le public, cette dis-
cussion aboutie parfois en des instruments politiques imparfaits. L’indexation de
la réglementation CO2 est un exemple d’une telle imperfection, les régulateurs ont
besoin de suivre de près l’application de cette politique afin d’éviter des impacts
négatifs à propos de l’objectif politique. Troisièmement, les décideurs publics ont
créé des instruments politiques pour réguler les impacts des émissions des véhicules
séparément, chaque type d’externalité se traduit par un instrument politique diffé-
rent. Quand les constructeurs préparent un futur mix technologique, ils prennent
en compte toutes les contraintes réglementaires à la fois pour obtenir un produit
adaptés aux besoins.
Tout en reconnaissant la nature stylisée de l’approche pour représenter les mé-
canismes de choix technologiques sous des contraintes des scénarios politiques et
de diffusions des technologies, nous pouvons élaborer quelques implications de nos
résultats pour les constructeurs automobiles et les décideurs publics.
Implications pour un constructeur automobile
L’optimisation de chaque composant du véhicule pour réduire le coût afin
d’augmenter le profit a dictée le développement des savoir-faire de chaque sous-
système. Cette structure en silos favorise les améliorations incrémentales de la tech-
nologie dominante qui visent à retravailler une architecture existante. Les technolo-
gies disruptives qui changent la manière dont un constructeur est structuré créent
une discontinuité et nécessitent plus d’efforts pour se diffuser. Il n’existe pas de so-
lution unique pour résoudre tous les besoins, un compromis est toujours nécessaire
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pour obtenir un produit final compétitif et adapté au contexte réglementaire. Malgré
le succès de l’industrie sur le développement du véhicule thermique, elle fait face à
d’importants défis pour engager une transition bas carbone. L’évidence du passé
sur les transitions technologiques montre que les technologies disruptives se déve-
loppe rarement à l’intérieur du système dominant, elles se développent à l’extérieur
dans des niches qui vont trouver des applications dans le système dominant plus
tard. Quand nous étudions le potentiel d’une technologie bas carbone, la contrainte
sur la diffusion technologique est aussi une mesure de la vitesse de changement de
la structure existante du constructeur pour développer des véhicules bas carbones
pour le grand public.
Une société automobile développe un plan de business qui définit le porte-
feuille de technologies pour les cinq années à venir en général, avec une vision plus
précise pour les trois prochaines années. Cette anticipation court terme contraste
avec une ambition long terme des décideurs publics qui planifient une transition
bas carbone qui visent à limiter le réchauffement climatique à un maximum de 2oC
à la fin du siècle. Malgré ces signaux de long terme, la planification du futur du
constructeur automobile ne se passe que dans le court terme. Quand le contexte de
long terme n’est pas clair, un constructeur peut difficilement préparer le chemin. Ce
qui pourrais être un plan rentable pour la cible à court terme peut déboucher en un
portefeuille de technologies inadapté pour des cibles plus contraignantes qui vont
apparaître plus tard dans le futur. Un constructeur automobile a le choix de décider
si il prend en compte les signaux faibles de la politique à long terme pour antici-
per le changement technologique. Ou bien il peut attendre et voir comment le lobby
évolue et défendre un objectif moins ambitieux dans le futur. Le résultat de la pre-
mière application de cette étude, sur l’anticipation des cibles consécutives, met en
évidence le risque d’un verrou sur la stratégie qui ne prend pas en compte la cible à
long terme.
La réglementation CO2 indexée à la masse produit une incitation à développer
des technologies plus lourdes. L’allégement est le champ de technologie le plus pé-
nalisé. Le paramètre d’indexation peut créer un avantage, un obstacle ou être sans
effet sur les technologies de réduction des émissions. Quand un constructeur décide
d’exploiter les bénéfices de cette incitation, il risque de modifier la cible réglemen-
taire spécifique au lieu de réduire les émissions réelles des véhicules. Dans le cas
d’un changement réglementaire le constructeur qui a suivit le mécanisme d’incita-
tion sera en difficulté pour s’adapter à un nouvel cadre politique. L’indexation à la
masse de cette réglementation bénéficie les véhicules électriques qui émettent moins
et sont plus lourds, cependant au niveau du portefeuille on observe une décrois-
sance du développement des technologies incrémentales de véhicules thermiques.
Un constructeur qui développe une stratégie de commercialisation massive de vé-
hicules électriques va être favoriser par le cadre réglementaire à condition que les
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consommateurs adoptent des véhicules électriques en masse. Par contre un construc-
teur qui ciblent un développement incrémental des véhicules thermiques ne dépend
pas de l’adoption de véhicules électriques mais peut souffrir une cible réglementaire
plus sévère.
Nous avons identifié un effet similaire avec deux autres types de politiques,
le ZEV Mandate et une LEZ, elles sont deux politiques qui incitent aussi la diffu-
sion des véhicules électriques. La différence avec l’effet de l’indexation de la régle-
mentation à la masse est qu’il y a plusieurs chemins pour réduire les émissions au
lieu de développer une seule option qui est un quota minimum de véhicules à zéro
émission. Ces deux politiques de véhicules à zéro émissions envoient un signal fort
au développement de véhicules à zéro émissions, l’indexation de la réglementation
n’est pas un signal clair, les véhicules électriques sont favorisés dans le mécanisme
d’indexation parce qu’ils contribuent à une réduction des émissions et de la cible
réglementaire.
Quand différents instruments politiques se superposent pour réguler les émis-
sions de véhicules, les constructeurs doivent analyser quelles sont les solutions adap-
tées pour un cadre réglementaire multi-objectif. Il existe des technologies qui sont
plus ou moins adaptées pour répondre à un type d’externalité. La technologie qui
semble adaptée à une large source d’externalités est le véhicule électrique qui ne
produit pas des émissions à l’usage. Il n’existe pas encore des politiques automo-
biles qui prennent en compte les émissions du puits à la roue à l’exception de la taxe
au carburant. Il y a des combinaisons de politiques qui ont besoin de technologies
coûteuses pour respecter le cadre politique. C’est le cas de la réglementation sur les
émissions polluantes combinée avec avec la réglementation CO2. Pour respecter le
double enjeu sur les émissions des véhicules le mix de technologie actuel doit pro-
fondément changer . Aujourd’hui on observe un changement rapide dans le marché
automobile, en France la part des ventes du diesel a chuté de 70% en 2010 à 39% en
2018.
Implications pour les décideurs publics
Les politiques sur les émissions des véhicules ont le rôle de pousser les construc-
teurs à développer des technologies bas carbones et moins polluantes. Elles ont aussi
le rôle pour inciter les consommateurs à adopter ce type de technologie. Cette thèse
peut donner quelques implications sur ce premier rôle des politiques.
Déterminer les cibles réglementaires a besoin d’un analyse des trajectoires bas
carbone pour évaluer comment partager les efforts d’abattement parmis les sec-
teurs d’énergies. L’ambition politique de l’abattement des VL dépend de la vitesse
de changement du système énergétique dans l’ensemble de l’écosystème. L’objectif
à long terme peut être estimé par contre la vitesse de la transition du secteur est
un sujet de débat. Un décideur public doit proposer des cibles intermédiaires pour
orienter le changement technologique dans le futur proche, l’industrie a besoin d’un
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signal qui peut être interprété dans le contexte actuel. Etablir ces cibles intermé-
diaires doit équilibrer entre un changement technologique faisable à court terme et
une trajectoire compatible avec un objectif à long terme. En outre, dans les secteurs
énergétiques qui risquent d’avoir des technologies qui provoquent des verrous à
forte intensité de carbone il y a deux éléments qui ont besoin d’être contrôlés : le
respect de la cible réglementaire et comment ce secteur choisit les technologies pour
réduire les émissions. Ces deux élélements de contrôle sont nécessaires pour éviter
la création de verrous de technologies à forte intensité carbone.
Pour déterminer la cible intermédiaire le régulateur doit prendre en compte
les conséquences des choix technologiques à court terme sur les futurs choix tech-
nologiques à long terme. Déterminer la cible à court terme est une tâche difficile qui
a besoin d’une évaluation fine du potentiel d’abattement des technologies. Or cette
information appartient à l’industrie automobile ainsi le régulateur a seulement une
information partielle du potentiel technologique. De ce fait, la cible intermédiaire
peut être sous-estimé pour éviter une cible long terme trop ambitieuse selon des
estimations trop conservatrices des constructeurs. Du point de vue du monitorage,
nous alertons sur le fait de se centrer seulement sur la cible réglementaire qui peut
être un indicateur insuffisant pour suivre le changement structurel nécessaire pour
être amène à répondre à la cible de long terme. Ceci appelle à d’autres indicateurs
qui soient capables de suivre ces changements structurels.
Souvent les instruments politiques visent la neutralité technologique afin d’être
une politique économique efficace en laissant les sociétés choisir les technologies
mieux adaptés pour répondre à un objectif réglementaire. Cependant, le mécanisme
de la politique peut en pratique provoquer un biais pour une famille de technolo-
gies. Dans le cas de la réglementation CO2 indexée à la masse nous montrons ce
biais pour des technologies qui augmentent la masse du véhicule. Un instrument
peut ainsi fermer la porte prématurément à des technologies bas carbone promet-
teuses. Un équilibre entre des instruments politiques efficaces qui sont neutres et
des incitations en R&D sur des technologies spécifiques pour développer des niches
de marché est nécessaire dans les étapes initiales d’une transition bas carbone.
La superposition d’instruments politiques, avec différents objectifs, peut créer
des conséquences non désirées. Par exemple, nous avons montré que la combinaison
de la réglementation CO2 avec le ZEV Mandate peut provoquer une polarisation des
réduction des émissions en créant une flotte de nouveaux véhicules divisée en des
véhicules à zéro ou faibles émissions et des véhicules fortement émetteurs. En raison
d’une réglementation CO2 qui régule les émissions des véhicules neufs sous cycle
homologué qui ne reflète pas la condition réelle d’usage, il y a un risque d’obtenir
des émissions plus élevées que prévue. De plus, une telle polarisation peut causer
des inégalités entre les ménages et territoires qui ont un facilité d’achat différente de
véhicules à faible émissions.
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Le contexte politique dans l’automobile est une combinaison de différents ins-
truments qui ont des mécanismes distincts. Dans le cas des externalités du réchauf-
fement climatique et de la pollution de l’air, les acteurs impliqués pour chaque po-
litique sont différents et peuvent avoir des intérêts divergents. Certains acteurs sont
communs comme le constructeur automobile et les propriétaires de véhicules mais
les décideurs publics changent. De nombreux régulateurs et autorités publiques
mettent en place des politiques qui impactent les technologies des véhicules. La su-
perposition d’instruments politiques produit un effet sur le portefeuille de techno-
logies mais la superposition de décideurs publics est aussi un défi qui produit des
multiples débats simultanés sur différentes externalités. L’effort de coordination du
réseau d’acteurs est difficile pour corriger l’ensemble des défaillances du marché.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
Modern transportation has created a highly connected world that allows indi-
viduals to move and trade wherever they want. The current means of transporta-
tion, however, are mostly based on fossil fuels which produce severe environmental
challenges such as global climate change.
Road transportation is one of the main contributors of the transport sector to
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, 72% of worldwide transport emissions originate
by Heavy-Duty Vehicles (HDV) and Light-Duty Vehicles (LDV) (Sims et al., 2014).
The current trend of rapid motorization in developed countries (International Orga-
nization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), 2015) can increase the contribution
of road transportation to climate change in the absence of mitigation efforts.
There are many levers of action to reduce emissions from transportation. The
solutions differ in the type of actors involved, the time needed for implementation
and the abatement potential. In road transportation, there has been more emphasis
on supply-side solutions such as improvements of energy efficiency of transporta-
tion or the use of low carbon fuels. Most current mitigation efforts in road trans-
portation mitigation rely on technological change.
This thesis focuses on the transition of LDV to technologies that improve fuel
economy.
The externalities generated by fossil-fuel vehicles are not limited to climate
change. They also include air pollution, noise, road safety and traffic congestion.
Current levels of air pollution in highly populated areas all over the world exceed
the safe limits for clean air and are causing premature deaths in cities such as Paris,
Madrid, Beijing, New Delhi, Santiago de Chile and others. Local and national pol-
icymakers, worried about air quality, take action to introduce measures to limit air
pollution. Though, the main focus of this thesis is the climate externality, we also
address the air pollution externality in Chapter 5.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
This thesis investigates "push" policy instruments that act on the supply of ve-
hicles provided by car manufacturers. The main focus of this thesis is on the Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard which requires a minimum level of av-
erage fuel economy of new vehicle sales from car manufacturers. Major economies
have all adopted a version of a CAFE policy, including China, the USA, the EU
and Japan. In all cases, these policies impose a future fuel economy target that gives
some anticipation time for automotive firms to adapt their portfolio accordingly (see
section 1.2.4 for more details).
To meet a more stringent fuel economy target in the future, carmakers must
deploy low carbon technology to improve fuel economy. However, the adoption
of new technologies faces several socio-technical challenges that translate into eco-
nomic inertia. For example, the introduction of plug-in vehicles requires a change
in the vehicle ecosystem that goes beyond the on-board technology of a vehicle. The
change in fuel from fossil-fuels to electricity has proven to be more difficult than
expected, since the incumbent ecosystem of fossil-fuel based vehicles has shaped
consumer behavior, infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities that take time to
transition to the plug-in vehicle environment. Thus the transition process is similar
to socio-technical transitions seen in the past in the transportation sector such as the
diffusion of automobiles to replace horse-carriages (Geels, 2012).
The main goal of this thesis is to analyze the choice of the technology portfolio
for an automotive firm when required to anticipate future and more stringent fuel
economy standards. The first research question is how to represent economic iner-
tia? Estimating the rate of penetration of technologies is key to determine how fast a
sector can transform. In this thesis, we propose a novel type of diffusion constraint
that limits the sales share growth of a technology according to past sales share and a
S-curve diffusion function.
On this basis, this thesis examines the effect of three characteristics of the fuel
economy standard on the transformation of the technology portfolio. First, we an-
alyze the impact of consecutive fuel economy targets and their relative degree of
stringency on technology paths. Near-term targets are typically certain, while the
long-term targets are often uncertain or unknown. A firm can choose to fully an-
ticipate the long-term target, or to proceed in a step-wise fashion by focusing only
on the near-term target. We ask: what are the implications of the different anticipa-
tion strategies to prepare for a fuel economy standard? Is the anticipation strategy a
limiting factor for future abatement potential?
Second, we increase the detail of representation of the fuel economy standard
to include the index parameter. An index parameter sets a different level of strin-
gency of the target according to a physical characteristic of the vehicle such as ve-
hicle mass or footprint. The objective is to quantify the effect on the portfolio of
technologies and the economic cost of such a policy when the policy is not neutral.
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We ask: how does the introduction of an index parameter affects technology choices?
What are the implications for emission reduction of an indexed based fuel economy
standard?
Third, we widen the scope of the policy package of this study to include mul-
tiple policies that regulate the climate change and air pollution externalities. The
goal is to show the interactions of policies to identify the effect of single and com-
bined policy applications. We ask: what is the impact of overlapping policies on
technology choices? How does the interaction between policies occur and in what
direction does the portfolio evolve? How does a policy package perform on the two
dimension of LDV externalities?
The goal of the present Chapter is threefold. First, it presents the environmen-
tal impacts of road transportation, the key issues related to fuel economy standards
and the literature review (Section 1.2). Second, Section 1.3 focuses on three selected
policy issues that are successively addressed in this thesis: path dependency, pol-
icy neutrality and superposition of policies. Last, this Chapter describes the method
adopted on the thesis, the institutional framework within which it was written, and
the other related academic and non academic work done during this Research (Sec-
tion 1.4).
1.2 Passenger Vehicle Externalities, Technical Solutions and
Mitigation Policies
This section provides an overview of the externalities associated with passen-
ger vehicles, of the technical solutions available, and of the mitigation policies. We
begin by describing the climate change implications of vehicle emissions. The nega-
tive consequences of road transportation however are not limited to climate change,
as described in section 1.2.1. A brief overview of mitigation options in the transport
sector is provided in section 1.2.3, before focusing in the technologies that improve
fuel economy in LDV. The policy instruments to improve fuel efficiency in LDV are
described in section 1.2.4. We conclude this section by mapping the literature gap
on policy studies in the automotive market that this thesis tries to fill.
1.2.1 Climate Change and the other externalities associated with Road
Transport
The indisputable increase of earth’s temperature is caused by human activity
emitting Greenhouse Gases (GHG) into the atmosphere. Without any change cli-
mate change might lead to an increase in temperature of a range of 2.5 to 8ºC from
pre-industrial temperatures. The main sectors that contribute to GHG emissions are
Electricity and heat production, Agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU),
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Industry and Transport. The transport sector accounted for 14 % of total GHG emis-
sions in 2010 according to the IPCC, 2014. The contribution of the transport sector
to GHG emissions varies depending on the region, in Western Europe the weight of
the transport sector is about 20% and in France in particular is 28.5% in 2014 (Min-
istère de la Transition Écologique et Solidaire, 2018). The share of transport in GHG
is growing especially in non-OECD countries where motorization grows every year
(Sims et al., 2014) (Fig. 1.1). Motorization is still increasing in OECD countries de-
spite the fact that levels of motorization are already high.
The main contribution to climate change comes from carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions caused by combustion of fossil fuels. All modes of transportation are
source of CO2 emissions with road transportation representing 72% of a total of 7
GtCO2eq of direct and indirect emissions in 2010 worldwide (Sims et al., 2014). Most
of road transportation is powered by fossil fuels such as gasoline, diesel and gas.
LDV are the most common mode of transportation in developed countries (Schafer,
1998; Schafer and David G Victor, 2000; Sims et al., 2014) and the most consuming of
fossil fuels among passenger transportation. At the same time, the worldwide fleet
of LDV is increasing as developing countries use more LDV in a context of popula-
tion and economic growth. We focus our research on this transportation mode.
FIGURE 1.1 – Motorization rate in 2015 and increase from 2005 world-
wide. Source: OICA,2015.
We briefly discuss the other externalities associated with road transport. The
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origin of these externalities is due to the intensive use of vehicles and the large vol-
ume of LDV on roads (Ian W. H Parry, Walls, and Harrington, 2007; Santos et al.,
2010).
— Traffic congestion causes delays on urban trips and wasted productive time.
Traffic congestion is highest during peak hours and is a major problem of
highly motorized cities such as Los Angeles or Sao Paulo. A high number
of idle vehicles during peak hours in large urban roads are also a major
source of local air pollutants. Some urban shapes can produce bottlenecks
that make traffic congestion worse.
— Despite many safety improvements on board and in roads, traffic accidents
are still responsible for fatalities and injuries. In many developing coun-
tries where vehicles are less secure and road infrastructure for safe travel is
not guaranteed, road accidents are among the top reasons of fatalities. The
road transport related fatalities affect passenger vehicles, two- and three-
wheelers, buses, taxis, bicycles and pedestrians.
— Noise from road traffic is a nuisance due to engine acceleration, tire contact
and braking. It affects pedestrians and other road users (Lemp and Kock-
elman, 2008; Calthrop and Proost, 1998). Noise is proportional to the traffic
density, speed and type of road. Some highways near urban areas have
sound barriers to decrease noise affecting those living close to the road.
— Space allocation to parking and road infrastructure can be an externality
if it leads to urban sprawl and if this space could be used for green-space
and buildings (Lemp and Kockelman, 2008). Passenger vehicles can mo-
nopolize the use of urban space to the point of making urban areas vehicle
dependent. In some cases, road vehicle becomes the only mean of trans-
portation possible.
— Fossil fueled vehicles rely on oil imports when the local supply is not suf-
ficient or not existent. This energy dependence on oil might translate into
an energy security issue thus causing an externality on energy provision.
— Other environmental externalities can be associated to LDV if the entire life
cycle is considered. For instance, the manufacturing process of vehicles can
lead to damages on natural resources such as water and soil pollution from
disposal of pollutants. Other sources of environmental damages exist at
the oil extraction process.
— Local air pollution externality is due to vehicle emissions from vehicle en-
gines or vehicle tires. Nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), hy-
drocarbons (HC) and particle matter (PM) emissions cause a health risk
when a person is exposed to high concentrations of these gases during
long periods. In urban areas that have a large vehicle fleet in a small geo-
graphical area air pollutant concentrations tend to rise beyond safe limits
of exposure. Unlike carbon dioxide, local air pollutants produce immedi-
ate effects in peak emissions events when local conditions such as weather,
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topography and urban traffic change the natural diffusion of these gases.
Local air pollution causes premature deaths and respiratory diseases, thereby
cutting lives short, increasing medical costs and reducing productivity through work-
ing days lost across the economy. Overall, PM with a diameter of 2.5 µm or less
(PM2.5) were responsible for about 391 000 premature deaths in the EU-28 (Guer-
reiro et al., 2018). Road transport’s contribution to local air pollution is significant:
39 % of NOx, 10 % of PM10 and 11 % of PM2.5 in EU-28 in 2016 (Guerreiro et al.,
2018).
The literature on LDV air pollution is recent. It has increased after the so-
called Dieselgate in 2015. Assessments on tail-pipe emissions agree that on-road
emissions are several times higher than emissions registered by type approval pro-
cedures, which regulate the market, especially for diesel cars (Weiss et al., 2012; Ti-
etge et al., 2017; Baldino et al., 2017). A general evaluation of the impact of vehicle’s
emissions on air pollution is difficult since pollution is higher where the concentra-
tion of gases is higher (unlike carbon emissions that act globally). Although there
are local measurements of air pollutants in urban areas and non urban areas, a sep-
arate assessment by source is more difficult. Recent literature is trying to fill this
gap, Degraeuwe et al., 2017 analyze the impact of NOx car emissions on 8 European
cities finding that impact of LDV on NOX emissions depend on diesel share, road
traffic intensity and other sources of pollution and S. Zhang et al., 2014 on Beijing
that studies the trend of vehicle emissions to show that heavy-duty diesel vehicles
have partly offset the reduction of NOX emissions from light-duty gasoline vehicles.
In this thesis we focus for the most part on the climate externality.
1.2.2 Overview of Mitigation Options in the Transport Sector
To limit climate change, GHG emissions need to be reduced from all sectors.
Most nations in the world have committed to the Paris Climate agreement to keep
temperature increase below 2ºC compared to pre-industrial times. Mitigation ac-
tions can be classified in three main categories: avoid, shift and improve (F. Creutzig,
Roy, et al., 2018) (Table 1.1).
In the context of transport mitigation policies (first row of Table 1.1), this classi-
fication translates into measures that aim at (i) avoiding the need of travel, (ii) shift-
ing travel to lowest-carbon mode, and (iii) improving vehicles to be more energy-
efficient and fuels to be less carbon-intensive. Another classification of mitigation so-
lutions distinguishes supply-side solutions, that involve technological change to low
carbon innovations, and demand side solutions that require consumers to change
their behavior. Demand-side solutions have high potential but have not gathered
the same level of attention from the scientific community as technological supply-
side solutions (F. Creutzig, Fernandez, et al., 2016).
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Sector Service Avoid Shift Improve
Transport Accessibility
Mobility
Integrate transport and
land-use planning Smart
logistics Teleworking
Compact cities
Mode shift from
car to cycling,
walking or public
transit
Electric two, three and
four-wheelers
Eco-driving Smaller,
light-weight vehicles
Building Shelter
Passive house or retrofit
(avoiding demand for
heating/cooling) Change
temperature set-points
Heat pumps,
district heating
and cooling
Combined heat
and power
Invertor air
conditioning
Condensing boiler
Incremental insulation
options Energy-efficient
appliances.
Manufactured
products ans
services
Clothing Ap-
pliances
Long-lasting fabric,
appliances, sharing
economy Eco-industrial
parks, circular economy
Shift to recycled
materials,
low-carbon
materials for
buildings and
infrastructure
Use of low-carbon fabrics
New manufacturing
processes and equipment
use
Food Nutrition
Calories in line with
daily needs Food waste
reduction
Shift from
ruminant meat to
other protein
sources where
appropriate
Reuse food waste
Smaller, efficient fridges
Healthy fresh food to
replace processed food
TABLE 1.1 – Illustrative "avoid-shift-improve" options in different
sectors and services. Source: F. Creutzig, Roy, et al., 2018
.
In a more practical perspective, transport mitigation can be achieved by reduc-
ing (i) mobility demand, (ii) the amount of energy needed for propelling a vehicle
over a given distance, or (iii) the carbon intensity of transport fuels or (iv) by shifting
to less carbon-intensive modes (B. F. Creutzig et al., 2015) (Fig. 1.2 and eq. 1.1).
Total GHG Emissions = ∑
Modal Shares
∑
Fuels
[Fuel Carbon Intensity ∗Energy Intensity ∗Activity]
(1.1)
The different types of modal shares include road transport, rail, air and sea.
These modes of transportation depend on the urban form, the transport infrastruc-
ture and the behavioral choice between modes. The available fuels vary in their
carbon content, direct and indirect emissions of fuels should be taken into account
to access the carbon emissions per unit of energy delivered. Energy intensity de-
pends on the mean of transportation and the occupation rate. Finally, road transport
emissions account for all type of activities: passenger and freight. This thesis will
focus on the Energy Intensity and Fuel Switching levers of Light Duty Vehicles.
1.2.3 Technical options for limiting Light Duty Vehicles emissions: An
Overview
So far, the mitigation solutions to reduce carbon emissions from vehicles have
been focused on fuel economy technologies. All main components of a passenger
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Decomposition
 Factors
Physical 
Units
Examples
System-
Infrastructure
Modal Choice
p-km mode / p-km 
total
Urban Form
Transport 
Infrastructure 
(Roads, Rail, 
Airports)
Behavioural Choice 
between Modes 
(Speed, Comfort, 
Cost, Convenience)
Fuel Carbon 
Intensity
tCO2eq / km
Diesel
Gasoline
CNG/LPG
Biofuels
Electricity
Hydrogen
Energy Intensity
MJ / p-km
MJ / t-km
Light Duty Vehicles, 
2- /3-Wheelers
Heavy Duty Vehicles
Trains
Aircraft
Ships and Boats
Cycling/Walking
Occupancy/ Loading 
Activity
p-km total
t-km total
Number of Journeys
Journey Distance
Journey Avoidance 
(Combining Trips, 
Video Conferencing, 
etc.)
Total GHG Emissions
FIGURE 1.2 – Direct transport GHG emission reduction for each mode
and fuel type options decomposed into activity, energy intensity, fuel
carbon intensity and system infrastructure and modal choice. Source:
Sims et al., 2014
.
vehicle consume some energy, thus energy efficiency has steered technology innova-
tion since the first fuel economy policies. In parallel, average modern vehicles have
become more powerful than their predecessors therefore vehicles are today more
energy efficient but also more powerful. To achieve this double objective, carmakers
have explored solutions in all vehicle components from tires to engine friction. Every
category of energy consumption has experienced some improvement: the average
mass of vehicle has been reduced or optimized to get a higher power to mass ratio,
the aerodynamic drag coefficient has been reduced through better design and lower
profile vehicles, the tire rolling resistance has been improved to get better traction
and less energy losses at the point of contact with the road, engines have introduced
all kind of improvements to the energy cycle to obtain the maximum energy from
combustion, new low carbon fuels have been introduced and new engine config-
urations with battery powered vehicles are an alternative to traditional powertrain
configurations. All other appliances on board have experienced an improved energy
efficiency to reduce energy demand as well.
The Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) has been the foundation stone of the
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car industry since the first car introduced in the XIXth century. Today, the main en-
gine types are the spark ignition engine based on gasoline or a mixture of gasoline
with ethanol and the self ignition engine based on diesel or bio-diesels. Other alter-
natives of ICE are available replacing gasoline and diesel with compressed natural
gas or liquefied petroleum gas. Despite the long history of ICE, the technology has
progressively evolved and today there are improvements in the process of combus-
tion of fuels with better design for ignition, exhaust control and improved air fuel
mixture for better combustion. One of the many developments is the use of a tur-
bocharger that uses engine’s exhaust gas force to deliver compressed air to the com-
bustion chamber. New materials and electronic controls are capable of adapting to
different regimes and reducing fuel combustion. Current developments on ICE are
still improving the thermodynamic efficiency of the engine with electric turbo, cylin-
der deactivation and direct injection. The energy efficiency frontier is being pushed
beyond limits. We show in Figure 1.3 the different powertrain configurations that
have been created to reduce carbon emissions. As illustrated, the baseline ICE (top
left) is progressively equipped with an electric motor and battery, each step down in
the figure representing a step further to full electrification of the powertrain.
The key limitation of ICE is that is only capable of storing and recuperating
energy in the form of kinetic energy in the engine free wheel. This potential is small,
and limited to certain conditions. To improve energy efficiency, the driving patterns
are the center of electrified ICE that include a conventional ICE with a small electric
motor and battery. This innovation is based on the electric start conveyor belt system
that uses a battery and a electric motor to start all ICE and charge the battery. Electri-
fied ICE go a step forward, the brake energy that would have been lost is converted
to electricity by the electric motor that acts as a generator and stores energy in a bat-
tery for later use. There are many different possible architectures that vary in electric
power, type of electric motor, store capacity, in line or parallel configuration. The ap-
plications to the driving patterns are diverse, and we only cite two here: a stop-start
functionality that allows a vehicle to turn off the engine when the vehicle is stopped
and start the engine back on to continue the ride, and a coasting functionality that
allows a vehicle to operate at constant speed with an electric motor.
Today all ICE technologies are combined with advanced transmission tech-
nologies that improve efficiency by moving the fuel consumption to the best per-
formance regime of the engine according to the engine map (Fig. 1.3, first row).
To improve how power is delivered to wheels, transmission technologies focus on
avoiding torque losses when shifting gears and being responsive when more power
is needed. To do so engineers have improved the transmission mechanism to de-
crease energy losses and have also increased the number of gears to deliver more
torque to wheels. Some of the recent developments are dual-clutch transmission,
continuous variable transmission, automatic transmissions including more than 6
gears and electric transmissions that reduce torque loss when changing gears with
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ICE Advanced ICE 
Electric 
Plug-in 
Hybrid
Mild-Hybrid 
Parallel
Full HybridMild-Hybrid 
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Hydrogen 
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Electric Motor
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Fuel Cell
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FIGURE 1.3 – Powertrain configuration of Automotive technologies
to reduce CO2 emissions. The CO2 tail-pipe emissions order of each
configuration is shown on the Y-axis. Source: The Author.
an electric motor.
The increasing storing and regenerating capacity of ICE that works on 12-Volts
or 48-Volts create a new family of engines called mild-hybrids, seen as a transition
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stage in the electrification of engines (Fig. 1.3, second row). The 12V and 48V fam-
ilies of engines can have the following configurations: parallel or series 1. A full-
hybrid or Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV) has a new function that allows all electric
drive under certain conditions. This type of engine is no longer in R&D phase, Toy-
ota has been selling the Prius HEV since 1997. The limitation of an HEV is battery
capacity. In order to increase the potential of the electric motor, electric power and
battery storage capacity had to be improved. With new battery technology that al-
lows an increase in energy density that converts to higher energy capacity at the
same weight, car manufacturers were able to produce Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehi-
cles (PHEV) (Fig.1.3, third row). Some PHEV are optimized for an all electric use
that will have an electric motor with an equivalent ICE of approximately the same
power thus producing higher energy efficiency. However the architecture of a PHEV
is more complex since it will integrate all ICE parts and all the Electric motor system.
The technological frontier on low carbon vehicles contains two solutions that
have zero tail pipe emissions: Battery powered Electric Vehicles (BEV) and Fuel Cell
Hydrogen Electric Vehicles (FCEV) (Fig. 1.3, bottom row). Both technologies use
electric motors and electric energy to move the vehicle however the energy storage
physics is different. In a BEV battery cells are combined to store a large electro-
chemical potential that can be charged or used to drive the electric motor. The FCEV
has a hydrogen tank that is combined to a fuel-cell that converts hydrogen gas to
electricity which produces only water and heat. While a BEV can be compatible
with the existing electric network with the installation of public and private charging
points, the FCEV can not, it requires a new hydrogen infrastructure to be deployed
which is the main challenge of this technology. Today only a few car manufacturers
are commercializing FCEV with limited models whereas BEV are commercialized
by many car manufacturers and an increasing number of models is available. The
battle of new BEVs focuses mostly on speed of charge: how much time to fully
charge the battery? and the autonomy of the vehicle: how many km can a vehicle
be driven with a full battery? The new technology solutions develop batteries with
more energy storage and capable of charging at higher power input.
With the commercialization of BEV new possibilities to further explore miti-
gation solutions have emerged. From a power energy distribution point of view a
BEV is an energy consumer that can move to different charging points. However it
can also store energy in batteries to be transferred to the grid for later use, when the
energy transfer is limited to home appliances this system is named Vehicle to Home
(V2H) and when the energy transfer is directed to the entire grid this is named Ve-
hicle to Grid (V2G). In a context where energy demand is predictable but renewable
1. A parallel configuration means that power output from the ICE engine and the electric motor
is combined through a belt or gear whereas a series configuration means that output from the the ICE
engine and the electric motor are added on the same shaft
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energies are intermittent, BEV could store energy when renewable energy produc-
tion is high and vice-versa they could provide energy when the electricity produc-
tion is low. With the recent and future developments of battery cells and network
systems, V2G and V2H become less costly and more efficient to manage the energy
demand and supply dynamics.
The BEV has suffered critics that the Life-Cycle Emissions are higher than con-
ventional engines due to indirect emissions of electric generation (J. R. Woo, Choi,
and Ahn, 2017). This critic holds when the electric mix relies mostly on fossil fu-
els and coal which is the case in India and China but in regions where the carbon
content of electricity is low: Brazil, EU and Japan an electric vehicle can effectively
reduce emissions (Audoly et al., 2018). If the electric mix reduces its carbon intensity
where it is still high then an electric vehicle becomes suited for sustainable low car-
bon transportation. Thus the benefits of a BEV can only be enhanced if the vehicle
is integrated to the grid nonetheless location and time of charge are two elements to
consider when deploying a BEV (Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson, 2015). The BEV
has also been pointed to have two more environmental impacts: metal depletion
(specific chemical elements used in batteries) and water pollution (C. Bauer et al.,
2015; Hawkins et al., 2012).
Technology solutions developed by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)
and suppliers are important to increase energy efficiency of vehicles. All R&D efforts
require costly investments that are executed when the industry sees a clear future in
a technology. More generally speaking, to provide the suitable conditions for R&D
investments that correct market failures of road transportation, policymakers incen-
tivize the industry to seek technology improvements that reduce vehicle’s external-
ities. Next section describes the policy instruments that have been implemented so
far in various jurisdictions.
1.2.4 Policy Instruments for Sustainable Passenger Vehicles Transporta-
tion
The negative externalities described above have inspired policymakers to both
push carmakers to produce vehicles causing less environmental harm and pull pub-
lic to adopt low carbon means of transportation. Policy instruments to regulate envi-
ronmental externalities are traditionally classified into two main groups: command-
and-control policies such as fuel economy standards and incentive policies such as
fiscal policy instruments. We focus on the set of policy instruments that regulate
vehicle’s emissions. Policy instruments based on vehicle emissions are summarized
in Table 1.2.
Incentive policies can be divided into two groups: incentives on vehicle pur-
chase and incentives on vehicle usage. Vehicle purchase can be oriented via a feebate
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scheme, meaning fees + rebates based on the vehicle emissions level (Soren T Ander-
son, Ian W H Parry, and James M Sallee, 2011; Greene, Patterson, et al., 2005; Fischer,
Harrington, and Ian W H Parry, 2007; Liu, Greene, and Bunch, 2014; Haan, Mueller,
and Scholz, 2009). This incentive encourages manufacturers to build more efficient
vehicles, by rewarding consumers who purchase more efficient vehicles. The essen-
tial elements of a feebate are: a pivot point that divides the vehicles charged with a
fee from those receiving a rebate and a rate of fee or rebate depending on vehicle’s
emissions. In France, it is named "bonus-malus". It appeared in 2008, it has been
adapted through the years by moving the pivot point, changing the configuration of
fees and rebates according to the CO2 emissions based categories and changing the
maximum penalty and subsidy. More than 16 European countries have some form
of CO2 or fuel consumption tax on LDV (Mahlia, Tohno, and Tezuka, 2013). One of
the characteristic of a feebate program is that it can be autonomous from the national
budget if the subvention on low emission vehicles is founded by the tax revenue on
high emission vehicles.
Sometimes government incentives for low carbon vehicles are present with-
out an equivalent dedicated fuel consumption purchase fee for high carbon vehi-
cles (Sen, Noori, and Tatari, 2017; Hardman et al., 2017). Conversely, there can be
only a penalty for high carbon vehicles, with a gas guzzler tax (Greene, Patterson,
et al., 2005; James M Sallee and Slemrod, 2012; Mahlia, Tohno, and Tezuka, 2013).
To incentivize vehicle renewal with new and more efficient vehicles some countries
have scrapping incentives, for example the UK (Brand, Anable, and Tran, 2013),
France, Australia, California, China, Italy, Japan, Turkey, Germany and other coun-
tries (Mahlia, Tohno, and Tezuka, 2013). Scrappage schemes typically focus on vehi-
cles that are more than a decade old or lack emission control technology such as the
first generation of Diesel vehicles.
On a vehicle’s lifetime, there are several policy instruments that regulate vehi-
cle’s usage: fuel taxes (Soren T Anderson, Ian W H Parry, and James M Sallee, 2011;
Aghion et al., 2016; Tscharaktschiew, 2015) paid each time the vehicle consumes a
liter/gallon of fuel 2, vehicle ownership taxes (ACEA, 2017) paid once a year or every
other year where a tax is based on the carbon emissions and/or emission standard
of a vehicle and vehicle km travelled taxation.
Command-and-control policies in the transport sector often come in the form
of regulatory standards. This instrument takes the form of a technical rule imposed
on firms, and characterized by a mandatory policy target or norm. To reduce fuel
carbon intensity, low carbon fuel standards (LCFS) promote the use of biofuels (Ian
W. H Parry, Walls, and Harrington, 2007; Santos et al., 2010). For example, Brazil has
based its low carbon fuel strategy on a mandatory blend of gasoline and bio ethanol
obtained from sugar cane plantations and promoted the use of flex-fuel vehicles
2. More stringent fuel tax can cause political resistance from consumers as seen in France where
an increase in oil price coincided with an increase in tax that resulted in protests.
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Policy Type Scale Mechanism Technology Specific / Neu-
tral
Low carbon fuel standard Command-and-control National Applied to fuel suppliers:
lowering carbon intensity of
fuel
Neutral
CAFE Command-and-control National Applied to car manufactur-
ers: increasing energy effi-
ciency of vehicles
Partially Neutral*
ZEV Mandate Command-and-control National Minimum quota of ZEV for
car manufacturers
Technology Specific
Emission Standard Command-and-control National Minimum requirement of
emission limits for all vehi-
cles
Neutral **
Feebate Incentive-based National Fees and Rebates of vehicle
price for high and low emit-
ting vehicles respectively
Neutral
Scrapping scheme Incentive-based National Subvention on new vehicle
purchase when scrapping an
old vehicle
Neutral
Fuel tax Incentive-based National Tax on fuel suppliers Neutral ***
Ownership tax Incentive-based National Tax on vehicle owners paid
once a year based on vehi-
cle’s emissions
Neutral
LEZ Command-and-control Local Circulation restriction of
high emitters from city-
centers or urban areas
Technology Specific
TABLE 1.2 – Summary of Main Policy Instruments based on vehicle’s
emissions. *When the fuel economy standard is indexed to a param-
eter there is an incentive to comply with the target by changing the
vehicle characteristic according to the index parameter.**The EURO
standard has treated Diesel and Gasoline vehicles differently with less
severe standards for Diesel vehicles. In latest standards this gap is re-
ducing and the policy goal is to eliminate this gap.***Some countries
have different fuel tax level for Gasoline and Diesel. In France Diesel
had a lower tax than Gasoline. Source: The Author.
adapted to accept gasoline or ethanol (Stattman, Hospes, and Mol, 2013). LCFS re-
quire the average lifecycle fuel carbon intensity to improve over the years. The goal
of the policy is to introduce low carbon fuels instead of traditional fuels. Lepitzki
and Axsen, 2018 show that when combined with other vehicle standards it has an
additive effect which is higher in the freight sector.
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard first implemented in
the USA after the oil crisis in the 1970’s is applied to car manufacturers. A firm is
required to have new vehicle sales with an average fuel economy above the enacted
target. If a firm fails to comply, it is subject to monetary fines. A CAFE standard is set
between 5 to 10 years in advance to allow carmakers to develop low carbon vehicles
and be compliant with more stringent targets. There is an increasing number of
markets that are implementing a CAFE policy and the stringency of the policy is
also growing in time. However there is still a wide gap between the leaders in fuel
economy in 2015 such as Japan and the EU and India, and the back of the pack with
countries such as China, South Africa and the US see Fig.1.4. The historic trend tell
us that countries with poor fuel economy in the past are capable to catch up with
others for example South Korea has done it in the past and plans to become one of
the leaders.
The mechanism of CAFE has little variations such as (i) the base driving test
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TABLE 1.3 – Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Vehicles main
vehicle markets. *JC08: Japanese test Cycle. Source: ICCT, 2017
Country or Region Index Parameter Unadjusted Target Target Year Test Cycle
Brazil Mass 1.82 MJ/km 2017 U.S. Combined
Canada Footprint 217 gCO2/km 2016 U.S. Combined
China Mass 5 L/100km 2020 NEDC
EU Mass 95 gCO2/km 2021 NEDC to WLTP
India Mass 113 gCO2/km 2022 NEDC
Japan Mass 20.3 km/L 2020 JC08* to WLTP
Mexico Footprint 39.3 mpg or 140 gCO2/km 2016 U.S. Combined
Saudi Arabia Footprint 17km/L 2020 U.S. Combined
South Korea Mass 24km/L or 97 gCO2/km 2020 U.S. Combined
U.S. Footprint 55.2 mpg or 146 gCO2/mi 2015 U.S. Combined
cycle, supposed to represent the typical usage of a car with a standard driving pro-
file, (ii) the credits for off cycle technologies that are not fully captured in the emis-
sion test such as LED lights, (iii) the supercredits for low carbon vehicles allowing to
count a zero emission vehicle more times on the average emissions of a firm, (iv) the
metrics of the standard: fuel economy (mpg) , energy intensity (MJ/km) or carbon
emissions (gCO2/km) and the index parameter: vehicle mass or footprint. In Table
4.1 we show the differences in CAFE policies around the world.
Most of the literature on fuel economy standards is based on the U.S. case
where it was introduced after the oil crisis in the 1970’s.
The main specificity of the U.S. CAFE standard is that it determines fuel-
economy target based on the footprint (wheelbase by track width) of vehicles, such
that larger vehicles have less stringent fuel-economy target. This design of the policy
introduces what some authors flag as a "loophole", because it creates a manufacturer
incentive to increase vehicle size in place of implementing fuel-saving technology
features to their vehicles; therefore reducing the stringency of the target and result-
ing in increased fleet-wide gasoline consumption and emissions. One of the key
question explored in the literature has been to assess how much the CAFE leads to
modify vehicle dimensions, implement fuel-saving technology features in internal
combustion engine vehicles (ICEV) or increase the market share of alternative fuel
vehicles, in particular electric vehicles. Using an agent-based model, Sen, Noori, and
Tatari, 2017 showed that manufacturers tend to comply with the CAFE standards by
changing the design of ICEV. With a representation of detailed vehicle specifications
and wide ranges of scenarios for consumer preferences, Ullman, 2016, Whitefoot and
Skerlos, 2012 and Shiau, Michalek, and Hendrickson, 2009 show that the footprint-
based standards create an incentive to increase vehicle size. The order of magnitude
of the resulting increased emissions is 5-15% compared to a standard with no indexa-
tion on the footprint. Klier and Linn, 2016b and Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos, 2017
add an additional dimension to the analysis, considering design trade off with other
vehicles attributes (horsepower, torque, acceleration) implied by CAFE standards.
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They provide empirical evidence that the standards have affected the direction of
technology adoption and that producers reduced horsepower, torque and acceler-
ation to achieve compliance. This effect mitigated incentives to shift sales toward
larger vehicles.
On the issue of size increase, implied by footprint based targets, some authors
explored the security implications (Bento, Gillingham, and Roth, 2017; Jacobsen,
2013). They find empirical evidence that CAFE standards reduced the mean weight
of vehicles, while increasing the dispersion of weights in the fleet. The lowered mean
weight dominated the effect on security, such that CAFE standards have reduced
accident fatalities.
A few studies focus on other specificities in the design of the CAFE standard,
in particular bonuses associated with certain technologies that allow automakers to
meet less stringent target. Jenn, Azevedo, and Michalek, 2016 analyzed the effect
of bonuses that give incentives to sell alternative fuel vehicles (AFV). They quan-
tify the additional emissions associated with this bonus, amounting to up to 60 tons
of CO2 per AVF sold, compared to a case without the bonus. Soren T. Anderson
and James M. Sallee, 2011 exploit another "loophole", as they call it, in the standards
to estimate cost of compliance. Automakers get a bonus when they equip vehicles
with flexible-fuel capacity. Soren T. Anderson and James M. Sallee, 2011 assume
that profit-maximizing firms will equate the marginal cost of compliance with the
standard using the bonus, which is observable, with the unobservable costs of tech-
nologies to improve fuel economy. They estimate compliance costs between $9 and
$27 per vehicle in years just before 2011.
Finally, some studies adopt a prospective approach and project the effect of
tightening CAFE standard at the 2025 horizon (Xie and Lin, 2017; Nicholas Lutsey,
2012; Liu, Greene, and Bunch, 2014; Luk, Saville, and Maclean, 2016). They find that
the technology adoption (of fuel efficiency technologies and alternative fuel vehicles)
is likely to play a larger role with the increased stringency in the standard.
There are also studies on CAFE standards in other countries and regions: in
Europe (German and Nic Lutsey, 2010; Thiel et al., 2016; Skeete, 2017; Klier and Linn,
2016a; Klier and Linn, 2016b; Yeh, Witcover, et al., 2016), in Japan (Ito and James M
Sallee, 2017), in China (Wang et al., 2018; X. Zhang and Bai, 2017), in South Korea
(J. Woo et al., 2017), in Brazil (Augustus et al., 2018), in ASEAN countries (Silitonga,
Atabani, and Mahlia, 2012) and a review of passenger car emission standards and
taxation measures in G20 countries by Yang, Mock, et al., 2017.
The Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Mandate is an air pollution measure that
the state California put in place to deploy low emission vehicles (Sykes and Axsen,
2017; Sierzchula and Nemet, 2015; Greene, Park, and Liu, 2014; Wesseling, Farla, and
Hekkert, 2015; Collantes and Sperling, 2008). The policy requires manufacturers to
deliver a mandatory share of ZEVs per year registered as ZEV credits. These credits
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FIGURE 1.4 – Historical fleet CO2 emissions performance, and current
standards targets in dashed lines (gCO2/km normalized to NEDC) for
passenger cars. Source: Yang and Bandivadekar, 2017.
work like a bank system where a car manufacturer can owe, lend and distribute the
credits with other OEM firms. The system includes also a possible conversion of
ZEV credits to fuel economy compliance to incentive ZEV. This technology specific
policy is only implemented in California, Quebec and China. This policy instrument
fosters innovation on zero emission vehicle but can also be a risky bet on battery
electric vehicles if the technology fails to deliver.
Air pollution is a major concern for policymakers. The EU has agreed on max-
imum concentrations levels of pollutants. For LDV this limits translate to emission
standards called EURO norms first introduced in 1992. In practice, firms need to
pass the emission test to receive approval for commercialization of a vehicle thus
new vehicles need to adapt when limits are more severe. Today EURO 6 standard is
integrating progressively Real Driving Emissions (RDE) to reduce the gap between
test-cycle and on road emissions.
The rapid motorization in the United States led to smog becoming a major
health issue during the 1950s and 1960s. Due to weather conditions and high volume
of traffic, the Los Angeles basin suffered more from this problem. California decided
to pass a Clean Air Act in 1965 that became later the federal rule for the nation (Klier
and Linn, 2016a). The first nationwide emission standards were implemented in
1968, Today they are known as Tier 3 standards that were implemented in 2017,
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they differ from European standards in their approach to be "fuel neutral" having
the same emission limits for all vehicles. The large majority of the vehicle market is
regulated by some variant of the US or EU type emission standard 3.
Vehicle labeling is a policy instrument that can be used as a complement to
fuel economy standards (Silitonga, Atabani, and Mahlia, 2012). The effectiveness
of fuel economy label depends upon supportive retail staff, advertisement and con-
sumer awareness of the label (Mahlia, Tohno, and Tezuka, 2013). The vehicle label
program works best when a grading system provides the consumer with the infor-
mation about the efficiency level.
There is a group of instruments that can be command-and-control or incentive-
based but that are applied locally to urban areas (Ajanovic and Haas, 2016) that also
regulate the vehicle market such as: tolls, high occupancy lanes or car pool lanes,
vehicle restriction or Low Emission Zones (LEZ) (Wolff, 2014; Ellison, Greaves, and
Hensher, 2013; Holman, R. Harrison, and Querol, 2015; Jiang et al., 2017; Morton,
Lovelace, and Anable, 2017) and parking restriction. The aim of local policies is
that they solve a local pollution or congestion problem to do so the mechanism can
vary. They can be technology neutral when based on the occupancy of a vehicle or
the registration plate number as oppose to technology specific policies that penalize
high emitting vehicles by restricting access to city centers or prohibiting the use of
such vehicles during peak emissions in french cities. Some services can be targeted
for low emission vehicles only for instance allowing access to Ultra Low Emission
Zones only (ULEZ) or access to reserved parking spaces. For developing the BEV
there are additional measures that can be implemented concerning infrastructure to
avoid having a chicken and the egg problem (G. Harrison and Thiel, 2017; Broadbent
and Drozdzewski, 2017; Querini and Benetto, 2014).
Today, many European cities have implemented LEZ or are planning to do so.
Before introducing the examples of applications, we can note that the strength of
LEZ policies can be measured by what is the share of the vehicle fleet that will be
left out of the restricted area. Figure 1.5 represents the type of LEZ from a policy
affecting old and polluting light and heavy duty vehicles to a policy allowing ZEV
only or no cars at all. Some LEZ are combined with car-restrict centers where only
vehicles of special purpose are allowed. In Milan, a urban toll labeled Ecopass was
implemented in 2009 and charges a fee proportional to PM emissions to enter an area
in the center of Milan. The policy today is called Area-C and charges a daily fee for
all vehicles except low emission vehicles: HEV, PHEV and BEV. The policy includes
a ban on Diesel vehicles registered with an Euro standard 1 to 4. In London, the
London Congestion Charge scheme, introduced in 2003, is also a system of fee levels
for different types of vehicles. Today the area covers the Greater London and only
Ultra Low Emission vehicles are exempt of the fee (Morton, Lovelace, and Anable,
3. More detail on limits and evolution of emission standards worldwide can be found in Trans-
portPolicy.net
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2017). In Paris, vehicle labels Crit’Air that identify vehicles in a note from zero emis-
sion (0) to high polluters (5) guide the LEZ. Since 2015, in case of peak emissions the
government can decide to ban the most polluting class of vehicles. The policy also
bans the highest class of labels from the city of Paris during weekdays permanently.
In the future, the major of Paris has plans to ban Diesel vehicles by 2024 and Gaso-
line vehicles by 2030. The area of the LEZ will expand next year to cover the outer
circulation rim delimiting the Greater Paris.
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FIGURE 1.5 – Four different levels of Low Emission Zones (LEZ) that
are currently implemented or planned by cities. An Ultra Low Emis-
sion Zone (ULEZ) only allows very low emission vehicles to circulate
in city centers. A Car Free Zone (CFZ) bans vehicles from city centers.
Source: The Author.
1.3 Position of the Thesis
Developed economies have based their growth in better connecting economic
hubs, this led to a high dependence on the automobile ecosystem: roads, fueling
stations and manufacturing. The economic benefits of a highly connected economy
have allowed countries to create wealth. However the economy has failed to solve
important damages to the environment and health threads from vehicle’s emissions.
This thesis is focused on a small part of sustainable transportation, we center our
attention on the low carbon technologies choices made by automotive firms. We
cover two externalities: climate change and air pollution.
There are multiple pathways to reduce emissions from road transportation, we
focus on passenger vehicles. We concentrate on energy efficient solutions to reduce
fuel consumption or increase the use of low carbon fuels. Thus we look closely at
powertrain technologies in all applications. We are also interested on a different fam-
ily of low carbon solutions, lightweight technologies in the aim of testing how a fuel
economy standard mass-index parameter treats a technology that reduces vehicle’s
mass, see Chapter 4.
The policy tools created in the LDV market are necessary but their efforts are
not sufficient, carbon dioxide concentration on the atmosphere is still on the rise
and air pollution is still above safe limits in many cities from developed countries
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and the situation is worse in developed countries. It is urgent to act on all possible
levers to reduce vehicle’s emissions. We pick the fuel economy standard to drive the
discussion of this thesis for three reasons. First, it is a worldwide policy that have
already been tested thus we know how the automotive market has reacted to this
policy. Second, it is a policy that gives short term vision and a more stable long term
sight than other policies giving policy targets for firms. Therefore the fuel economy
standard gives strong signals to develop a future technology portfolio. Third, the
literature is large but there are still key policy issues that need to be explored.
We focus on three policy issues related to fuel economy standards in this The-
sis. First, we study the intertemporal effects of fuel economy targets and how a firm
perception of future policies could lead to lock-in technologies that have low abate-
ment potential (1.3.1). Second, we zoom in the fuel economy standard to show how
the mass-indexation works and how it affects technology choices and compliance
costs (1.3.2). Third, we incorporate air pollution policies on LDV to the analysis, an
emission standard, two types of LEZ (Level 2 and 3 in Fig. 1.5) and a Zero Emission
mandate. Air pollution is receiving more attention due the growing vehicle fleet
worldwide and the extreme pollutants concentrations in developing countries that
have highly populated urban areas with an increasing demand for motorized vehi-
cles. We evaluate the effect of overlapping policies with different policy objectives
(1.3.3).
1.3.1 Fuel Economy Standard and Path Dependency of vehicle technol-
ogy choices
Energy efficiency solutions to reduce carbon emissions require a R& D to mar-
ket process than can be long until cost and performance can compete with current
technologies. Moreover, technology adoption of innovative products is slow be-
cause only a small niche of consumers is willing to adopt new technology at first.
Passenger vehicle technology show this behavior for new low carbon technologies
as we will describe in section 1.4. Therefore the response that an automotive firm
can produce to reduce emissions depends not only on the knowledge and experi-
ence to deliver a safe and reliable vehicle but also on the rate of adoption of new
technologies.
These market limitations are key to preparing a mix of solutions adapted to
future fuel economy standards. The challenge for a firm is to prepare technology
solutions in advance to allow for consumer adoption with the final goal being com-
pliant when the standard comes into effect. In a competitive industry where market
strategy pushes firms to make profits in the short term, long term policies are of-
ten a second priority. The perception of future policy objectives is key along two
dimensions: time and stringency.
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A fuel economy policy is determined several years in advance, in most markets
ten years. This horizon needs to be large enough to allow technology development.
Time also relates to the diffusion of new technologies that is slow especially when
the replacement technology does not provide exactly the same performance as the
incumbent technology. This is case of the EV, which is not yet capable of fully replac-
ing an ICEV for all purposes. Conversely, when a technology diffuses in a market
and a car manufacturer has already committed to this technology, the firm will be
less likely to change for another technology in the near term. This is economic iner-
tia.
The stringency of the fuel economy standard determines the amount of low
carbon technology in the technology portfolio. An stringent policy means that it is
more likely to have a high share of low carbon technologies rather than a scenario
where stringency is low and compliance is possible with little change in the current
mix. The stringency of the policy increases in time as seen in Fig.1.4 thus a car
manufacturer knows that if the trend of increasing stringency continues, it will be
required to develop or diffuse more low carbon technology in the future.
How does an automotive firm prepares for near term and longer term policy
targets? A firm can take two approaches: It can take all available information on
future policy targets to develop a foresight strategy to adapt for the near and the
longer term, or it can weight in more the near term policy input and prepare for the
longer term target later on in a myopic view of the future. What is the impact of a
myopic view of the future on technology choices? These questions will be treated in
Chapter 3.
When addressing the same question for energy supply technologies under
emissions constraint, Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) show carbon lock-in on
coal generation when there is lack of policy ambition (Bertram et al., 2015; Vuuren
and Riahi, 2011; N. Bauer et al., 2015) that is caused by a failure to anticipate long-
term targets.
Applying a similar approach, we focus in Chapter 3 on the impact in the au-
tomotive industry of consecutive fuel economy policies with increasing stringency.
This problem has been overlooked in the previous fuel economy literature in which a
single policy target is often considered, thus neglecting the path dependency of tech-
nology choices. In a macro scale, Vogt-schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018 suggest
that investments should be optimally directed to sectors with higher mitigation cost
if they are also characterized by higher inertia. We will develop the concepts of path
dependency, technology lock-in and inertia in section 1.4.
Specifically, Chapter 3 will explore the different conditions under which the
near term efforts are sufficient to allow long term compliance in a myopic scenario
and ask when near term target compliance is a sufficient condition, or not, to guar-
antee longer term compliance.
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1.3.2 Mass-index fuel economy standard implications on technology se-
lection
Automotive regulations such as fuel economy standards are made to correct
market failures. However, they can produce unintended consequences, such as
vehicles using conventional fuels instead of renewable fuels for flex-fuel vehicles
(Marchant, 2009). Consumers that bought flex-fuel vehicles refuel with gasoline,
thus the government objective of reducing emissions is not achieved. In the corpo-
rate fuel economy standard, studies show that automakers have adapted a vehicle
parameter or vehicle segment to have less stringent targets (Knittel, 2011; Ullman,
2016; Luk, Saville, and Maclean, 2016). For example, in the USA there are two LDV
fuel economy standards: one for small to medium vehicles that is stringent and an-
other one for pick-ups and SUV segment that is less stringent, thus the segment
distribution of some manufactures has evolved to develop more of the high carbon
emission segment of pick-up and SUV.
Does the fuel economy standard has any loophole and if any what are the im-
plications? Two main kinds of fuel economy standard exist: one based on vehicle
footprint, a measure of vehicle size: wheelbase x track width, and the other based
on vehicle mass, also a measure an indirect measure of vehicle size. Both have been
studied closely to check if there was any incentive to change the policy parameter
instead of introducing better fuel economy vehicles. Studies in the US (footprint
indexation) (Ullman, 2016; Whitefoot and Skerlos, 2012; Shiau, Michalek, and Hen-
drickson, 2009; Ito and James M Sallee, 2017) and in Europe (mass indexation) (Luk,
Saville, and Maclean, 2016; German and Nic Lutsey, 2010; Kollamthodi et al., 2015)
have found evidence of an incentive to change the indexation parameter. This thesis
investigates the neutrality of fuel economy standard indexed to vehicle’s mass and
discusses the implications of such technology choices in Chapter 4. Our approach
shows the bias on technology choice in theory and in compliance application that
includes lightweight technologies. To do so we isolate the effect of mass indexation
by modeling two scenarios with the same fuel economy target but with a fuel econ-
omy standard with and without indexation. We show the differences between the
two mechanisms in terms of vehicle’s mass, technology cost and cost of ownership.
We found that when preparing for a future CAFE policy target indexed to mass
a car manufacturer does not have an incentive to introduce lightweight technologies
instead it develops BEV that have zero emissions in the context of CAFE and are
heavy. Besides this difference in technology choice, we find only limited difference
in overall costs between a CAFE standard with and without indexation.
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1.3.3 Overlapping of Environmental Policies to address a double objec-
tive: air pollution and climate change
The automotive industry needs to produce vehicles that correspond to local
government ambitions that push for less emitting vehicles. The technology portfo-
lio of current technologies needs to evolve if the aim of local policies is to have a
zero emitting fleet. Furthermore, the time horizon of zero emission policies of cities
through local policies is closer than national or regional scale policies. Therefore
the technology solutions need to be prepared in advance and there is a more severe
stringency on technology choices. The problem arises when policymakers create
policies meant to reduce GHG emissions and policies meant to reduce local pollu-
tion in urban traffic, these are two different objectives and an automotive firm faces
both.
The combination of two policies in the automotive sector one local and the
other global is the subject of Chapter 5. How the overlapping of policy instruments
affects technology choice? To study the effects of the combination of two policies
we use two concepts: synergy and trade-off to describe the interaction of policies.
We can describe these effects at three different levels, described below: a single tech-
nology choice, a portfolio of technologies selection and a policymaker ambition to
reduce vehicle’s externalities.
When a firm is confronted with different objectives, it will analyze if an objec-
tive prevails over the others. Likewise, when preparing a future technology portfolio
a firm strategy will look for technology solutions that can answer to multiple policy
objectives, in this case the policy effect is synergy. In the case that such a technology
does not exist or is too expensive, a car manufacturer will have to trade-off between
the optimal solution for a policy objective and a second-best solution that complies
with multiple objectives. Are synergy and tradeoff effects seen when combining two
passenger vehicles policies? We check for the gap at the technology choice level to
understand how overlapping of policies changes the preferred technology.
To prepare a future technology portfolio, a firm finds a least cost solution to
answer a policy objective. When two objectives are considered, there can be three
situations. First, the second policy does not change the first choice of technologies
because the policy is not severe enough to constraint technology choice. Second, the
stringency of the second policy is high enough to affect technology choice but both
policies share some compatible technologies thus creating synergy. Thus there will
be differences between the first choice and the second choice with overlapping poli-
cies but it will be small. Third, when there is incompatibility between the require-
ments for the two policies, the technology portfolio optimal for each of the policies
will be different when combined with the other policy and a trade-off emerge to
create a mix suitable for both policies.
24 Chapter 1. Introduction
For policymakers aiming to reduce different sorts of externalities, they face a
challenge to create a policy package that is efficient meaning that it will be be cost-
beneficial for society. Finding the ideal combination of policies is difficult because
synergies reduce the cost of overlapping policy compliance but some objectives do
not produce synergy therefore a policymaker decision is based on a balance between
trade-off and synergies within a policy package. The challenge is double because
most often policies for different externalities are prepared by different actors.
We have combined a fuel economy standard with a local policy to see the inter-
action between these policies. We have also modeled a Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV)
Mandate that is a mandatory quota of low zero emission or very low carbon vehi-
cles that a car manufacturer needs to comply at a national scale in the same fashion
than the Chinese and Californian ZEV Mandates. There are three policies that are
technology specific the two types of LEZ and the ZEV Mandate, nevertheless the
actors engaged on each of the LEZ policies and the ZEV Mandate are entirely dif-
ferent: one is developed by local authorities and is subject to local context and the
other is a national enacted target that has been created by national governments. The
mechanism is different where a ZEV Mandate does not require to sell low emission
vehicles in cities, a LEZ policy only restricts vehicles of urban areas meaning that in
rural areas or cities that do not adopt LEZ policies there is no constraint on the type
of technology. Therefore we modeled both policies to compare it effects.
The ZEV Mandate pushes for very low carbon vehicles which puts more con-
straints on technology choices and develops a mix that has very low emissions ve-
hicles and high emissions vehicles. This compensating effect seen in other policies
and described as the green promotes the dirtiest (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010) is
an undesired effect of the ZEV Mandate.
We explore various scenarios of policy applications: first we identify the effects
of application of a single passenger policy and second we combine a fuel economy
standard with one of the policies described above to identify a difference in technol-
ogy choice, CO2 emission reduction and costs. A prevailing policy exist when it is
more difficult to comply with a policy than others. The strength of a policy can be
modified by a change in stringency. For this reason and to model a range of policy
outcomes to represent the policy target uncertainty we have changed the stringency
of each of the policies. For the purpose of this Chapter, the analysis is focused on
prevailing policies rather than the uncertainty of the target. The aim of Chapter 5 is
to study the effect of overlapping policies.
1.3.4 Summary
The fuel economy standard has the spotlight of this thesis but it is seen from
different perspectives to show implications on the anticipation of targets, the loop-
hole in the mechanism of compliance and the effect on other automotive policies.
1.4. Methodological Approach: Technology Choice under inertia and policy
constraints
25
Every application of this thesis shares two aspects: they all treat the fuel economy
standard and they are all based on the same model that we introduce in section 1.4.
The research community has long studied low carbon policies that apply to
passenger vehicles, we contribute to this literature by focusing on three aspects that
have been less studied. First, the dynamics of how technologies are selected gives us
the clues to detect when a technology solution is not competitive enough to be de-
veloped and is consequently abandoned. The stringency and timing of policies are
crucial to give a strong signal to firms to take action. Second, the creation of auto-
motive policies is the result of discussions between firms, policymakers and public,
this sometimes leads to imperfect policy instruments. The CO2 emission standard
indexed to vehicle’s mass is one example of such policies, regulators need to keep
an eye on the application of this policy to avoid negative impacts on the policy goal.
Third, policymakers have created policy instruments to regulate vehicle’s emissions
impacts separately, meaning that the policy objective is focused on solving one type
of externality. When preparing a future technology mix, a firm will need to take into
account all of policy constraints jointly to deliver an adapted product. All of these
aspects on vehicle’s emission policy will be treated from a supply side approach
where a firm will choose the technology options to respond to a policy framework
and a demand that resist to change. The next section will describe this approach.
1.4 Methodological Approach: Technology Choice under in-
ertia and policy constraints
To address the questions outlined in Section 1.3, we develop a stylized model
of technology choice for an automotive firm with policy and market constraints.
This section describes the gap that the model tries to fill. Two branches of literature
have inspired the development of the model: the diffusion of technologies literature
that has observed past technological transitions and characterized them (1.4.1) and
the passenger vehicle technology models that have multiple forms but all are related
in the sense that they study the same market relations between policymakers, firms
and consumers (1.4.2).
1.4.1 Economic inertia as a constraint on Technology Diffusion
The wider context of economic and social changes in which the transport sec-
tor evolves is a lengthy process of energy demand and supply transition that is
changing the current system. This large transformation is referred to as the low car-
bon transition and is comparable with past energy transitions that have also deeply
changed the energy systems. In short, an energy transition can been defined as the
period of major changes from a established and functional energy system to a new
and different system (Geels, 2002; Geels, 2012). Thus the adoption of a new energy
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system requires changes not only on the end-use technology but also on the ecosys-
tem as a whole (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). In terms of automotive technology,
the low carbon transition means developing less fossil fuel consuming technologies.
The internal combustion engine is the incumbent technology that is the established
ecosystem and alternative fuel vehicles (AFV) are the low carbon solution. Once
that the transition takes place, the incumbent technology will try to resist and will
develop further to avoid been replaced, this is called the sailing ship or last gap effect
(Grübler, Nakic´enovic´, and David G. Victor, 1999; Fouquet, 2016; Sick et al., 2016).
Past transitions in the transport sector have been analyzed and give valuable
information about how future transition might occur. Two examples that have rad-
ically changed the means of transportation are the evolution from horse carriage to
steam engines and railways and the diffusion of petrol engines and roads replac-
ing steam engines and railways (Grübler, Nakic´enovic´, and David G. Victor, 1999;
Wilson and Grubler, 2011). The change in the energy vector from oil to electricity in
transport is a sign that the future transition to electric powered vehicles will radically
change the energy system as it is conceived today. The technological improvements
have been accelerating in recent years with the main markets demanding for low
carbon solutions from the industry (Dechezleprêtre, Neumayer, and Perkins, 2015).
The concept of path dependency was first elaborated to describe how a prod-
uct spreads and becomes a standard despite not being the optimal solution for ev-
eryone. The QWERTY keyboard system was develop to avoid typewriters to type
fast in machines that tend to jam. This change in design stuck through decades de-
spite losing its purpose to avoid fast-typing when technology improvements solve
the jamming problem. The reasons for keeping with this design were technical inter-
relatedness, economies of scale and quasi-irreversibility of investment (David, 1985).
Economists have applied the concept of path dependency to describe the way
in which a small, historically contingent events can trigger self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms and processes that "lock-in" particular structures and pathways of develop-
ment (Martin and Sunley, 2006). In the automotive industry path dependency oc-
curs when technical choices dictated by historical developments due to scale and
learning economies, technical compatibility, and industrial networks, result in lock-
in in technologies that are less competitive for future’s requirements (Åhman and
Nilsson, 2008). In the climate change community, the concept of carbon lock-in de-
fines the interlocking technological, institutional and social forces that led industrial
economies become locked into fossil fuel-based technological systems (Unruh, 2000).
In a complex and large energy system where different end-use technologies co-
exist, clustering and network effects form between energy conversion technologies
and energy supply infrastructure (Wilson and Grubler, 2011). The dominant system
benefits from an adapted network and infrastructure that are difficult to change. On
top on the energy system, institutions, behavioral routines and practices enhance the
1.4. Methodological Approach: Technology Choice under inertia and policy
constraints
27
system mechanisms (Wilson and Grubler, 2011; Li, Trutnevyte, and Strachan, 2015).
These definitions describe the system dynamics and forces that create lock-in and
the dynamics of this process are described as path dependency. To replace the dom-
inant technology, the entire system needs to adapt too, this dynamic is slow because
of lock-ins where the incomer technology finds a niche market to develop but finds
resistance to spread to a larger market.
To integrate how a technology can become more competitive through cost
reductions and performance improvements, economists introduce learning effects.
The specific mechanisms driving learning are listed below, taken from Kahouli-
brahmi, 2008:
— Learning-by-doing: repetitive manufacturing tasks involve an improve-
ment of the production process.
— Learning-by-researching: improvements related to the innovation process
and creation of knowledge.
— Learning-by-using: user’s experience and feedback effects that follow in-
troduction to the market are source of technology learning.
— Learning-by-interacting: interactions between the various actors like the
research laboratories, the industry, the end-users and the political decision-
makers enhance the diffusion of knowledge.
— Economies of scale: at the mass production stage, as the output increases
the unit cost curve drives costs down.
Learning is one of the mechanism that can explain technology lock-in (Mattauch, F.
Creutzig, and Edenhofer, 2015). A dedicated literature has focused on estimating
the learning rate of technologies: in the energy sector (Mcdonald and Schratten-
holzer, 2001) and in vehicle technology (Weiss et al., 2012). The implementation of
learning in models allowed to take into account some of the dynamics driving path
dependency, when a technology spreads in a market it will reduce costs following a
learning curve (Grübler and Messner, 1998; Berglund and Söderholm, 2006; Kahouli-
brahmi, 2008). Although our model does not include any type of learning but, we are
able to capture the effects of path dependency by focusing on inertia and diffusion
constraints.
Past diffusion of technologies have shown a defined S shape of market share
where the initial rate of diffusion is slow when the market share is low in the first
stage of diffusion then the rate of diffusion peaks when half of the potential market
has been covered and finally is slow again to diffuse on the most incompatible or
unwilling consumers to adopt the technology. A large freight cargo ship requires
several kms to fully stop because of mechanical inertia. In economy, an energy sys-
tem also have a difficulty to change direction and speed. To capture this dynamic we
can use economic inertia that acts as an upper limit on technology diffusion (Vogt-
schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018).
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The approach that we have developed is different from (Vogt-schilb, Meunier,
and Hallegatte, 2018) in the way that we treat the diffusion constraint. We obtain
the limits on speed of diffusion from the sales share of technologies. By doing so
we solve the estimation problem of being too optimistic or pessimistic on the rate
of diffusion of technologies when modeling an exogenous constant diffusion limit.
The seminal research on optimal abatement from Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014
inspired the model that is presented in the next section. We propose a different
mechanism to represent technology diffusion and apply this to the optimal choice of
car manufacturer.
Government agencies and the scientific community have studied the diffusion
of automobile technologies since the oil crisis in the 1970’s. The trend of technology
evolution is key to understand how fast a market can adopt a technology. We con-
tribute to this literature of estimation of diffusion speed by analyzing recent data in
the US market(Zoepf and Heywood, 2012). In terms of technology adoption behav-
ior our model relies on the diffusion speed estimations to limit technology adoption
when low carbon technologies will progressively enter the market. Thus, the diffu-
sion of technologies follows a "S-shape" curve where the initial take-off is slow then
the diffusion process gains momentum, peaks and then slows when the technology
is close to the saturation point. How this mechanism is integrated in an optimization
model of low carbon technologies is a main contribution of this research.
1.4.2 An Optimization Model of Low Carbon Technologies
The economic literature has studied road transport with different approaches
in a spectrum of geographical and temporal scales represented in Fig. 1.6. The main
families of models that are developed to answer questions about the environmen-
tal impacts of the road transport are: traffic network models, behavioural models,
agent-based modelling, system dynamics modelling, techno-economic models and
Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) (Linton, Grant-Muller, and Gale, 2015). These
categories represent the various scales from local to global and from the near-term
future to long-term horizons of 2100 (Fig. 1.6). In the case of the automotive sec-
tor, the representation of a vehicle passenger to assess the environmental impacts
depends on the focus on the study.
Traffic networks studies are local-based and produce the impact of road trans-
portation in urban areas. Behavioral models are based on the consumer choice the-
ory that describes individual and collective decision making (Al-alawi and Bradley,
2013). Agent-based models focus on the action and interaction of each agent in a
virtual environment where they are characterized by their demographics and pref-
erences (Al-alawi and Bradley, 2013). System dynamics modelling uses a high level
of aggregation to model a system by breaking it into its major components and inter-
actions Shafiei et al., 2012. Techno-economics models uses expert judgment, policy
makers ambitions and consumer surveys to forecast the trends on the automobile
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sector (FEV, 2015; Hill et al., 2016; National Rearch Council Board on Energy and
Environmental, 2015). IAM are economy-wide models that develop specific pack-
ages for the transport sector and link the transport environment to a macro-scale
economy (Yeh, Shankar, et al., 2016). To do so they often model transport based
on four factors: technological: intensity of fuels, energy intensity of mobility and be-
havioural: modal structure and volume of mobility (Linton, Grant-Muller, and Gale,
2015).
System 
Dynamics 
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Traﬃc 
Network 
Models
Techno-
Economic 
Models
Integrated 
Assessment 
Models
Local Global
Long term
(e.g. 2100)
Short term
(a few years)
microsimulation 
activity models 
This Thesis: 
OMLCAT
FIGURE 1.6 – Spatial and temporal scales for Road Transport Models.
Source: Linton, Grant-Muller, and Gale, 2015.
The model that is developed in this thesis is based on Techno-Economic Mod-
els. The methodology of the model is suited to represent long term horizon to show
the dynamics in play, the technology diffusion constraint makes sense in a large scale
context such that aggregate market trends are dominant (Fig. 1.6).
Applied to energy systems, marginal abatement cost curves (MACC) are graph-
ical representations of the relationship between abatement costs and emission levels
to determine the appropiate set of measures to reach the desired carbon reduction
target (Tomaschek, 2015; Kesicki, 2013; Kesicki and Strachan, 2011). The model of
this thesis shares the same foundations to build a MACC but it introduces a con-
straint to limit technology diffusion to take into account the economic inertia of each
option as seen in Vogt-schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018. Most of the models
in automotive studies are agent-based, econometric models of policy impacts and
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consumer behavior that are static, thus portraying a future of technology landscape
without actually detailing the roadmap. Our goal is to fill this gap and propose a
model that is dynamic to take into account the yearly change of the technology mix.
The objective is to obtain the optimal technology choices that a car manufac-
turer makes to prepare for environmental policies. The logic behind the optimization
problem is that a firm will seek to obtain the maximum profits from a product port-
folio. To do so they apply pricing strategies to different vehicles to obtain more or
less profit for a particular type of vehicles. We do not treat pricing strategies instead
we focus on the choice of the technology portfolio. To allow for maximum profit we
assume a base price equal for a vehicle segment and find the technology mix that has
minimal cost. Thus we search for the technology mix that has the lowest cost over
the entire simulation period. We have selected the CAFE standard to be central to the
model because it is targeted on the industry and requires a change in the technology
portfolio to comply with more stringent targets in the future. This thesis uses this
model through out the entire length but selects key topics on environmental policy
modeling to develop insights on the impacts of policy applications on technology
choices. Chapter 2 describes the assumptions, mechanism and methodology of the
model.
1.4.3 Summary
Low carbon technologies are considerably different than the traditional auto-
mobile technologies that firms produce. The consumer experience is also different
because an electric motor does not behave the same way as an ICE. Moreover, the
electric vehicle or hydrogen vehicle ecosystem are not compatible with the existing
automobile infrastructure. The adoption of low carbon technologies has started in
a niche market that is supported by policymakers but it has not spread to the mass
market yet. The mass adoption of these technologies will require effort from all ac-
tors to develop the ecosystem. This is the reason why we limit growth of technolo-
gies with a diffusion constraint. This approach is compatible with a firm’s strategy
that can not gamble its future which implies that a firm will be more likely to invest
on low carbon technologies in an incremental fashion. Our model is not built to pre-
dict how a firm should actually pick technologies, the model is made to show what
are the implications of some policy caveats and rise concern on the aspects that can
lead to a firm to choose a better low carbon strategy.
1.4.4 Institutional Framework of the Thesis
This research was conducted thanks to a CIFRE fellowship, a program that al-
lows private firms to research on a promising field with the help of a academic part-
ner. The partnership was established between the automotive firm Groupe Renault
and Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, and more specifically its affiliated research insti-
tute CIRED. The project was formulated in collaboration between the environmental
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strategic team in Groupe Renault and CIRED, following prior research projects con-
ducted within the frame of the Sustainable Mobility Institute (Institut de la Mobilité
Durable, IMD). IMD is a partnership between Groupe Renault Foundation for Re-
search and ParisTech, and Ecole des Ponts ParisTech. In particular, IMD contributed
to finance previous work from Adrien Vogt-Schilb (()Vogt-Schilb2014), within an re-
search program on the global vision on raw materials, climate and health. The thesis
was conducted half-time in the environmental strategic team in Groupe Renault and
half-time at CIRED research institute.
In terms of non research work, I was involved in several workgroups that dis-
cussed the challenges of low carbon mobility. Next, I briefly present these work-
groups:
— MoMo IEA: This was a large workgroup of different actors in the trans-
portation and energy sector that talk about the future of low carbon tech-
nologies: powertrain and fuels in a worldwide perspective. The group
was lead by IEA who manages the MoMo model. Groupe Renault partici-
pated in reviewing and commenting technology, policy and LDV mobility
assumptions.
— UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies: Groupe Renault is an indus-
try partner of the research projects conducted by this institute. Groupe
Renault gives feedback on ongoing research projects. I had a main inter-
est and exchanged with STEPS program coordinator Lew Fulton in four
projects: Transportation Transition Scenarios to Meet Climate Change Goals
for CA and the US, International Electric Vehicle Modeling and Scenar-
ios and Near-term Transitions to AF Vehicles Using a Regional Consumer
Choice and Fueling Infrastructure Model.
— BIPE: Groupe Renault commands ad hoc studies to consulting group BIPE
about many subjects on low carbon mobility. Their strength is a Total Cost
of Ownership model with a detailed mobility demand analysis. I con-
tributed in this group to learn how Renault and BIPE interact and provide
a different type of analysis in this thesis. BIPE also lead a workgroup in
Plateforme Automobile (PFA) that is composed of several automotive in-
dustry actors in France. This latter workgroup develops a worldwide view
of the evolution of the automotive industry. They base their work on their
World Automotive Powertrain Outlook.
— CO2 Public Policy team in Environmental Planning: I contributed to fol-
lowup of ongoing public policy discussions and evaluations. I was in
charge of one part of the literature review, focusing on ICCT publications,
on low carbon policies in the automotive sector. This close contact with
Groupe Renault managers in charge of planning future compliance of cli-
mate change objectives was crucial to apprehend the challenges of the low
carbon mobility for an automotive firm.
During the meetings of these workgroups, there were different approaches to
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study the low carbon mobility challenge. These studies varied in scope: space and
time horizon, methodology and ad hoc questions. This thesis is inspired by many
of the discussions conducted during these meetings. The automotive firm vision on
low carbon mobility was made clear during these discussions which feeds this re-
search that shows the industry technology choices. Data on automotive technologies
was provided by Groupe Renault.
Concerning non academic research, I participated in different internal Semi-
nars of different topics concerning the automotive markets that helped me under-
stand how the industry works. The topics of such conferences were consumer be-
havior and needs, vehicle design, autonomous vehicles, vehicle charge infrastruc-
ture, regional market characteristics. I was also in contact with interns that con-
ducted their project in the environmental planning team where I learn about the
other areas of the department: air quality, life cycle assessment, circular economy
and raw materials.
1.5 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the optimization model
of low carbon technology choices under inertia and policy instruments constraints.
This model is the foundation for the applications that follow. Chapter 3 looks at the
impact of consecutive fuel economy targets on vehicle technology choices. Chapter
4 uses a more refined model of the fuel economy standard to study how technol-
ogy choices are influenced by mass indexation of the policy. Chapter 5 expands
the spectrum of policy instruments from climate change to air pollution to consider
a combination of policies answering both challenges. There we analyze the impli-
cations on the technology mix when the fuel economy standard is combined with
another local or global policy. Chapter 6 concludes and discusses the implications of
our findings for automotive firms and for policymakers.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Technology choice under
policy and inertia constraints:
Model description
2.1 Introduction
Industries from all sectors face a difficult challenge to change the fossil-fuel
based economy to a low carbon economy that limits climate change. The develop-
ment of low emission technologies requires time and resources. In the automotive
industry, the technological challenge can be briefly summarized to the transition
from Internal Combustion Engines Vehicles (ICEVs) to Alternative Fuel Vehicles
(AFVs). There is no silver-bullet solution and there is a consensus that a technol-
ogy mix between various AFVs is needed to replace ICEVs (González Palencia et al.,
2015; Yang et al., 2009). How this transition unfolds depends on the mix of policies
that steer the technology pathway.
This thesis evaluates economic outcomes for economy sectors based on as-
sumptions about technology development, policy scenarios and market dynamics
(Al-alawi and Bradley, 2013; Li and Strachan, 2016). The technology rich family of
models and technical-economy assessment are close to what is developed in this
thesis (Miotti et al., 2016; Mcdowall, 2014; Dodds and Mcdowall, 2013). However
instead of searching for the more cost beneficial solution to reduce emissions from a
sector we reduce the scale of the analysis to the firm to find out what is the least cost
technology choices that a firm has to make to comply with a fuel economy policy. To
answer this we look for the technology mix that has the minimum technology costs
thus creating an optimization problem.
Policy makers have different options to push car manufactures to reduce car-
bon emissions from passenger vehicles that vary on mechanisms, stringency and
time horizons. Car manufacturers are directly regulated by fuel economy standards
and are indirectly impacted by incentives and taxes on different vehicles classes. All
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policy instruments have an effect on technology selection in the automotive indus-
try. Here, we focus on the corporate average fuel economy standard (CAFE) for
three reasons: it is applied in main automotive markets, it is a main concern for
car manufacturers and it has near term and mid term signals for future abatement
requirements.
Replacing a mainstream technology with a new technology faces resistance
from the established socio-technical system (Frank W Geels, 2002). Thus, the poten-
tial growth of a technology is limited in the initial phase where only a niche market
adopts new technology. In latter phases of diffusion the speed of diffusion can be
greater. A car manufacturer that responds to an ambitious CAFE target needs to
consider this lag on the technology deployment to anticipate commercialization of
new products. We use a S-shape curve to limit the dynamics of a technology in a
similar fashion that the literature has characterized the diffusion dynamics of past
technology transitions (S. M. Zoepf, 2011; EPA, 2016; ICCT, 2015).
The novelty of our modelisation is how inertia is integrated as a diffusion con-
straint independent of time. It is based on previous works from Vogt-schilb, Meu-
nier, and Hallegatte, 2018; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014 on technology selection
for abatement objectives under limiting factors such as availability of the abatement
potential. This seminal research uses a simplified model to show that investments
should be directed early to technology with high abatement potential but with low
speed of diffusion. Their approach limits the diffusion of abatement technologies
with a constraint on the available potential that can be introduced in a given year.
Thus only a part of total abatement potential can be implemented each year because
an increase in the abatement technology requires time and resources. This inertia
constraint acts on every abatement option in the market limiting the diffusion speed
to a constant maximum.
Based on the same principle of limited diffusion of abatement technologies
seen in Vogt-schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018 we propose a new variation of
the diffusion constraint where the diffusion constraint, based on a S-shape curve,
changes the speed of diffusion according to the sales share of a technology. The dif-
fusion of technologies in the past has seen different speeds according to the diffusion
stage of the technology. Our contribution to modeling of technology diffusion is the
mechanism of the constraint. Our model does not have a constant speed of diffusion
anymore, we replicate a form of diffusion seen in the past in the shape of S-curve. A
new technology will face a change in diffusion speed from low speed at market entry
to maximum speed at mass market adoption to low speed again when the diffusion
saturates.
This Chapter describes the model developed to represent technology portfolio
choices in a policy context where CAFE regulation pushes for low carbon solutions.
The model has three main forces that interact to produce an optimal solution: the
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overall goal that searches for the least cost technology mix, the policy context that
mandates a minimal requirement on technology fuel economy and a limiting change
in technology subject to diffusion limits.
The model is used in the subsequent Chapters of this thesis to answer the fol-
lowing questions about firm policy: Is an emission target feasible? What does it take
and how much does it cost to comply with a CAFE target? How will the technology
pathway evolve? To answer these questions we describe the mechanics of the model
applied to the case of a lower medium vehicle segment in an automotive firm. We
aim at isolating the effects of the fuel economy standard with the limited scope of a
single vehicle segment.
This Chapter is structured as follows, Section 2.2 presents an overview of the
model and its components. Section 2.3 describes the main assumptions on how
an automotive technology is treated and the associated policies that affect a firm’s
choice. Section 2.4 presents the governing equations, explains how the model works
and discusses its limitations. Section 2.5 presents the applications and variations of
the model used in this thesis.
2.2 Overview of the Model
The Optimization Model of Low Carbon Automotive Technologies (OMLCAT)
developed in this thesis analyzes the impact of regulations that affect fleet emissions
on the choice of technology made by the industry. The model is a supply-side car
manufacturer perspective, which would seek to minimize the total production costs
of vehicles sold, discounted over the time horizon considered. To do so the opti-
mization algorithm finds the least cost technology mix that complies with a given
policy target.
The model has three main blocks, in Fig.2.1: a technology input block that de-
fines the technology cost & other attributes, a policy package block that defines the
external constraint that steers the technology mix in the direction to adapt to a pol-
icy and an optimization algorithm that is built on an endogenous model of inertia that
interacts with the sales share of a technology to determine where a technology is on
S-shape curves (see Section 2.4.2 below).
The structure of the model is generic meaning that the application to a different
automotive firm, a different vehicle segment and a different market is possible. In
the automotive industry there are two different categories of vehicles: Light-Duty
Vehicles and Heavy-Duty Vehicles. Light-Duty Vehicles are composed of passenger
vehicles and commercial vehicles. We focus on a particular segment of passenger
vehicles: lower-medium segment. In Europe this segment is the largest segment and
contains many different models. For generalist car manufacturers such as Renault it
is one of the core segments of their market. Thus we adapt the generic structure to
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fit the case of technology choice in the lower medium vehicle segment, we detail the
assumptions made below in Section 2.3.
Cost Minimization of Low Carbon Technology mix
Variables:
Unit annual sales of technology products
Constraints:
- Emissions constraint: CAFE target at year i
- Annual Volume Sales
- Speed of diffusion limits
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FIGURE 2.1 – Overview of Optimization Model of Low Carbon Tech-
nologies for the study of the fuel economy standard. Source: The
Author.
In the following sections we describe each block of the model.
2.3 Technology assumptions for a lower medium vehicle seg-
ment
A vehicle is today full of different components that give a unique mechani-
cal performance and consumer experience. In terms of energy consumption, some
components play a more important role than others, in Fig. 2.2 we show the main
technology bricks that play a key role on energy consumption. There are many fields
that have the potential to increase energy efficiency. Some have been explored since
the birth of automobiles such as powertrain technologies but some are new, such as
electric appliances of low consumption. From these technology bricks we construct
a few vehicle variants focused mainly on powertrain technologies which define our
technology inputs. For a vehicle segment we have a limited number of vehicle mod-
els but they are representative of the different powertrain options available.
The other technology bricks are also developed to reduce vehicle’s emissions
but are not studied in this Chapter. Aerodynamics develops technologies aiming at
reducing the aerodynamic drag of the vehicle such as low profile vehicles to reduce
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FIGURE 2.2 – Main low carbon technology bricks in a vehicle. Source:
The Author.
energy demand. Tires are the point of contact with the road, they convert the ro-
tational motion into linear motion, but they oppose a rolling resistance that causes
energy losses. Tire suppliers search for new materials and architectures to reduce
this resistance. The overall mass of the vehicle is essential to determine the energy
demand of the vehicle, with a light mass a vehicle will require less energy to move.
Lightweight technologies are thus an important vector for low carbon technologies
and are explored in Chapter 4.
We can consider a modern passenger car as an energy conversion system where
a reservoir, a mechanical conversion system or powertrain and a mechanical trans-
fer component interact to allow movement. The energy conversion system can be
divided into different blocks with a main process that converts chemical energy into
kinetic energy. Today there are three common conversion systems. The first type
converts the chemical energy potential of a fossil fuel into kinetic energy in an in-
ternal combustion engine by a compression (CI) or spark-ignition (SI). The second
type uses electricity to stock electrochemical potential into a battery that will supply
electric energy to an electric machine (EM) thus obtaining kinetic energy. The third
type transforms hydrogen gas to produce electricity in a fuel cell that connects with
an electric machine. This definition of a vehicle system does not describe the energy
supply methods for passenger cars, e.g. the means to produce electricity and fossil
fuel extraction. The boundary of the technology system is consistent with the scope
of the CAFE policy that is based on tank-to-wheel emissions in Europe.
There are many different alternatives that can be chosen to produce a low car-
bon vehicle. Some options might have a high abatement potential and others might
have a lower potential. The blocks used to build a powertrain option are fuel type,
energy conversion system and transmission type. Some models use two fuel types:
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electricity and fossil-fuels. These are a 12-V mild-hybrid engine, a 48-V mild-hybrid
engine, a full hybrid engine or a plug-in hybrid system: fossil-fuel engine and elec-
tric engine. There are different kinds of transmissions that are available, from low
to high efficiency: Manual, Automated Transmission, Double-Clutch Transmission
and Continuous Variable Transmission. A Gas Vehicle works with variation of a SI
Engine and uses Liquefied Petroleum Gas or Compressed Natural Gas.
The model does not explore all solutions, to build the set of feasible vehicles
that defines the future technology mix we choose technologies based on three rules:
an engineering criteria of feasibility, an automotive firm compatibility criteria and a
reduction of technology choices to only have one option per powertrain. The engi-
neering criteria selects which options are feasible from the combination of a Power-
train Type with a Transmission type. For example for a BEV architecture there are
only two options: an automated transmission or no transmission at all. From an
engineering perspective a BEV with a manual transmission is not possible. We ap-
plied the same criteria to all options. We aggregate the technology contribution of
different blocks into one single technology option that is named after its powertrain
unit. The reduced number of technology families is presented in Table 2.1 which has
already passed the engineering criteria filter.
A second criteria based on automotive firm compatibility depends on a firm
strategy. For example a car manufacturer that has not invested in Hydrogen vehicles
will not consider this option for the near-term thus we do not include this option in
the model for that particular manufacturer. In reality a firm faces only a limited flex-
ibility when it comes to technology diversity due to limited resources to develop a
portfolio of engine variations. Thus product strategy, manufacturing facilities and
consumer needs define how an automotive firm selects a reduced number power-
train units. Our selected technology portfolio is similar to the available choices of
french car manufacturer Renault which contributed to this thesis 1. The shortlist of
technologies is compatible with a European market.
For each technology package we define three main features: the cost of the
technology, the CO2 emissions level measured in New European Driving Cycle (NEDC),
the mass of vehicle and the air quality compliance level according to the EURO stan-
dards of the vehicle. The cost, emission, mass and air quality compliance estimation
is obtained via estimates from Renault and data from ICCT (Meszler et al., 2016) for a
lower medium vehicle segment in the European market. The cost of the technology
is the sum of cost of production of each component of the powertrain technology
family for a lower medium vehicle segment. The cost does not represent the total
1. This thesis was developed under the CIFRE fellowship that is an Industrial Agreement of
Training through Research between CIRED and Renault. This research is thus fundamentally applied
to an industry need of understanding policy impacts in a more challenging context of low carbon
mobility to do so the fellowship gathers academic researchers and industrial managers to develop a
research program that contributes to the scientific research and provides key elements of understand-
ing the given topic.
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TABLE 2.1 – Powertrain Technology Families for Passenger Vehicles
Powertrain Type Fuel Energy Conversion Transmission
Gasoline Gasoline SI Engine Manual, AT, CVT or DCT
Gasoline Next Gen Gasoline SI Engine with 12V or 48V Manual, AT, CVT or DCT
Diesel Diesel CI Engine Manual, AT, CVT or DCT
Diesel Next Gen Diesel CI Engine with 12V or 48V Manual, AT, CVT or DCT
Hybrid (HEV) Gasoline or Diesel CI or SI with EM AT, CVT
Plug-in Hybrid (PHEV) Gasoline or Diesel and Electricity CI or SI with EM AT, CVT
Battery Electric (BEV) Electricity EM AT or None
Hydrogen (FCHEV) Hydrogen EM AT or None
Gas (GV) LPG or CNG SI Engines Manual, AT, CVT or DCT
cost of production of the vehicle. For technological assumptions used for each appli-
cation, refer to Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 and Table 5.5 in Chapter
5.
To develop low carbon technologies, manufacturing, research and marketing
efforts are needed. Thus an automotive firm best interest is to share the risk of in-
vestment in a new promising technology with a competitor. Allowing for market
influence might change the preferred choices for a firm. Further research might look
into the automotive firm’s dynamics in terms of technology choices. Some informa-
tion is available from patent data: where firms that historically develop alternative
fuel vehicles tend to spread these technologies to others in the same market (Aghion
et al., 2016). At a single firm level, the technology cost can integrate a component of
R&D cost in an exogenous manner which can not vary as function of the sales share.
The technology inputs are used by the global objective function and the model
constraints based on policies and inertia limits described in the next Section.
2.4 Core Optimization Algorithm
2.4.1 Governing Equations
A firm’s profit maximization problem can be simplified to eq.2.1 which indi-
cates that a firm can change vehicle price, number of vehicles sold or cost of produc-
tion. Assuming that low carbon technologies are the main component of abatement
technology cost we can consider that cost of production is determined by low car-
bon technology costs. The type of low carbon technologies in a vehicle is in turn
determined by policy ambitions.
maxxj
n
∑
j=1
xj ∗ (Pj − Cj) (2.1)
where xj is the number of vehicles sold with powertrain technology j, Pj is the price
of a vehicle with powertrain technology j and Cj is the cost of production of a vehicle
with powertrain technology j.
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Vehicle price is not a variable of optimization in our model. We do not in-
tegrate the mechanism of pricing different vehicle technologies to adjust for prof-
itability margin. The vehicle price of expensive low carbon technology is in practice
higher than the vehicle price of fossil-fuel based technologies. We do not investigate
how the vehicle margin varies according to the type of technology.
The model is limited to find the least low carbon technology cost solution to
comply with a policy ambition. The technology cost is determined in a vehicle unit
basis, it does not take into account the resources necessary to increase or launch
production of low carbon vehicles. Plug-in vehicles require a new type of assembly
lines of electric motors which in turn requires a new type of labor and knowledge.
The cost assumptions used in this thesis are limited to marginal cost of producing a
powertrain with a specific technology type. The cost of all other technologies of the
vehicle is considered the same for all powertrain types.
The simplifying assumption of cost minimization gives information of what is
the cheapest technology mix to comply with a policy target limited by inertia con-
straints. The solution of the model can not be interpreted as the optimal technology
mix to maximize profit margins. However the mechanism of policy instruments and
technology diffusion constraints are applicable to a profit maximization problem.
The result of a given run of the model is the optimal technology mix output, or
technologies portfolio, i.e. the share of each technology in the total vehicle sale every
year along the time horizon considered. From the optimal technology mix of sales
over the entire period, the optimal emissions pathway and the production costs can
be calculated. Thus a firm following the optimal technology choices of the model
would respect the policy regulations and can potentially maximize its revenue.
The model accounts for two type of constraints. The first type corresponds
to the regulatory constraint imposed by corporate average fuel economy standards
described in this Section below. The second type are dynamic constraints, or inertia
constraints, on the maximum speed at which each technology can be diffused. This
dynamic model acts on the yearly sales of new vehicles.
The model searches the mix of technologies with the minimum cost while re-
specting inertia and policy constraints. The governing equations are the objective
function, a set of constraints and auxiliary functions (eq.2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.17 ) 2.
min
m
∑
i=1
1
(1+ r)(i−1)
n
∑
j=1
xij ∗ Cj (2.2)
∀years i
n
∑
j=1
xij = SALESi (2.3)
2. The optimization algorithm uses Interior Point Optimizer (IPOPT) (Wächter and Biegler,
2006) with the Scilab library Sci-IPOpt. All runs of the model are made with the same optimization
solver.
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f or target year i∗
∑nj=1 xi∗ jEi∗ j
SALES
≤ TARGET (2.4)
where xij are the sales of technology j at year i, m is the number of years in the
model, n is the number of technologies, r is the discount rate, Ei is the emission level
in gCO2/km, Cj is the cost of technology of j in e, SALESi are unit sales in a year i
and TARGET is the CAFE target in gCO2/km.
The objective function in eq. 2.2 aims at reducing costs, there are two ways to
do so: reducing the number of vehicles sold or reducing the cost of vehicles sold.
The first option is not allowed by constraining the volume of sales each year in eq.
2.3. The second and only option is to reduce costs, therefore the objective function
looks for the least cost technology mix. However the fuel economy policy constraint
in eq. 2.4 sets a maximum requirement of average CO2 emissions. Thus the model
selects the least cost low carbon technologies adapted to the policy ambition.
The volume constraint presented in eq.2.3 sets an exogenous trajectory of total
vehicle sales in number of vehicles sold each year. An automotive firm has a sales
volume goal for future years determined for the strategic plan that guides labor and
manufacturing needs. In order to commit to a strategic change in the number of
vehicles sold, an automotive firm also prepares for future policy constraints. Our
approach is a policy assessment of the impact of CAFE that is made before setting
volume targets. For the purpose of this thesis, we keep the sales volume constraint
constant and refer to sales share instead of number vehicles. The volume constraint
can be interpreted as a guarantee that the sum of sales share of the technology port-
folio is always 100 %.
In practice, the volume constraint requires a high level of the cheapest solution
in the near future until low carbon alternatives become available due to the limiting
constraint of inertia in the initial phases of diffusion. There is no upper limit on
volume sales which is not needed given the minimization objective function. The
volume constraint acts as a dam, all units sold must fill a sales minimum but any
additional unit over this limit is not profitable since the dam was designed to a fixed
volume. A feature that is not used in this thesis is that the volume constraint can be
used to test volume growth with a sales forecast.
The automotive policy that is central to this thesis and common for all appli-
cations is the fuel economy standard. The model described in this Chapter has only
the CAFE policy. Four more policies studied later in this thesis are presented in sec-
tion 2.5.3. The model of CAFE shown in eq. 2.4 is a simplified version of the policy,
we force the firm to comply with the fuel economy standard without allowing the
firm to pay fines. Also, we have not taken into account the following elements of the
European policy:
— Supercredits on low emission vehicles that make low emission vehicles
count more times in the corporate average to promote the deployment of
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low carbon vehicles and help OEMs meet their target (European Parlia-
ment and European Council, 2009).
— Eco innovation or off-cycle technology credits that reduce stringency of the
target up to 7 gCO2/km if vehicles are equipped with technologies that
allow energy savings not captured by the test-cycle (European Parliament
and European Council, 2009; Fontaras, Zacharof, and Ciuffo, 2017).
— Pooling strategies where car manufacturers can regroup their vehicles sales
from different brands to have a joint corporate average.
— Phase-in of the target which requires an increasing share of new passenger
vehicle registrations of car manufacturers to be compliant with the policy
target before the enacted year of the policy.
Eq.2.4 could be modified in future exercises to accommodate some of these elements.
Mass indexation, for instance is introduced in Ch.4 and 5.
The CAFE constraint makes sure that the automotive firm complies with the
emissions reduction target. The CAFE acts on the average emissions of vehicles
therefore some vehicles having higher emissions than the target are still in the tech-
nology mix. These high emitting vehicles are compensated by low emissions vehi-
cles. This is seen in practice where automotive firms produce low emitting vehicles
to keep high emitting vehicles in their offer. This is one caveat of the CAFE pol-
icy that has been already identified, the model reproduces the same behavior. The
abatement pathway of the technology mix, meaning how fast the emission reduc-
tion rate occurs is subject to the diffusion constraint. Since the CAFE policy final
objective is a low carbon automotive fleet, the constraint is applied on the final year
of simulation. Intermediate targets may be applied as well.
The Policy package is limited to a selection of policies nevertheless other poli-
cies affecting technology choice might be interesting to study (Anderson et al., 2011).
For instance, a feebate scheme that will penalize high emitting technologies and in-
centive low emitting technologies (Anderson et al., 2011; Carley et al., 2016; Haan,
Mueller, and Scholz, 2009; Greene et al., 2005). This and other policies have been
studied for policy efficiency purposes. The OMLCAT can be compatible with all of
these applications and can be extended to such analysis. A road tax or fuel tax (Klier
and Linn, 2013) are beyond the scope of OLMCAT and can not be treated with its
current form.
The model is a linear optimization problem which in the absence of diffusion
constraints, would create a bang-bang solution. In this non-dynamic case it would
only change in the year of compliance creating a discontinuity or step in the technol-
ogy pathway, choosing 100% of the cheapest technology to comply with the target.
We present below several methods to correct this. We introduce the last constraint of
the model that limits technology in the following Section 2.4.2 to describe the novel
approach that we use to constraint technology growth.
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2.4.2 Modeling the constraint on the Speed of Diffusion of new technolo-
gies
Here, we develop the principle and mechanism of the diffusion constraint.
Technological change is time consuming and extends over decades (Rogers, 2003),
the success of technology diffusion depends on the dynamics of supply and demand.
A technology that enters a market might experience all or one part of the following
phases: innovation, diffusion, stabilization and decay. We are interested in the dif-
fusion phase that occurs after innovation when sales share show a growth from zero
sales share meaning that the technology is commercially available.
At the consumer level the reasons explaining the limitations of technology dif-
fusion are consumer awareness, consumer willingness to buy and consumer prefer-
ences. At the automotive firm level, technology change is limited by capital inertia
of the assets of the firm to produce a specific technology. When a firm plans to de-
velop a new technology it requires adapted manufacturing and labor resources than
can be new to the firm and costly. A more radical technological change demands a
deeper change in the firm business structure.
The technological change in a firm is the supply-side transition in a diffusion
process. This transition integrates a build up in capacity to produce the new tech-
nology. In economy models it is represented by learning effects or how a technol-
ogy can become more competitive through cost reductions and performance im-
provements. The specific mechanisms driving learning are listed below, taken from
Kahouli-brahmi, 2008:
— Learning-by-doing: repetitive manufacturing tasks involve an improve-
ment of the production process.
— Learning-by-researching: improvements related to the innovation process
and creation of knowledge.
— Learning-by-using: user’s experience and feedback effects that follow in-
troduction to the market are source of technology learning.
— Learning-by-interacting: interactions between the various actors like the
research laboratories, the industry, the end-users and the political decision-
makers enhance the diffusion of knowledge.
— Economies of scale: at the mass production stage, as the output increases
the unit cost curve drives costs down.
In the automotive sector, technology learning is one of the key methods to acquire
knowledge, capabilities and experience. The process of learning requires time thus
it is a limiting factor in the diffusion of new technologies. The learning rate of tech-
nologies has been estimated in vehicle technology (Weiss et al., 2012). The imple-
mentation of learning in models follows a learning curve where each additional unit
produced or each additional investment builds up the knowledge and experience
stock (Grübler and Messner, 1998; Berglund and Söderholm, 2006; Kahouli-brahmi,
2008). Although our model does not include any type of explicit learning we are able
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to capture the effects of limiting supply-side inertia and market diffusion through
the S-curve.
From a technology perspective, the model does not describe the complex mech-
anisms of neither adoption of a given technology (consumer dynamics) nor capital
inertia of a the technology (industry dynamics), it uses a more comprehensive ap-
proach. A technology is subject to market inertia that represents both consumer and
supply dynamics of technology diffusion. At market level, products that are broadly
used like vehicles have been analyzed in literature to understand how does the dif-
fusion of a technology has occurred in the past.
Empirical research on past technology diffusion has found that S-shaped curves
are useful for analyzing technology diffusion where two simple processes: diffusion
and substitution are observed (Grübler, Nakic´enovic´, and Victor, 1999). Diffusion oc-
curs whenever a technology becomes widely adopted starting from a market niche.
Substitution occurs when a technology replaces an incumbent technology such as
the replacement of horses by cars in transportation. The storyline, the history of facts
defining the direction of technology development, that accompanies the diffusion of
technology is key to understand its limitations, success and failure (Charlie Wilson,
2012; Charlie Wilson and Grubler, 2011; Rogers, 2003). The drivers of technology
diffusion are described in socio-technical studies of technological change (Frank W
Geels, 2012; Frank W. Geels, Berkhout, and Vuuren, 2016). We are interested in how
empirical research has modeled technology diffusion.
The profile of growth has a consistent shape where technologies go from low to
high market shares. For cumulative sales or stock of technology, this shape is known
as the S-curve (Rogers, 2003; Peres, Muller, and Mahajan, 2010; Geroski, 2000). This
S-curve can be divided into 5 phases: Niche Market, Early Adoption, Early Majority,
Late Majority and Laggards seen in Fig.2.3. The initial phase of Innovators refers to
the more complex and unstable phase that is critical for new technology develop-
ment (Bento and Charlie Wilson, 2016; Charlie Wilson, 2012). The other phases are
commonly seen on diffusion literature and define the type of consumer that adopts
the technology. The Niche Market contains consumers that are eager to buy new
technology and are willing to pay for an additional cost in technology whereas Lag-
gards are consumers that are not compatible with the technology services and will
adopt it only when neighbors have done the change. The properties that define the
diffusion profile are the total time to reach to full growth, the maximum growth rate
and the maximum potential or saturation of a technology (S. Zoepf and Heywood,
2012) shown in Fig.2.3.
The sigmoid or logistic function has been used to fit past technology diffusion
(Grübler, 1991; Wilson et al., 2013; S. Zoepf and Heywood, 2012). We apply this
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FIGURE 2.3 – Schematics of the stages of diffusion of a technology
from innovation to full deployment. Source: The Author.
sigmoid function to model future technology diffusion:
Growth : SS(t) =
a
1+ be−ct
(2.5)
where a is the saturation point, c is the speed of diffusion, b is the translation param-
eter of the function in time and SS is the resulting sales share.
To model the technology pathway of an economic sector a hypothesis on the
diffusion of technologies is needed, there are different ways used on classical fami-
lies of models to treat diffusion: "While diffusion is clearly a distinct area of empir-
ical work, climate models diverge in their treatment of diffusion: top-down models
without technology detail typically subsume diffusion into trends in sectoral pro-
ductivity, while technology-rich bottom-up models typically include more ad hoc as-
sumptions to constrain the penetration of new technologies.”(Pizer and Popp, 2008).
Our approach is technology rich and fixes limits on diffusion from the basis of tech-
nology inertia.
In energy systems models, there are limits on the diffusion of technologies
where growth constraints set the limit on the expansion of a technology. In bottom-
up models, technology growth is expressed with a maximum growth rate(Leibowicz,
Krey, and Grubler, 2016). The MARKAL family of models (Fishbone and Abilok,
1981) puts a constraint on the cumulative sales of a technology:
∀ years i > 0 ∀technology j Sij − (1+ gi−1j)iSi−1j ≤ S0j (2.6)
where S is the cumulative sales of a technology, g is the annual growth rate and S0
is an initial constant to allow growth from zero.
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The MESSAGE family of models (Schrattenholzer, 1981) also defines limit on
technology growth based on the added capacity of the technology.
∀ years i > 0 ∀technology j Xij ≤ γXi−1j + g (2.7)
where X is the number of annual sales of a technology, γ is the matrix of growth
parameters and g is a vector of start-up values allowing X to reach positive values
after having zero before.
Both of these expressions of technology diffusion translate into an exponential
constraint with a constant or variable growth rate. Other cases where technology
diffusion is modeled are marginal abatement cost curve (MACCs) where technology
options are launched if the cost of abatement is lower than the carbon tax/price. The
growth of an abatement technology comes with a marginal cost increase necessary to
produce the additional unit of abatement. In a classic MACC (Enkvist, Nauclér, and
Rosander, 2007) there is no constraint on growth thus in this form they fail to capture
the dynamics of diffusion (Kesicki, 2012; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014). In other
words, the potential of a technology is assumed to be fully available at any point
in time. To capture the slow take-off on abatement solutions, economic inertia of
an investment is defined as the availability of the abatement potential of an option
at a period of time. A technical inertia is used to include the resources and tools
needed to favor the spread of the technology: labor, manufacturing, R&D, logistics
(Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014).
With economic inertia, only a fraction of the total abatement potential is avail-
able, the logic of this concept is that it takes time to achieve full abatement potential.
A constraint on inertia can limit the amount of a technology as defined in eq. 2.8.
∀ year i > 0 ∀ technology j Maximumpotential aij = ai−1j + β j(ti − ti−1) (2.8)
aij − ai−1j ≤ amaxj (2.9)
Where a is the abatement of a technology, β is the speed of abatement of a technology
and amax is the maximum number of abatement for a technology
When the maximum abatement potential constraint is considered, the short
term solution to achieve emission reduction in the future is not limited to those in-
vestments that are cheaper to the target but also includes more expensive measures
because it will take time to spread a high inertia technology. If we consider that ad-
ditional abatement capacity is due to the deployment of new units in the market, we
can express eq.2.9 in terms of units of technology and maximal technology units per
year.
Xij − Xi−1j ≤ Xmaxj (2.10)
To describe the complex dynamics behind inertia, energy models have used
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learning effects. OMLCAT does not have learning effects but has a constraint on
diffusion that is inspired on the inertia constraint on abatement technologies. When
including learning there is a component of increasing knowledge based on the cu-
mulative size of a technology that reduces investment cost and technology cost in
time (Goulder and Mathai, 2000). With learning there is a more refined mechanism
to analyze the mechanism of path dependency however they require more data and
estimations on the sector’s learning curve. For macro trends on the automotive mar-
ket and to consider market effects beyond learning such as consumer behavior a
constraint on diffusion is enough. In Vogt-schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018
there is no learning either, only a part of abatement potential is available at a point
in time thus making an abatement solution not instantaneous as in a classic MACC.
The approach of learning in Goulder and Mathai, 2000 requires a learning
curve that produce a change in costs of options when knowledge stock changes. In
the exogenous model of inertia of Vogt-schilb, Meunier, and Hallegatte, 2018 there
is a constant exogenous limit on diffusion that does not evolve in time. The constant
speed of diffusion fails to capture the change in diffusion dynamics of an S-curve.
Our approach shows that we can produce a limiting inertia that evolves in time if
we replicate a S-curve behavior from the history of the economic sector.
Our model is related to limited availability of abatement potential form of dif-
fusion constraint but the difference lies in the limits on growth. The model in eq. 2.8
can change the limits of speed by increasing or decreasing the exogenous limits with
time, β j. Diffusion limits that are too optimistic, a high β j will result in a share of low
carbon technologies that is too high inconsistent with a pace that can be followed.
In contrast diffusion limits that are too pessimistic, a low β j will reduce the chance
of penetration of low carbon technologies. To follow a S-shape diffusion, this type
of constraint would have to modulate speed limits in time. However this modified
constraint would still be ex-ante meaning that diffusion limits are fixed before sim-
ulation. The limitation would be that the model assumes some diffusion is already
happening which creates a bias to artificially change the speed of diffusion.
In a near term perspective an ex-ante approach is not an issue because the dif-
fusion limit potential error when a technology under-performs is small. In a long
term perspective if the technology does not diffuse in the early period, the diffusion
limits will still grow and the technology might be picked only when the diffusion
limit is highest. Thus the technology might benefit from an artificial diffusion pro-
cess that reduces growth constraints in the future. The inconvenient is that a technol-
ogy might develop only because the model enables the technology to diffuse instead
of being the adapted abatement technology for the model settings. The overall con-
sequence is that a model might reserve high abatement options to be developed at
the time when the ex-ante defined S-shaped diffusion exhibits its faster growth.
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Thus we propose an endogenous function that limits growth for each technol-
ogy that is constructed from a sigmoid function. We modified the function to take
the sales share at year i as input and return the maximum growth or maximum speed
of diffusion that is possible for that technology. By doing so we limit the diffusion
profile of a technology to the S-curve profile. The following equations explain the
intermediate steps to obtain the diffusion constraint.
f : SS(t) =
a
1+ be−ct
(2.11)
g : t(SS) = −1
c
ln(
1
b
(
a
SS
− 1)) (2.12)
where SS is the sales share of a technology, a,b and c are the coefficients of the sig-
moid function of diffusion: saturation point, translation parameter and speed pa-
rameter respectively. f is a function of time of the sales share. We want a function
of the rate of change of the sales share respect to the sales share at any given time.
Therefore we perform a time derivative of function f and then we replace t by g.
d f
dt
=
abce−ct
(1+ be−ct)2
(2.13)
d f
dt
=
abce−cg
(1+ be−cg)2
(2.14)
d f
dt
=
cSS(a− SS)
a
(2.15)
∀year i > i0 and ∀technology j : SSij − SSi−1j ≤
d f (SSi−1j)
dt
(2.16)
∀year i > i0 and ∀technology j : SSij − SSi−1j ≤
cSSi−1j(a− SSi−1j)
a
(2.17)
To allow possible full diffusion of any technology we have set a = 1 for all tech-
nologies. There are some technologies that are not perfect substitutes of fossil-fuel
based engines, plug-in vehicles for example are not fit for consumers that do not
have access to a charging infrastructure or those that do very long trips. Thus hav-
ing a lower a saturation point reduces the maximum sales share of a technology and
limit the emission reduction potential of this technology. For the purpose of this
thesis, we do not change the saturation point. For distant time horizons, a change
in the saturation parameter is key to determine which technologies are necessary to
develop once that the least cost technologies have reached their maximum potential.
For a = 1 and for short time horizons, c is the only parameter constraining the speed
of diffusion as in eq. 2.18.
∀year i > i0 and ∀technology j :
SSij − SSi−1j
SSi−1j
≤ c(1− SSi−1j) (2.18)
where SS is the sales share of a technology, and c is the speed parameter of the
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sigmoid function of diffusion. The constraint on diffusion is a convex function and
all other constraints are linear, therefore the solution is unique.
The diffusion constraint fixes the growth limits on technologies with a recur-
sive limit obtained with the year n-1 sales share. The diffusion constraint is strong
for low and high sales share of technologies because it does not let a rapid growth.
For a CAFE policy the most profitable solution is the one with the lowest marginal
abatement cost, the technology that satisfies this condition will be likely to be fully
deployed by a firm. In our applications we can test when OMLCAT saturates the
technology diffusion constraint by comparing the sales share of a technology with
the hypothetical saturation profile that simulates the maximum deployment capac-
ity of a technology. When the two curves are identical, the technology is fully satu-
rated and can not be further deployed.
The function in eq. 2.15 gives a low speed limit for sales shares that are low,
it peaks when sales share are at 50% of a and then decreases until sales shares reach
the value a. The difference from other models relies on two aspects: first, the dif-
fusion constraint is based on the sales share meaning that if sales remain stable for
several years the speed limits will not change and second it considers both the slow
take off characteristic of an exponential growth and also the reduction on diffusion
speed when the market faces those consumers that are more resistant to adopt new
technology. The model represents the inertia of low carbon technologies to diffuse
in a market that starts from a low sales share and then takes time to diffuse.
The type of constraint proposed in eq.2.18 is different from the exponential
growth rates of MARKAL and MESSAGE families in eq.2.6 and 2.7 because the
growth rate is not constant it will decrease when the market share is high. This
produces a technology adoption in the shape of an S-curve instead of an exponential
growth seen in the other families. Calibrating the diffusion constraint in an exoge-
nous and constant manner as in MARKAL and MESSAGE can result in overestimat-
ing the potential growth if the exponential constant is high or underestimating the
potential growth if the exponential constant is low. In OMLCAT overestimation and
underestimation issues are reduced but there needs to be available data on past dif-
fusions to obtain the sigmoid function profiles of an economic sector. If the model
is assessing the technology diffusion of a new economic sector or when there are
no estimates of the diffusion of technologies, OMLCAT can test different diffusion
speeds.
The difference of the diffusion constraint in OMLCAT with the model pre-
sented in eq.2.9 is that the gap in abatement potential from one year to the other is
always limited to the same exogenous constant. For initial market adoption this limit
will not constraint technology deployment on the contrary if the abatement speed is
too high, low carbon technologies will move too fast. Conversely if the limit is too
low, it will delay the deployment of low carbon technologies to a mass market. In
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OMLCAT this gap depends on the market share of the previous year it can increase
meaning that the technology can grow faster if the market share is below 50% or it
can decrease when the market share is above 50%.
Moreover, the same differences in speed are observed in the geographical lo-
cation of the market (Barreto, 2008; Grübler, 2012). A core market is the one that first
adopts the technology and a periphery market is the one that follows. The choice of
the region of the model in our case Europe also determines the diffusion rate. Eu-
rope is a core automotive market thus using estimates from USA diffusion another
core market is not problematic in terms of speed.
The diffusion constraint is different from what is found in literature because it
does not fixes constant growth limits at a given year, the constraint acts according to
the sales share evolution of a technology. This constraint is more adapted to model
long periods of a technology mix because the time to full diffusion of a technology
under this constraint in the case of LOW diffusion profile is 25 years. With a long
time horizon one should be able to see the change in speed of technology diffusion
and identify the peak in speed of diffusion at half of the saturation sales share.
The recursive nature of the diffusion constraint implies that the technology
diffusion depends on the start point of sales share of the technology. The calibration
of initial technology sale shares is made on data of the sales share of the lower ve-
hicle segment. However, some technologies are not commercialized so the real sales
shares are zero. Our model can not develop a technology from a zero sales share,
therefore we simulate an introduction of commercialization of a technology with a
2% sales share. Costs on the first years are expected to be high until the model re-
duces the number of options of technologies. This is a limitation of the model and
results on potentially sensitivity to initial value chosen for technologies with small
sales shares. A sensitivity test should be applied to check for robustness of results
with variations of initial conditions.
Keeping in mind that comparable technology diffusion makes sense in a large
market and with a large scale of time (Grubler, Charlie Wilson, and Nemet, 2016)
we look at USA market. The data that was used to determine the parameters of the
diffusion constraint are extracted from the dynamics of USA automobile technology
historic from 1975 to 2015 from national agencies Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA, 2016) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Davis et al., 2016).
From the database on historical trends (EPA, 2016; Davis et al., 2016) we have
performed a non linear least square regression with the fitted function defined in eq.
2.5 on technologies with a penetration of more than 50% 3. We isolated the diffusion
phase from the first growth phase to where growth trend is stable or is reversed to a
decay phase. The fitted curves on the database can be seen in Fig. 2.4. We obtain the
3. The diffusion profiles of technologies in the automotive sectors were obtained using non lin-
ear regression in R.
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speed of diffusion from parameter c in Table 2.2. There are different types of tech-
nologies in the database: gasoline engine technologies that reduce fuel consumption
such as Port Fuel Injection, Multi-Valve and Variable Valve Timing, transmission
technologies: CVT and Lockup and drive type technology: Front Wheel Drive.
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FIGURE 2.4 – Plots of historical automotive diffusion technologies in
the USA with fitted sigmoid function. Technologies are in the engine
or transmission components. The start year is the beginning of the
diffusion phase and the end year is the end of the diffusion phase or
the end of the time series in 2015. Red circles are historical data and
black line is the fitted function. CVT: Continuous Variable Transmis-
sion. Source: EPA, 2016; Davis et al., 2016.
What we learn from these time series is that in the trajectory of sales share,
there are moments were growth occurs faster and others when it slows down. As
new technology replaces the older alternatives, the growth of the newcomer in-
creases and the decay of the mainstream technology accelerates, sometimes there
is a symmetry. For example as seen in the replacement of Carburetor by Port Fuel
Injection in the USA. In this case the newcomer is a perfect replacement. In general,
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most diffusions take time to penetrate to the mass market. Some technologies fail
and do not diffuse in a market, this is the case of diesel in the USA for passenger
cars. The analysis of the historical trends will allow us to understand how the dif-
fusion process works and characterize it. We define the rhythm at which consumers
buy the newcomer technology and the capacity of the industry to deliver products
at competitive price. Our approach is empirical, we test a diffusion model into his-
torical data. The diffusion model comes from the S-shape curve.
From the historic trends of diffusion, we have some technologies that have a
low saturation point a < 50%. These technologies did not successfully diffuse in
the market and, were ruled out of the estimation of parameters. The fitted function
shows different estimates for its parameters. The saturation parameter a changes
with the maximum sales share of past technology, we have not constrained a to be
lower than 1 although the diffusion is theoretically limited to 1. The translation
b parameter indicates when the S curve profile will begin, it can vary due to the
difference between the trimmed data and a theoretical diffusion starting at year 0,
b is a measure of this delay. The speed of diffusion c parameter is of most interest
to this research and shows that there is not a single dynamic of diffusion in the
automotive market, different speeds define technology diffusion as seen on Table
2.2. The residuals from the regression are low, this means that the sigmoid function
was a good fit.
Technology a b c RSE ∆t
Front Wheel Drive 0.886 27.67 -0.394 0.040 11.2
Lockup 0.809 28.30 -0.398 0.069 11.0
CVT 0.515 48.77 -0.274 0.025 16.0
Port Fuel Injection 1.024 341.03 -0.423 0.026 10.4
Multi-Valve 0.979 10.27 -0.184 0.049 23.8
Variable Valve Timing 1.107 95.36 -0.248 0.032 17.7
TABLE 2.2 – Summary of regression estimates of diffusion technolo-
gies in the USA. Those technologies with parameter a less than 0.5
mean that they have not diffused in the entire market and thus are
not example of a fully successful diffusion. RSE is the Residual Stan-
dard Error of the fitted function and ∆t is the time period over which
market share grows from 10% to 90% of a, thus ∆t = ln(81)c .
Table 2.3 is a compilation of large technology diffusions in the past, the exam-
ples cover the transport and energy sectors and represent infrastructure and end-use
technologies. A review of diffusion processes from Grübler, Nakic´enovic´, and Vic-
tor, 1999 shows that the mean value of time constants is 41 years, with a standard
deviation of about equal size and half of the diffusion processes have ∆t, defined in
Table 2.2, of less than 30 years. Nonetheless this study includes infrastructure and
energy generation processes that take a long time to diffuse. The more end-user tech-
nologies such as passenger vehicles diffuse faster. From these regression estimates,
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Technology Description Region ∆t in years Source
Steamships Worldwide 55 (Grübler, 1991)
Railway networks Worldwide 56.9 (Grübler, 1991)
Canals USA 30 (Grübler, 1991)
Length of surface roads USA 64 (Grübler, 1991)
Motor vehicles (cars, taxis and motor-
cycles)
UK 16 (Grübler, 1991)
Air conditioning USA 18 (Grübler, 1991)
Nuclear power OECD 20 (Wilson et al., 2013)
Natural gas power OECD 28 (Wilson et al., 2013)
Compact fluorescent light Bulbs OECD 15 (Wilson et al., 2013)
TABLE 2.3 – Summary of diffusion time periods from different tech-
nology in transport and energy sectors from historic data.
we created three diffusion profiles: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH and VERY HIGH that
represent the lower bound and intermediate speed and a higher speed presented in
Table 2.4 and Fig. 2.5.
The powertrain technologies with an electric motor have a more difficult chal-
lenge to diffuse in a market due to a change in the energy supply ecosystem (charg-
ing infrastructure) but also a change in the consumer behavior (vehicle’s autonomy
limited to battery size and driving behavior) therefore we took the conservative dif-
fusion profile of LOW for all technologies. Two reasons from a diffusion perspective
are important to be conservative about the speed of diffusion. First an electrification
of passenger vehicles is a novel diffusion process that will affect core regions where
conventional vehicles are deeply adopted and dominate the market. Second electri-
fication of vehicles is not the only technology at disposal to develop a low carbon
transport. It is today competing with other technologies vs. only replacing the in-
cumbent technology, e.g. motor vehicles and horse carriages, which makes diffusion
process slower.
The LOW diffusion profile is used to limit diffusion of all technologies in
Chapter 3 and 4. In Chapter 5 we have changed the diffusion profiles of emission
control technologies that diffuse faster than powertrain technologies. The change in
the diffusion profiles is shown in Table 5.5.
The above mentioned technology diffusion model of a S-curve looks at market
wide changes containing all firms in a sector. Our model is focused on one firm tech-
nology choice. The difference relies on whether the firm is a first mover or a follower
(Wesseling, Farla, and Hekkert, 2015). If the firm is a first-mover, i.e. the first to de-
velop a technology, it will have a slower diffusion rate than those that come after
and benefit from technology spillovers (EPA, 2016; S. Zoepf and Heywood, 2012). A
firm that prepares a future technology portfolio can push the boundaries of diffu-
sion of a technology if they find a competitive advantage to attract more consumers,
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FIGURE 2.5 – Example of Technology diffusion limited by three diffu-
sion profiles: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH and VERY HIGH from an initial
share of 2 %. LOW means also slow and HIGH means fast.
Diffusion Profile c ∆t (in years)
LOW 0.18 24.4
MEDIUM 0.25 17.6
HIGH 0.30 14.6
VERY HIGH 0.40 11
TABLE 2.4 – Four diffusion profiles representing the different dynam-
ics in automotive technologies. Summary of c parameter and time
period defining the speed of diffusion. LOW represents the lower
bound of technology diffusion, MEDIUM is an intermediate speed
seen in all markets, HIGH is a fast diffusion and VERY HIGH repre-
sents the upper bound of family of fast diffusion.
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lower the prices of vehicles or increase the technology exposure. However on aver-
age the supply-side dynamics is limited to the market speed. The last firm to change
technology has often the fastest rate of change. Our model does not distinguish the
position of a firm if it a first mover or a follower therefore our estimate on diffusion
is based on the market average. This thesis is based on a large car manufacturer in
Europe therefore we can assume that it moves at an average speed compared to the
market.
The discount rate value is presented on each application of the model, we have
taken a low estimate that is close to a social discount rate. In the automotive industry,
we can distinguish three different values of discount rates where a firm discounts
the investments in technology, an end-user discounts the price and use of a vehicle
and a policymaker discounts the social cost of a policy. Although modeling a firm
technology choice, we want to evaluate the social implications of the technology
portfolio therefore our estimate is lower than the industry discount rate.
2.4.3 Model Output
The OMLCAT is a dynamic model of optimization, it can show the technol-
ogy pathway or the static technology mix profile at a point in time. The results can
be interpreted on a yearly basis with the status of the mix at one point in time or
as an indicator of the dynamics of a technology. The variables that are obtained to
monitor the emission reduction of the technology portfolio focus on the abatement
pathway, the content and cost of the mix. The abatement pathway is the yearly aver-
age emissions that is compared to the CO2 emissions target. Technology choices are
shown in the sales share decomposition of the mix. The overall cost of the portfolio
of technologies is the objective function of the model, shown in eq.2.2, and can also
be analyzed dynamically to see how the cost evolves. We describe the methodology
to include the cost of using the technology mix in Chapter 4.
2.5 Variants of the Model used to study specific Research Ques-
tions
The OMLCAT is used in three different applications in this thesis to study dif-
ferent policy issues with a fuel economy standard. These applications are described
in full in each of the following chapters. Chapter 3 explores the impacts of a firm
strategy when it prepares future consecutive policy targets. Chapter 4 focuses on
the implications on technology selection caused by the nature of the fuel economy
standard that is indexed to vehicle’s mass. Chapter 5 enlarges the policy scope of
the model to treat both local and global policies in two dimensions: air pollutants
and CO2 emissions in order to understand how different policies interact with each
other. Here we describe the model variations, change in technology assumptions
and key elements used for each application.
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2.5.1 Chapter 3: Path Dependency of technology choices
In this first application of OMLCAT, we introduce 9 powertrain technologies
of the lower medium vehicle segment listed in Table 2.5. The fuel economy standard
constraint is modeled in two steps of increasing stringency in 2020 and 2030. The
CAFE constraint is the same simplified mechanism presented in section 2.4. What
we change in this application is the strategy to anticipate future targets, in terms
of modeling application the effect is three different variants of time horizon and
number of constraints.
— A single CAFE constraint in 2030
— Two CAFE constraints in 2020 and 2030 in one single run
— Two CAFE constraints in 2020 and 2030 a first run up to 2020 and a second
run starting in 2020 up to 2030.
Technology Name Description
Gasoline Baseline Gasoline engine
Gasoline 12V Gasoline engine with a small 12-V electric motor and battery
Gasoline 48V Gasoline engine with a 48-V electric motor and battery
Gasoline HEV Hybrid engine with gasoline ICE, an electric motor and a battery
Gasoline PHEV Plug-in Hybrid engine with gasoline ICE, and electric motor and a
battery capable of charge from the grid
Diesel Baseline Diesel engine
Diesel 12V Diesel engine with a small 12-V electric motor and battery
Diesel 48V Diesel engine with a 48-V electric motor and battery
BEV Electric motor and large battery capable of charge from the grid
TABLE 2.5 – Nine powertrain technologies common to all applica-
tions in this thesis. These technologies were selected to represent the
portfolio selection a car manufacturer with limited choices.
The key element that is analyzed here is the fuel economy constraint and the timing
of abatement technology deployment.
2.5.2 Chapter 4: Implications of CO2 vehicle’s emission regulation in-
dexed to mass
A second application focuses on the mechanism of the policy to distribute
abatement efforts. Chapter 2 has presented a simplified version of the CAFE con-
straint, eq.2.4 does not include any vehicle’s parameter to distinguish between ve-
hicle categories. In practice there are two parameters: mass and footprint that are
used to differentiate vehicles and correct fuel economy targets as a function of this
parameter. Chapter 4 introduces the vehicle mass parameter and modifies the fuel
economy constraint in 2030 to the form applied in Europe with a mass index seen in
eq.2.19.
CAFEi = TARGETi + a
(
Mcorporate −M0
)
(2.19)
where TARGETi is the enacted European target in gCO2/kmfor year i
a = 0.0457 gCO2/km/kg in 2015 and 0.0333 from 2020 is the mass index coefficient
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Mcorporate is the average mass in kg of corporate sales for year i M0 is the estimated
average mass in kg of all new vehicles by the regulator
To test this constraint we introduce one additional technology variant to a
Gasoline technology called Gasoline Light including weight reduction at different
levels to see which scenarios choose this technology. In order to show the gap of
indexing the fuel economy standard to mass we use four scenarios with variations
of the fuel economy standard.
— A CAFE constraint in 2030 without mass indexation
— A CAFE constraint in 2030 with mass indexation based on the initial aver-
age vehicle’s mass
— A CAFE constraint in 2030 with mass indexation based on yearly average
vehicle’s mass
— A CAFE constraint in 2030 with the same target of the scenario above but
without mass indexation
The key element that is analyzed here is vehicle’s mass and the second part of the
fuel economy expression related to vehicle’s mass.
2.5.3 Chapter 5: Overlapping of CO2 and Air Quality Policies
The third and last application of OMLCAT expands the policy package limited
in all other application to the fuel economy standard. This Chapter explores 5 more
policies, listed below: 2 national policies and 3 local policies concerning both GHG
emissions and air pollutants. To simulate the impact of local policies we develop in
Chapter 5 a model of propagation of LEZ policy in urban areas that affects a larger
share of vehicle sales.
— National: EURO Emission standard applied on pollutant vehicle’s emis-
sions for each vehicle
— National: Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Mandate that requires a minimum
share of ZEV
— Local: Low Emission Zones (LEZ) with a progressive ban on ICE
— Local: LEZ with a hard ban on ICE to force entry of ZEV
Automotive technologies in this section are further divided into emission technology
categories where the Diesel and Gasoline families have three variants that change
with compliance with more severe Emission Standards. The technology evolution
includes better fuel combustion and after-treatment of vehicle’s emissions improve-
ments. In terms of mechanism, each policy affects the whole or a part of new vehicle
sales, has its own time horizon and its own target. The key element of this Chapter
is the inclusion of more policy constraints and how this additional limits change the
baseline of fuel economy standard only scenario.
Table 2.6 is a landscape view of the Scenarios developed in this thesis which
explore the mechanism of the CAFE constraint, the time horizon and the combina-
tion with other policies. We leave the discussion of the results of each application to
70
Chapter 2. Optimal Technology choice under policy and inertia constraints: Model
description
Application Scenarios Fuel Economy Policy Horizon Other Policies
Path Dependency
Optimal Long term no mass index 2030 None
Foresight no mass index 2020 & 2030 None
Myopic no mass index 2020 then 2030 None
Mass Index
Simplified no mass index 2030 None
Initial Mass correction target corrected by initial
mass
2030 None
Mass correction endoge-
nous
target corrected by yearly
average mass
2030 None
Target correction from Sce-
nario mass-index
target equal to Scenario
mass-index
2030 None
Vehicle’s Emissions Policies
CO2 only w & w/o mass index 2030 None
CO2 & Air Pollution regu-
lation
w & w/o mass index 2030 EURO standard:6dFull and
7 in 2020 and 2025
CO2 & ZEV Mandate w & w/o mass index 2030 Quota for NEV: 25-37 cred-
its in 2030
CO2 & LEZ ICE ban w & w/o mass index 2030 tech restriction in cities
starts in 2022 with Diesel
CO2 & LEZ ZEV force w & w/o mass index 2030 tech restriction in cities
starts in 2027
TABLE 2.6 – Scenarios of Vehicle’s Emissions Policies for Passenger
Vehicles for each application in this thesis.
the corresponding Chapters. Throughout this thesis we have tested each of the com-
ponents blocks: changing the technology assumptions, changing the policy package
and changing the time horizon of the simulation.
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Path Dependency of vehicle
technology choices with
consecutive fuel economy targets
3.1 Introduction
The objective to limit climate change below a 2°C, or a 1.5°C, increase com-
pared to preindustrial times, as agreed in the Paris Agreement, require meeting an
ambitious target of net zero CO2 emissions in the course of the 21st century (Masson-
Delmotte et al., 2018). Triggering and amplifying mitigation efforts along a path-
way compatible with such long-term target necessitates the implementation of pol-
icy instruments to guide investment, consumption and R&D decisions. Because the
credibility of long-term targets and policy instruments is problematic, shorter-term
targets are enacted. For example, at the national level, short-term carbon budgets
are defined along national low-carbon strategies and in the framework of the Paris
Agreement countries announce Nationally Determined Contributions at the 2030
horizon. At the sectoral level, several examples of short-term targets also exist: for
instance targets on the share of renewable energy in power generation or targets on
average fuel efficiency in car manufacturing. The question is therefore how shorter-
term targets can be chosen to enable the transformations required to be triggered, or
how the choice of short-term targets influences the attainability of long-term targets.
Recent studies on the dynamics of mitigation pathways, at an economy-wide
global level, have highlighted the risk of carbon lock-in implied when short-term
targets are not stringent enough and thus compromise long-term abatement solu-
tions (Bertram et al., 2015; Bauer et al., 2015; Vuuren and Riahi, 2011). With a more
methodological approach, Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014 have shown that the op-
timal strategy to reach a short-term target depends on longer-term targets, and that
the best strategy might not be to implement the cheapest abatement options first.
The reason for this result lies in the inertia, or limited speed, at which abatement
options can be deployed: in the presence of inertia, it may be optimal to start early
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implementing expensive but high-potential and long-to-implement options. Vogt-
Schilb, Hallegatte, and De Gouvello, 2015 applies this reasoning to the case of Brazil
2030 mitigation target, and show that optimal mitigation for each sector at the 2030
horizon depends on the long-term target.
But these studies remain at an aggregated and relatively abstract level, and
fail to connect directly with existing policy instrument. This chapter aims to bridge
this gap. It focuses on a specific sector, car manufacturing, and a specific policy in-
strument, Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) Standards, which are the main
instrument in place to reduce CO2 emissions from the new fleet of vehicles sold.
It aims to study how consecutive fuel economy standard influences vehicles tech-
nology choices, and how reaching short-term CAFE targets enables or hinders the
attainment of long-term targets.
CAFE standards apply to car manufacturers requiring a performance limit on
the average fuel economy of their yearly sales. They are announced some years in
advance, and are designed to become more stringent over time. The economic liter-
ature on CAFE standards has evaluated the cost of meeting the standard in a static
approach (Luk, Saville, and Maclean, 2016; Hill et al., 2016; Krause, Donati, and
Thiel, 2017; Pasaoglu, Honselaar, and Thiel, 2012; NHTSA, 2010; NHTSA, 2011) in
two main markets: USA and Europe. There are also studies that compare the CAFE
standard with other policy instruments to determine policy efficiency (Karplus et
al., 2013; Damert and Rudolph, 2018; Yang et al., 2017; Anderson and Sallee, 2016;
Yang et al., 2017; Anderson, Parry, and Sallee, 2011; Brand, Anable, and Tran, 2013;
Damert and Rudolph, 2018; Fox, Axsen, and Jaccard, 2017). The literature agrees
that a fuel tax is the most efficient policy but it has the highest political risk. But the
literature on CAFE standards has mainly taken a static perspective and neglected to
study the dynamics of technology choices implied by consecutive targets that tighten
over time.
Our goal is to bridge the gap between climate policy assessment of long-term
and near-term targets with a sector specific policy instrument dynamics. Our aim is
to show an illustrative case of a CAFE policy with two targets in the future to study
the interaction between a near-term target and a longer term target.
To do so, we build an optimization model of vehicle technology portfolio
choices, and use it to analyze two polar cases of anticipation of policy targets. The
first case is a myopic scenario where only a short-term target is accounted for. The
other is a case of perfect information and foresight of both short-term and long-term
targets. We show how the different types of anticipation have an impact on pol-
icy feasibility, technology choices and compliance costs. We illustrate the analysis
with a given set of technologies from which the car manufacturer can choose a port-
folio, a given short-term target and a range of long-term targets. We study how
emission pathways and technology choices pathways differ depending on the type
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of anticipation, with foresight or myopic, and exhibit cases of path-dependency of
technology choices.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
methods, data and scenarios used for the analysis. Section 3.3 describes and analyzes
the results. Section 3.4 discusses the implications of the results for the anticipation
of a fuel economy standard policy and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Methodology
We use an optimization model of the technologies portfolio choices. The com-
plete model description is presented in Chapter 2. The assumptions and data used to
represent technologies are described in section 3.2.2. The representation of fuel econ-
omy standards in the model are given and discussed in section 3.2.3. The scenarios
constructed with this modeling framework are detailed in section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Model of Optimization for Low Carbon Technologies
Cost Minimization of Low Carbon Technology mix
 
Variables: 
Unit annual sales of technology products 
 
Constraints:
- Emissions constraint: CAFE target at year i
- Annual Volume Sales
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FIGURE 3.1 – Overview of the version of the Model of of Optimiza-
tion of Cost of Low Carbon Technologies for this article. Source: The
Author.
The model, described in Fig.3.1 adopts a supply-side car manufacturer per-
spective, which would seek to minimize the total production costs of vehicles sold,
discounted over the time horizon considered. A firm’s profit maximization prob-
lem can be simplified to eq. 3.1 which indicates that a firm can change vehicle price,
number of vehicles or cost of production. In the context of abatement solutions in the
automotive industry, we assume that low carbon technologies are the main driver
of technology cost and consider that cost of production corresponds to low carbon
powertrain technology costs. The type of low carbon technologies in a vehicle is
determined by policy ambitions.
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max
n
∑
j=1
xj ∗ (Pj − Cj) (3.1)
where xj is the number of vehicles sold with powertrain technology j, Pj is the selling
price of a vehicle with powertrain technology j and Cj is the production cost of a
vehicle with powertrain technology j.
Vehicle price is not a variable of optimization in our model. We do not inte-
grate the mechanism of pricing different vehicle technologies to adjust for profitabil-
ity margin, and therefore neglect that the selling price of low carbon technology is in
practice higher than the vehicle price of fossil-fuel based technologies. Instead, the
model finds the least cost solution among low carbon technologies to comply with a
policy ambition.
In addition, we assume technologies unit cost to be constant and independent
of the number of units produced. The model does not take into account the resources
necessary to increase or launch production of low carbon vehicles. Plug-in vehicles
require new type of assembly lines of electric motors and batteries which in turn
requires new type of knowledge and skills. The cost assumptions used in this article
are limited to marginal cost of producing a powertrain unit with a specific technol-
ogy type. The cost of all other technologies of the vehicle is considered the same for
all powertrain types.
The simplifying assumption of costs minimization gives information of what
is the cheapest technology mix to comply with a policy target limited by inertia con-
straints. The solution of the model could be interpreted as the optimal technology
mix to maximize profit margins, under the simplifying assumptions of constant sell-
ing prices and constant unit production cost independent of the number of units
produced.
Here, technology is used to describe a complete vehicle product that includes
all the required technologies to satisfy customer needs in a given vehicle segment.
It is different from the definition of a single technology application e.g. automated
transmission. For example, a technology can refer to a gasoline-powered vehicle
and a different technology would be an electric vehicle.
The inputs to the model are the characteristics of the available technologies:
their production costs and the associated emissions levels. See section 3.2.2 for a
description of these inputs.
The result of a given run of the model is the optimal technology mix output, or
"technologies portfolio", i.e. the share of each technology in total vehicle sales every
year though the time horizon considered. From the optimal technology mix of sales
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over the entire period, the associated emissions pathway and the production costs
can be calculated.
The model accounts for two types of constraints. The first type corresponds
to the regulatory constraint imposed by corporate average fuel economy standards.
The second type are dynamic constraints, or "inertia constraints", on the maximum
speed at which each technology can be diffused. These dynamic constraints act on
the yearly sales of new vehicles.
The objective function and constraints are defined as follows:
minxij
m
∑
i=1
1
(1+ r)i−1
n
∑
j=1
xij ∗ Cj (3.2)
∀years i
n
∑
j=1
xij = SALESi (3.3)
f or target year i∗
∑nj=1 xi∗ jEj
SALESi∗
≤ TARGETi∗ (3.4)
where xij is the number of vehicles sold corresponding to a technology j on
year i, m is the time horizon considered (in years), r is the discount rate, n is the
number of technologies considered, Cj is the cost of technology j in e, SALESi is the
total number of vehicles sold at the year i, Ej is the CO2 emissions of technology j in
gCO2/km, and TARGETi∗ is the corporate average fuel economy standard imposed
at the compliance year i∗.
The sales volume constraint presented in eq. 3.3 sets an exogenous trajectory
of number of vehicles sold each year. An automotive firm has a sales volume goal for
future years that guides the labor and manufacturing needs. In order to commit to
a strategic change in the number of vehicles sold, an automotive firm also prepares
for future policy constraints. Our approach is a policy assessment of the impact of
CAFE that is made after setting volume targets. For the purpose of this article, we
keep the sales volume constraint constant and refer to sales share instead of number
of vehicles. The volume constraint can be interpreted as a guarantee that the sum of
sales share of the technology portfolio is always 100%.
The corporate average fuel economy standard introduced in our modelling
framework is described in section 3.2.3.
The application of the model presented in this article is calibrated to year 2014
and the time horizon considered is 2030. The time step is annual, such that m = 17 is
the number of years. The number of technology options is n = 9 (see section 3.2.2).
The discount rate r is set at 4%.
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The inertia constraints introduced aim at accounting for stylized facts about
the dynamics of technology diffusion. Both supply and demand barriers to diffu-
sion are complex to model. Historical evidence on automotive technologies in the
European and North American markets (EPA, 2016; Davis et al., 2016; ICCT, 2015)
shows that technology diffusion tends to follow an ’S’ shaped curve where diffu-
sion rates first rise and then fall over time. The stages of diffusion under this curve
are defined as: Innovation, Early Adoption, Early Majority, Late Majority and Lag-
gards (Fouquet, 2016; Charlie Wilson and Grubler, 2011; Grubler, Charlie Wilson,
and Nemet, 2016). To represent the shape of diffusion, the literature suggest that
a sigmoid function captures the different stages of diffusion (Grübler, 1991; Wilson
et al., 2013; Zoepf and Heywood, 2012).
SS(t) =
a
1+ be−ct
(3.5)
where SS(t) is the share of a technology in total sales at time t, a,b and c are the coef-
ficients of the sigmoid function of diffusion: saturation point, translation parameter
and speed parameter respectively.
To replicate the S-curve dynamics on our model, we limit the sales share of
year i as a function of the sales share of year i− 1. We use a sigmoid function (eq.3.5)
to derive the constraint on speed of diffusion from the sales share of a technology
(see Chapter 2). We obtain the inertia constraint, eq. 3.6, which produces an upper
limit to the speed of diffusion of each technology, i.e. the maximum yearly change
of sales share of a technology as a function of the previous year sales share.
∀year i > i0 and ∀technology j :
SSij − SSi−1j
SSi−1j
≤ c(1− SSi−1j) (3.6)
where SSij is the share of a technology j in total sales at year i, SSi−1j the share of the
same technology at the previous year i− 1, and c the speed parameter coefficients of
the sigmoid function of diffusion.
Based on this modelling framework of diffusion, we analyze data of past diffu-
sion dynamics of engine and transmission technologies from the USA market (EPA,
2016; Davis et al., 2016). We perform a non linear regression to obtain the dynam-
ics parameters of past diffusion. We obtain three "archetypes" of diffusion profiles
based on past dynamics: LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH and VERY HIGH, depending on
the speed of the diffusion. Supplementary Material gives further details on the data
used and the analysis performed.
In the application of the model presented here, we retain the same diffusion
constraint for all technologies. It is set to LOW which corresponds to a slow dif-
fusion process of high inertia. The values of the sigmoid function coefficients are:
a = 1, b = 300 and c = 0.18. In such condition, the increase from 10% market share
to 90% of full adoption would take 24 years. We choose this conservative estimate of
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inertia because our technology assumptions include electric-powered vehicles that
are more difficult to diffuse. Compared to past fossil fuel technologies, plug-in vehi-
cles demand infrastructure deployment and consumer behavior change. Therefore
a conservative diffusion profile seems more compatible with the deep changes re-
quired to the vehicle ecosystem. Although the dynamics on diffusion vary among
car manufacturers and locations, we estimate that the car manufacturer size and
location in a core automotive market justifies the estimate of a diffusion speed cali-
brated to the average of the market.
The model does not include learning-by-doing effects but has a constraint on
diffusion that is inspired on the inertia constraint on abatement technologies. When
including learning there is a component of increasing knowledge based on the cu-
mulative size of a technology that reduces investment cost and technology cost in
time (Goulder and Mathai, 2000). With learning there is a more refine mechanism
to analyze the mechanism of path dependency however they require more data and
estimations on the sector’s technologies learning curve. For macro trends on the au-
tomotive market and to consider market effects beyond learning such as consumer
behavior a constraint on diffusion is enough.
3.2.2 Technology Assumptions
The set of technologies considered in the application presented here is con-
structed to represent a medium vehicle segment with powertrain options to comply
with the fuel economy standard in Europe. Our model does not take into account all
low carbon technology options as opposed to (Krause, Donati, and Thiel, 2017; Hill
et al., 2016; Sanchez, Bandivadekar, and German, 2012) where they explore a large
set of technologies, but focuses on the main powertrain solutions that are available
in the market. The baseline engine technologies are a Gasoline Engine and a Diesel
Engine, from which incremental electrification of the powertrain improves vehicle’s
emissions but it increases the technology cost. There are two options of mild-hybrids
at 12 and 48 V for Gasoline and Diesel. These hybrid technologies work most the
time in ICE mode but they allow some energy recovery to assist the ICE in specific
conditions and include a stop & start capacity. There is one single full-hybrid and
plug-in hybrid configuration with a gasoline engine. There is a battery-electric vehi-
cle that is the best option in terms of tailpipe emissions but it is also the most costly
(BEV).
Table 3.1 gathers the numerical assumptions for the emission levels and costs
of the technologies considered. These assumptions were discussed with technology
experts from Renault, a french car manufacturer, and are meant to be consistent with
a medium vehicle segment case. The emissions data correspond to emissions over
the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC), given that the upgrade to measurement
of emissions over the World harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedure (WTLP) cycle
is currently on going.
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The initial shares of technologies in total sales for the year of calibration, 2014,
are indicative. They are not meant to represent exactly the sales of a real car man-
ufacturer. Instead, they represent the case of an hypothetical firm that would have
already introduced in the market all types of technologies for the medium vehicle
segment. Otherwise, having a zero market share in 2014 for a given technology
would prevent the diffusion of this technology over the entire time horizon, given
the representation of the inertia constraint chosen. This is a limitation of the method-
ology, and obviously results are sensitive to initial market shares for technologies
that have small initial shares. But the objective of the application presented in this
paper is not to reproduce a real case, but rather to exhibit illustrative cases of path
dependency in technology choices.
Technology Emissions (gCO2/km) Powertrain Cost (e) Share (% 2014)
Gasoline 105 1950 45
Gasoline 12V 98 2350 3
Gasoline 48V 91 3150 2
Diesel 95 2950 40
Diesel 12V 89 3350 3
Diesel 48V 83 4150 2
Gasoline HEV 80 4650 1
Gasoline PHEV 40 5950 1
BEV 0 7950 3
TABLE 3.1 – Assumption of Powertrain Technologies for a lower ve-
hicle segment.
Traditionally in energy models, technology learning is the mechanism to rep-
resent how a technology can become more competitive through cost reductions and
technological improvements (Kahouli-brahmi, 2008). The accumulation of know-
hows in a technology is progressive and follows a diffusion process of its own. For
simplicity, we abstract from learning-by-doing mechanisms and costs are kept con-
stant over time.
3.2.3 Future of Fuel Economy Targets
We aim to test how technology choices for reducing carbon dioxide emissions
made in the short term affect the abatement potential and composition of the tech-
nology mix in a future where fuel economy policy will be more stringent. We analyze
the fuel economy policy in Europe.
The European Fuel Economy Standard is defined as a mandatory upper limit
of Corporate Average CO2 emissions that is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the
emissions level of all new vehicles sold in a given year as in eq.3.7, measured in
gCO2/km. The target for passenger vehicles is set every 5 years with an increasing
stringency to reduce vehicle emission of the overall fleet.
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∀ year i CAFEi =
∑nj=1 XijEj
SALESi
(3.7)
where Ej is the emission level for technology j in gCO2/km,
SALESi is the total vehicle sales of the manufacturer at year i,
Xij is the units of sales of vehicles with technology j at year i,
and n is the total number of vehicle technology options.
The regulatory constraint imposed by CAFE standards is thus represented as:
CAFEi ≤ TARGETi (3.8)
where TARGETi is the enacted European target in gCO2/km.
For the purpose of this Chapter, we make a number of simplifications and ne-
glect some details of the CAFE standard enacted regulation, that would not change
our overall results. In particular, the fuel economy standard in current European
regulation is indexed on the average mass of vehicles, such that heavier vehicles
contribute to lowering the overall standard (European Parliament and European
Council, 2009). Here, we do not account for this indexation of the standard on the
mass of vehicles. Also, the regulation provision includes an economic fine that non-
complying manufacturers would pay. In our modeling choices here, we do not con-
sider this possibility to pay the fine, and the firm has to comply whatever the cost.
The economic literature on Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards has
evaluated the cost of meeting the standard looking at different aspects that limit the
technology pathways, such as consumer preferences on vehicle characteristics: ac-
celeration, size, price, weight (Whitefoot and Skerlos, 2012; Whitefoot, Fowlie, and
Skerlos, 2017; Klier and Linn, 2012; Knittel, 2011), car manufacturers competition
(Whitefoot and Skerlos, 2012). Techno-Economic models have produced an assess-
ment of the technology potential of current solutions (Luk, Saville, and Maclean,
2016; Hill et al., 2016; Krause, Donati, and Thiel, 2017; Pasaoglu, Honselaar, and
Thiel, 2012; NHTSA, 2010; NHTSA, 2011) in two main markets: USA and Europe.
Previous studies produce a static picture of the future technology mix complying
with a given target (Karplus et al., 2013; Damert and Rudolph, 2018; Yang et al.,
2017; Anderson and Sallee, 2016) but few studies are interested in the technology
dynamics under CAFE standards, the implications of short-term technology choices
on long-term technology choices. We bridge this gap in this chapter.
3.2.4 Scenarios
Our aim is twofold: first, test the impact of different levels of stringency of long
term targets that are still uncertain on the technology mix and second, investigate
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the implications of complying with a short term target for the attainment of a longer
term target.
The time horizon considered covers 2015-2030, and includes two fuel economy
targets - a short-term target for 2020 and a long-term target for 2030. The short-term
target is fixed at the enacted target from European Commission of 95 gCO2/km in
2020. For the long-term target, we explored the range between 60 and 80 gCO2/km
comprising a 15% and 30% reduction of the target from the 2020 target level which
correspond to the possible target which is not yet definitive at the time of publica-
tion. Four Scenarios are considered:
— The 2020 only Scenario corresponds to a strategy aiming to respect the 2020
target only. For this Scenario, the time horizon is limited to 2015-2020.
— The 2030 only Scenario corresponds to a strategy aiming to respect the 2030
target only. It optimizes technology choices over the time horizon to min-
imize the overall discounted compliance cost for the 2030 target, without
considering the 2020 target. The resulting average emissions of the fleet
sold in 2020 may in this scenario be higher or lower than the 2020 target of
95 gCO2/km.
— The Foresight Scenario corresponds to a strategy optimizing technology
choices over the time horizon to minimize the overall discounted compli-
ance cost to respect both the 2020 and the 2030 target. It represents a case
where the manufacturer would have perfect information and perfect antic-
ipation of both the short-term and the long-term target.
— The Myopic Scenario corresponds to a sequential strategy that would opti-
mize technology choices first over 2015-2020 to minimize discounted com-
pliance costs over the period to respect the 2020 target, and then over 2020-
2030. The choices over 2015-2020 do not take into account the 2030 target,
they are identical to those from the 2020 only scenario. Technology shares
are re-calibrated in 2020 to the results of the first period optimization, and
the 2030 target is only prepared in the strategy starting in 2020. This Sce-
nario represent a manufacturer that would focus solely on the closest tar-
get, without anticipating the potential tightening of longer-term targets.
A Myopic Scenario would illustrate a case where a car manufacturer would
have no information on future targets or would not anticipate beyond the short-
term target. In Supplementary Material we present a variant of the Myopic Scenario
where the first technology choice is made on the 2014-2030 period but without con-
sidering the 2030 target, keeping the 2020 target constant from 2020 to 2030 and a
second technology choice is made for a 2020-2030 with a 2030 target from the mix in
2020 of the first run.
Table 3.2 summarizes the scenarios and fuel economy targets considered.
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Target years 2020 2030
CAFE targets (gCO2/km) 95 60-80
2020 only ?
2030 only ?
Foresight Scenario ? ?
Myopic Scenario ? ◦
TABLE 3.2 – Scenarios of Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Vehi-
cles Targets. For each Scenario, the CAFE target constraints accounted
for are defined by a ?. The 2030 target ◦ in the Myopic Scenario is not
anticipated from the start of the horizon, it is prepared from the 2020
mix that complies with a 2020 target.
3.3 Results
We first compare average emissions level in 2020 for the four scenarios con-
sidered. Figure 3.2 shows the difference in emission levels in 2020 between the 2020
CAFE target of 95 gCO2/km and two Scenarios - the 2030 Only Scenario and the
Foresight Scenario - as a function of the 2030 target. Note that for the two other
scenarios - the 2020 only Scenario and the Myopic Scenario - the emissions in 2020
are trivially strictly equal to the 2020 target. In the 2030 Only Scenario, emissions
in 2020 are below 95 gCO2/km if the 2030 target is stringent (below 67 gCO2/km in
our case), and above if the 2030 target is less stringent. It means that it is optimal
to outperform the short-term target when the long-term target is stringent, and that
when the long-term target is less stringent it is not necessary nor optimal to meet
the short-term target when the only objective is to meet the long-term target at min-
imal compliance cost. In the Foresight Scenario, if the 2030 target is stringent (below
67 gCO2/km in our case), it is the real constraint and it is optimal to outperform
the 2020 target as in the 2030 Only Scenario. When the 2030 target is less stringent,
the constraint on the short-term is the 2020 target, and the emissions in 2020 in the
Foresight Scenario are strictly equal to the target.
The Myopic Scenario becomes unfeasible for long-term targets below a cer-
tain threshold. The inertia constraints on the diffusion of new technologies is more
limiting when technologies deployment starts in 2020. For 2030 CAFE targets be-
low 69 gCO2/km, the portfolio of technologies fails to comply with the 2030 target.
It is remarkable that in our case this unfeasibility threshold is above the value (67
gCO2/km) for which it becomes optimal in the Foresight Scenario to outperform the
2020 target. The two values determine a range of 2030 targets for which it is neither
necessary nor sufficient to comply with the 2020 target to guarantee the ability to
meet the 2030 target.
Within this range, the Myopic Scenario and the Foresight Scenario have iden-
tical average emissions over the vehicles sales. However, the composition of the
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Not Sufficient
1 Nor Sufficient
Nor Necessary
2
Sufficient 
but different Technology 
choices
3
Myopic Scenario 
Not Feasible
FIGURE 3.2 – CO2 emissions gap in 2020 between the 2020 CAFE Tar-
get of 95 gCO2/km and two Scenarios - the 2030 Only Scenario and
the Foresight Scenario - as a function of the 2030 target. A positive
gap means that emissions in the scenario considered are higher in
2020 than the CAFE Target, a negative gap means that the scenario
over-complies with the target in 2020.
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sales is different in terms of technology shares. For long-term targets above the fea-
sibility threshold for the Myopic Scenario, technologies shares remain different from
the Foresight Scenario. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 detail this point by comparing the tech-
nologies shares in 2020 and in 2030 between the Myopic Scenario and the Foresight
Scenario.
We can define the 2030 compliance conditions from the comparison between
the short-term average emissions and the 2020 target. The 2020 emissions target
level is said sufficient when a short-term target compliance enables a latter target
compliance. It is not sufficient when a short-term target is not enough to comply
with a long-term target. And, it is not necessary when the compliance of the long-
term can be achieved without a short-term target, the emissions level may be higher
than the target in the short-term.
— Not Sufficient Region: To comply with a 2030 target, the average emissions
in 2020 needs to be below the 2020 target. The Myopic Scenario is not fea-
sible in this region. It is Region 1 in Fig. 3.2.
— Nor Necessary nor Sufficient Region: To comply with a 2030 target, the
average emissions in 2020 may be at the 2020 target but the optimal com-
pliance in 2030 is obtained with an average emissions higher than the target
in 2020. The Myopic Scenario is not yet feasible in this region. It is Region
2 in Fig.3.2
— Sufficient but Different Choices Region: The same conditions as in Nor
Necessary nor Sufficient Region but the Myopic Scenario is feasible. How-
ever the technology choices between Myopic and Foresight Scenarios are
different.
To further analyze the dynamics at play, we compare the technology choices
in the Myopic Scenarios and in the Foresight Scenarios. In Figure 3.3 the share of
technology in new vehicles sales in 2020 is compared between the Myopic Scenario
and different Foresight Scenarios ranging from a 68 to 80 gCO2/km CAFE target
in 2030. There is only one single case for the Myopic Scenario in 2020 since the
first period from 2014 to 2020 is independent from the 2030 target by construction.
In contrast, the Foresight Scenario where the 2030 target has impact on the 2020
technology choices produces a different 2020 technology mix for each 2030 target.
The main difference between the Myopic and Foresight Scenario technology
mixes is the absence of Gasoline PHEV in the Myopic Scenario. This technology can
achieve high reduction of CO2 emissions when fully deployed, thus the absence of
Gasoline PHEV removes the option of reducing emissions with this technology in
the longer term in the Myopic Scenario. Furthermore, in Foresight scenarios when
the 2030 target becomes less stringent, the share of PHEV in the 2020 technology
mixes decreases while the share of Gasoline increases. The share of Diesel is slightly
higher in the Myopic Scenario than in all the Foresight Scenarios. Since the Myopic
Scenario minimizes technology costs in a sequential manner, the 2020 technology
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Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
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(A) Mix in 2020
BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline
(B) Zoom in Mix 2020
FIGURE 3.3 – Technology mix in 2020 of Foresight Scenario for dif-
ferent 2030 targets and Myopic Scenario for a common 95 gCO2/km
target in 2020. Myopic Scenario only sees the 2020 target up to 2020.
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mix of the Myopic Scenario is the optimal mix in 2020. Therefore, the introduction
of Gasoline PHEV is not optimal for a 2020 CAFE compliance but it is present in
2020 in the optimal pathway to comply with both 2020 and 2030 targets.
BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline
M F M F M FM FM F M FM FM F M FM FM FM F
M: Myopic
F: Foresight
FIGURE 3.4 – Technology mix in 2030 of Myopic Scenario (left) and
Foresight Scenario (right) for each 2030 target from 69 to 74 gCO2/km.
The technology mix of new vehicle sales in 2030 of the Myopic and Foresight
Scenarios in Fig. 3.4 indicates how each Scenario makes different technology choices
to achieve each of the 2030 emission objectives. There are two main difference. First,
Myopic Scenarios, on the left of each 2030 target, do not deploy any Gasoline PHEV
which is consistent with the technology choices made for the 2020 technology mix.
Second, the Myopic Scenario searches the highest abatement technology: BEV to
compensate the lack of Gasoline PHEV, thus the share of BEV is higher in Myopic
Scenarios for stringent CAFE targets. In Foresight scenarios, the response to a 2030
target uses a mixture of Gasoline PHEV and BEV, and only adapts the sales share of
low carbon technologies to the stringency of the 2030 target. In contrast the Myopic
Scenario produces a technology mix with a high dependence on BEV that requires an
additional abatement technology: Gasoline 48V to comply with more stringent tar-
gets in 2030. When the 2030 target is not stringent, Foresight and Myopic Scenarios
produce an identical technology mix in 2030, as seen on the right of Fig.3.3.
The technology choices made have locked out a potential low carbon technol-
ogy such as Gasoline PHEV and have locked-in Diesel that produces little abatement
only. These 2030 technology choices are the consequence of the 2020 technology mix
where the Myopic Scenario has to choose from fewer low carbon technologies and
thus pushes BEV to the diffusion limit. When this diffusion limit is reached, Myopic
Scenario resort to other technologies such as Gasoline 48V. Gasoline 48V plays a role
of an intermediate technology that is used to comply with a short-term target but
then is abandoned in favor of technologies with higher abatement in the longer term
in the Foresight Scenario.
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Next, we compare the total discounted vehicle production cost in Scenarios
Myopic and Foresight. We show the relative difference in costs between Myopic
and Foresight to the 2030 only Scenario as a function of the 2030 target in Fig.3.5.
The 2030 only Scenario is the optimal pathway to comply with a 2030 CAFE target.
Thus all gaps are positive which is consistent with the construction of the 2030 only
Scenario that has less policy constraints. Foresight Scenario has a better anticipation
of the 2030 target than Myopic Scenario by construction thus the relative difference
in cost with 2030 only Scenario is higher in the Myopic Scenario. However we find
that the cost difference between Myopic and Foresight Scenarios remains small in all
cases.
We show that the Foresight Scenario is more expensive than the 2030 only
Scenario for less stringent 2030 targets and this gap increases. The pivot point is
the change between Region 1 and Region 2 defined in Fig. 3.2. For CAFE targets
in Region 1, the Foresight Scenario needs to have an emission level lower than the
2020 target in order to comply with the 2030 target. In Region 1 technology choices
between Foresight and 2030 only Scenarios are identical because the near term CAFE
constraint is not binding. In Region 2, the 2030 only Scenario has a higher emission
level in 2020 than the target in 2020. Thus the 2030 Only scenario is free to choose less
expensive solutions for year 2020 which results in a less expensive solution overall.
The Myopic Scenario is not feasible for 2030 targets less than 69 gCO2/km.
However, the Myopic Scenario is the least expensive scenario until 2020 by construc-
tion. After 2020, the Myopic Scenario has to re-adapt the technology mix for 2030.
This second step in the Myopic Scenario is costly for stringent targets in 2030. For
less stringent 2030 CAFE target we should expect Myopic and Foresight Scenarios
having the same cost, this is not case because the first step of the Myopic Scenario
does not anticipate the 2020-2030 thus choices are only optimal until 2020. In Supple-
mentary Material we show that the variant of the Myopic Scenario which anticipates
the 2020-2030 period with a constant target at the 2020 level, has the same cost than
Foresight scenario for low stringency 2030 targets.
We have studied the case of a single 2020 target, because the near-term target is
less uncertain. We have explored a range of 2030 targets, which are more uncertain.
In the last part of this results section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the results
to the level of the 2020 target. Fig.3.6 shows the three Regions defined above and the
explored area of the 2020 and 2030 targets.
Due to the diffusion constraint on low carbon technologies, the abatement po-
tential in the near-term and longer term is limited. We explore the maximal abate-
ment that could be obtained with the current diffusion speed settings. First, from
left to right, 2020 targets that are lower than 86 gCO2/km are not feasible because
the near-term target is too stringent. Second, from bottom to top, 2030 targets lower
than 53 gCO2/km are not feasible because they are too stringent.
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FIGURE 3.5 – Gap of Total Discounted Cost of technologies between
Scenarios Myopic and Foresight to Scenario 2030 Only. The gap is the
relative difference of cost of Myopic and Foresight Scenarios to 2030
only Scenario for a range of 2030 CAFE targets.
Targets that are higher than 96 gCO2/km in 2020 are not interesting and are not
explored because they would imply that the target is less stringent than average ini-
tial in 2014 emission level of 96 gCO2/km. We also left aside, a 2030 target that is less
stringent than the 2020 ambition thus the line on top of compliance box represents
cases where the near-term and long-term targets are equal.
Region 1 is the "‘not sufficient"’ region, region 2 the "‘nor sufficient nor neces-
sary"’ and region 3 the "‘sufficient but different choices"’ region. Regions 1 & 2 are
the regions where Myopic scenarios are unfeasible. The Foresight Scenario is feasi-
ble for all cases inside the delimited zone in Fig. 3.6. However Regions 2 & 3 are the
regions where the Foresight Scenario is feasible and does not need to have a lower
emission level in 2020 than the target. Region 1 requires a more stringent intermedi-
ate point in 2020 than the target for the Foresight Scenario. We show that when the
2020 target is stringent all 2030 targets are feasible for Myopic Scenario. As the 2020
target becomes less stringent, some stringent targets in 2030 are not feasible for the
Myopic Scenario: there is an increase in the size of the combination of Regions 1 and
2. When the 2020 Target is not stringent on the right of the box, the Myopic Scenario
is unable to comply with almost half of the 2030 targets.
B shows the results of the variant of the Myopic Scenario for the 2020 and
2030 technology mixes. When taking into account the 2020-2030 period in a the first
optimization step of the Myopic Scenario the 2020 technology mix converges with a
Foresight Scenario with a low stringent target in 2030.
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FIGURE 3.6 – Change in the conditions of compliance of the 2030 tar-
get for a range of 2020 and 2030 targets. The three regions identified
are described above in Fig. 3.2 which describes in detail the case for
95 gCO2/km target.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
We showed how consecutive CAFE targets affect technology choices with two
different types of anticipation. A limited foresight means that a firm optimizes tech-
nology choices for the closest target and then repeats the same process for the next
target. On the contrary, a perfect foresight corresponds to a firm optimizing technol-
ogy choices knowing and considering all upcoming targets.
We illustrated how near-term target compliance influences long-term targets
attainment. We identified three regions, depending on the stringency of the long-
term target, where a myopic strategy focusing on the 2020 CAFE target can be: not
sufficient, nor sufficient nor necessary or sufficient but leading technology choices
are different. When meeting the 2020 target is "‘not sufficient"’ or "‘nor sufficient
nor necessary"’, Myopic scenario is unable to comply with a 2030 target. For less
stringent 2030 targets, the Myopic scenario is able to meet the long-term target, but
technology choices remain different to the optimal choices with foresight. The lack
of anticipation creates technology choice lock-ins that are optimal for a near-term
compliance but not adapted for stringent long-term targets.
Preparing an intermediate target might develop technologies that are not suit-
able for a long-term abatement trajectory. Thus, there is a risk of not complying with
long-term targets because a near-term technology mix might not be well prepared or
not adapted for ambitious reductions in the long-term despite complying the near-
term target. The results are illustrative, they show the effect of the consecutive CAFE
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targets instead of a complete assessment on how to comply with the upcoming tar-
gets. Some of the limitations are that we consider only a limited set of technologies
and a single vehicle segment, that we do not account for learning-by-doing mecha-
nisms and that representation of the CAFE policy instrument is simplified and ne-
glects mass-indexation of targets for instance. Therefore, our contribution remains
of an illustrative nature and cannot provide precise quantitative elements for policy
design or firm strategy to comply with policy.
Furthermore, we have only considered a horizon limited to 2030, although the
mitigation objective are in fact going further in time with net zero objectives along
the 21st century. Considering even longer-term targets may change the picture. In
particular a strategy that develops early very low emissions technologies or zero
emissions technologies may in fact be in better place to be compatible with the net
zero emissions target. However, at this time horizon, it would be necessary to con-
sider mechanisms of learning-by-doing, as well as types of technologies that are
essentially not yet deployed, such as fuel cell technologies.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results have implications for both pol-
icy makers and car manufacturers. The potential risks of a myopic strategy high-
lighted in this article, call for regulators to announce targets as early as possible,
with credibility and stability. When policymakers prepare long-term policies there
is a need to give more tangible objectives to firms on the near-term. A near-term
point of passage can effectively steer change in firms but it can mislead to think
the mix of technologies developed for the near-term plan is compatible with very
low carbon reductions. There are two challenges on the near-term objective: first
the stringency of the target needs to be compatible with the long-term ambition and
second the share of low carbon technologies needs to be monitored to allow deeper
reductions for a more stringent long-term target. Beyond the illustrative case on
CAFE standards developped in the article, our results indicate that monitoring only
the aggregate emissions results along a low-carbon transition pathway might not be
sufficient to indicate whether the trends are adequate to reach long-term targets. In-
dicators to track the structural change and technology change at finer levels are also
necessary.
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Technology choices under a
mass-indexed CO2 emission
standard
4.1 Introduction
The passenger vehicle market is composed of different segments that vary in
aspects such as price, performance, comfort, occupancy capacity, utility, size and
mass. A key question for carmakers and regulators alike is how to distribute emis-
sion reductions across segments? In the first version of the CAFE standard, the fuel
economy target was the same for all passenger vehicles, but less stringent for light-
trucks and Sport Utility Vehicles (SUV). In order to equally distribute the emission
reduction efforts across all vehicle segments, a vehicle characteristic was introduced
to differentiate the different segments.
At the time of creation of the standard, the choice of the index parameter 1 was
a matter of debate. Two parameters seemed suitable to capture the differences be-
tween segments: mass and footprint: the wheelbase x the track width. In both cases,
the purpose is to distribute fuel economy efforts by allowing heavier or larger ve-
hicles to have a less stringent fuel economy limit and increasing the stringency for
smaller or lighter vehicles. The USA chose footprint to "facilitate the use of promis-
ing lightweight materials for current and future policy targets to enhance both ve-
hicle safety and fuel economy" (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
2006). In Europe, where the standard was created later, an assessment on the nature
of the index concluded that both mass and footprint are suitable for the CO2 regula-
tion but finally mass was chosen (Commision of the European Communities, 2007).
In 2009 the first mandatory standard was introduced. It was applied to vehicle’s
emissions measured in gCO2/km and was mass-indexed meaning that size was not
a direct parameter (European Parliament and European Council, 2009).
1. The index parameter is often called utility parameter in legislation but it is not to be confused
with economic utility. To avoid any confusion we will use the term index parameter.
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This work treats the impact of the mechanism of technology choice for opti-
mal compliance with a mass-indexed CAFE standard for a car manufacturer and the
implications for society. We investigate how mass evolution of the technology mix
determines the stringency of future targets. For a 2030 target compliance we quan-
tify how much does the mix change when we consider a mass index coefficient. This
lead us to our main research question: how does the technology mix with a mass in-
dexed fuel economy standard change and what are the implications for society? In
order to answer this question, we compare different mechanisms of modeling a CO2
emissions regulation with and without mass indexation in a car manufacturer tech-
nology model that finds the least cost compliance conditions. The model explores
the dynamics of technology diffusion and focuses on the minimal cost solution of
technology choices. We complete the study with an insight of the cost benefit of the
mass-indexed CAFE for society with the implications on the usage of the vehicle:
mobility cost, road safety, air pollutants and energy demand.
The policy analysis in this Chapter relates with other studies that have taken a
closer look at the CAFE standard in the US (Shiau, Michalek, and Hendrickson, 2009;
Whitefoot and Skerlos, 2012; Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos, 2017; Klier and Linn,
2012; Klier and Linn, 2016). We focus on the European region where the fuel econ-
omy standard is mass indexed and has risen concern on potential drawbacks that
were already identified by policymakers: "this system (utility based standard) which
reflects better the diversity of cars and car makers, would provide more realistic tar-
gets for individual manufacturers, but could be the source of perverse incentives
(e.g. if car makers chose to increase utility instead of decreasing CO2)" (Commision
of the European Communities, 2007). We contribute to the literature that has stud-
ied the market evidence of the fuel economy standard impact on vehicle’s features
(Martin et al., 2015; Luk, Saville, and Maclean, 2016; Fontaras and Samaras, 2010)
and why the CAFE is not a technology neutral standard (Ito and Sallee, 2017; Fox,
Axsen, and Jaccard, 2017).
Our contribution shows the implications of the mass indexed policy, we quan-
tify the difference in the optimal portfolio of technologies of the bias induced by
mass indexation. We highlight these differences by focusing on technology choices
and the resulting vehicle characteristics of the optimal compliance for two scenarios
whit and without mass indexation. We investigate the consequences of this bias in
terms of technology and usage costs to assess the economic benefits or impacts of
mass indexation.
Our approach centered on OEM low carbon technology choices under a fuel
economy standard is novel because we focus on the implication of the policy at the
manufacturer level. We use an ex-ante dynamic approach of technology choices. In
addition, we have included lightweight technology options to identify which scenar-
ios pick these technologies for CAFE compliance. We model different mechanisms
of compliance of a fuel economy standard indexed to mass with an endogenous
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and exogenous evolution of mass and compare them with a fuel economy standard
without a mass index.
The mechanism to comply with a fuel economy standard indexed to mass ex-
cludes technologies that make vehicles lighter consequently this type of policy is
not technology neutral: there is a preference for heavier technologies for the same
abatement cost. Our results show that the index factor of the fuel economy standard
is key to determine the mass impact on the technology choice, a low index factor of
the fuel economy standard reduces the regulation bias. We introduce a lightweight
cost curve to explore different technology options of mass reduction. We identify the
mass reduction potential that delivers optimal cost for a given abatement goal. We
can see as expected that when the fuel economy standard is indexed to mass, the op-
timal output does not pick lightweight technologies and thus limits the technology
choices to reduce emissions.
When considering the production cost and the cost of usage of a vehicle we
obtain a non significant difference between a scenario preparing a technology mix
for a CAFE target with mass indexation and scenario aiming at the same emission
target without mass indexation. This is counter-intuitive since one should expect
that a heavier vehicle mix, preferred by a CAFE with mass index, will consume more
fuel thus having a higher cost of usage. However, BEV play an important role in
countering this effect, they are heavy, expensive to produce but cheap to use. There
is a significant difference in cost of usage of BEVs compared to all other technologies,
they are the least costly technology in usage. In addition, not developing lightweight
technologies in a mass indexed policy compensates the difference in cost with the
scenario that does but has lower BEV sales share.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the data and methodology used for analyzing the fuel economy standard impact on
technology choice. Section 4.3 compares and shows the impact of the fuel economy
standard constraint on a full vehicle segment and a broader technology availability
of options with lightweighting for the same vehicle segment. Section 4.4 discusses
the implications of the results for fuel economy standard policy and concludes the
chapter.
4.2 Modeling the Mechanism of the CO2 Regulation in Eu-
rope
4.2.1 Indexing a Fuel Economy Standard
The main goal of fuel economy standard is to regulate the environmental per-
formance of supply of new vehicles at the OEM level. The policy is applied to the
average environmental performance of all vehicles sold in a year. Vehicle metrics
can be measured in fuel economy (distance traveled with an amount of fuel), fuel
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consumption (amount of fuel to travel a given distance) or CO2 emissions to drive
a given distance 2. The OEM fuel economy mean of vehicles is compared with a
country or region compliance target. Fuel economy standards are mandatory and
imply fines for those OEMs that do not comply with the target. In Chapter 1 in Table
4.1 we present the fuel economy standard variations in the main vehicle markets.
We can see that the differences come from the index parameter: mass or footprint.
On the stringency and year of compliance of the target: given that the latest fuel
economy standards are currently been defined by policymakers we refer to the In-
ternational Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT) publications for the latest targets
and discussion (Yang and Bandivadekar, 2017).
The test cycle used to test vehicles under the same conditions is different from
one region to the other which is partially explained by the different driving con-
ditions of each country or the unherited market regulations from the main market
supplier. Although test cycles do not represent real driving conditions 3 they allow a
comparison between low carbon vehicle technologies. Further differences between
CAFE standards in two major markets: EU and USA have been studied in German
and Lutsey, 2010. Mass-indexed CAFE is wide-spread, we focus on the European
fuel economy standard but the policy analysis in this chapter is relevant for other
markets.
The Fuel Economy Standard in Europe works as a mandatory upper limit of
Corporate Average CO2 emissions that are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the
emissions level of all new vehicles sold in a given year eq.4.2. The target is set in a 5
year step fashion, lowering the emissions target at each step. OEMs that fail to com-
ply are subject to economic fines. There is a target that applies to passenger vehicles
and a different target for commercial vehicles that is not treated in this Chapter. The
fuel economy in Europe is measured in the equivalent gCO2/km emissions from a
vehicle under the NEDC test that simulates an specific driving behavior. In 2017, the
World harmonized Light duty Vehicle Test Procedure (WLTP) has been adopted to
better capture real driving conditions (Fontaras, Ciuffo, et al., 2017).
The policy introduces three flexibilities to comply with the final target. First,
the target is introduced progressively in a phase-in mechanism where only a part of
an OEM sales must comply with the target. Second, supercredits on zero emission
vehicles are introduced to promote the deployment of AFVs and to help OEM to
meet the target (European Parliament and European Council, 2009). Third, vehicles
equipped with eco innovation or off-cycle technologies that allow energy savings
but are not captured by the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test (Fontaras,
Zacharof, and Ciuffo, 2017) benefit of an emissions reduction to comply with CAFE.
2. Brazil uses a different unit: MJ/km to account for differences in energy content in fuels:
ethanol vs petrol and is expressed as energy efficiency.
3. For a discussion on the differences between in use driving emissions and type-approval test
cycle emissions see Fontaras, Ciuffo, et al., 2017; Fontaras, Zacharof, and Ciuffo, 2017; Tsokolis et al.,
2016
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TABLE 4.1 – Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Vehicles main
vehicle markets. *JC08: Japanese test Cycle. Source: ICCT,2017
Country or Region Index Parameter Unadjusted Target Target Year Test Cycle
Brazil Mass 1.82 MJ/km 2017 U.S. Combined
Canada Footprint 217 gCO2/km 2016 U.S. Combined
China Mass 5 L/100km 2020 NEDC
EU Mass 95 gCO2/km 2021 NEDC to WLTP
India Mass 113 gCO2/km 2022 NEDC
Japan Mass 20.3 km/L 2020 JC08* to WLTP
Mexico Footprint 39.3 mpg or 140 gCO2/km 2016 U.S. Combined
Saudi Arabia Footprint 17km/L 2020 U.S. Combined
South Korea Mass 24km/L or 97 gCO2/km 2020 U.S. Combined
U.S. Footprint 55.2 mpg or 146 gCO2/mi 2015 U.S. Combined
The EU fixes one target but, in practice the abatement efforts are distributed
according to the gap between the corporate average and the compliance line as seen
in Fig.4.1. The logic behind is that carmakers with a low average vehicle mass con-
sidered as light have low emissions and thus will have a lower target, as opposed
to carmakers with a high average vehicle mass considered as heavy that have high
emissions and a higher target.
The mass-index standard is a continuous linear function of the homologated
vehicle mass and the allowed gCO2/km emissions for a manufacturer as explained
below eq.4.1.
CAFEi = TARGETi + a
(
Mcorporate −M0
)
(4.1)
where TARGETi is the enacted European target in gCO2/kmfor year i
a = 0.0457 gCO2/km/kg in 2015 and 0.0333 from 2020 is the mass index coefficient
Mcorporate is the average mass in kg of corporate sales for year i Mcorporate =
∑nj=1 Xij Mij
SALESi
M0 is the estimated average mass in kg of all new vehicles by the regulator Mij is the
mass of technology 4 j for year i in kg. Xij is the unit sales of vehicle with technology
j for year i and n is the total number of vehicle technology options. The arithmetic
mean of CO2 emissions of a car manufacturer is obtained below.
∀ year i CAFEi =
∑nj=1 XijEij
SALESi
(4.2)
where Eij is the emission level for technology j at year i in gCO2/km
SALESi is the Vehicle Sales of the manufacturer at year i
Equation 4.1 is the full expression of the fuel economy standard, the average
4. We use technology to describe a complete vehicle product that includes all the required tech-
nologies to satisfy customer need in a given segment. Therefore, it is different from the definition of
a single technology application e.g. automated transmission. The mass of a technology is defined as the
mass of a vehicle equipped with that technology.
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mass of the manufacturer and the a slope parameter define the stringency of the spe-
cific target. The slope of the linear regression of the weighted sales for curb weight
and emissions as seen in Fig. 4.1 is slightly higher than the index factor of the reg-
ulation, a f itted = 0.8 apolicy in 2015. To promote lighter cars, the regulator uses a
smaller slope (Commision of the European Communities, 2007) this pushes heavier
manufacturers to do more efforts to comply with the policy.
In order to understand how the mass-indexed compliance works, the first step
is to define OEM’s target. An OEM that produces lighter than the average mass
vehicles (determined by M0) will have a more stringent target than an OEM that
is heavier than average. In Fig. 4.1 the positioning of several OEM in Europe is
compared with the 2015 and 2020 compliance target lines. More on the trends of size
and mass evolution can be found in Cuenot, 2017. The fuel economy standard has a
more stringent target in 2020, the slope of the line will be reduced and the average
mass has been slightly corrected in 2016. The progression of the main OEMs from
2011 shows three behaviors: OEMs that reduce emissions and increase mass: Ford,
OEMs that reduce emissions and mass: Peugeot and GM and OEMS that reduce
emissions and keep mass constant: Renault, Volkswagen, BMW 5. In Fig. 4.2 we
detail these different approaches of compliance. We can see that from a given initial
condition the strategy that requires the minimum emission reduction efforts is to
increase vehicle mass and decreasing vehicle emissions for a less stringent target.
In summary, in order to reduce emissions of an OEM, there are three mech-
anisms that can be combined or not when choosing the strategy to comply with a
fuel economy standard as is described in Kollamthodi et al. (2015) and German and
Lutsey (2010). For example a powertrain that emits less CO2 and has an equivalent
mass than the traditional technology allows a vehicle to move down the y-axis in
Fig. 4.2. A new vehicle that includes a crossover appearance is heavier and allows a
vehicle to move right the x-axis. Some technologies can have a combined effect like
HEV vehicles (clean + heavy) or a low weight chassis with downsized engine (clean
+ light). In the upcoming section we will detail the impact on technology choice of a
mass attribute.
4.2.2 From the simplified constraint to an emission and mass constraint
Without any complexity on the Fuel Economy standard, the first model of a
fuel economy standard that is intuitive is a limit on the emissions goal only. This ap-
proach is straight forward, the fuel economy standard can be converted to an upper
limit on the average emissions of the manufacturer eq.4.3. This simplification allows
to focus only on the potential of abatement technologies and does not consider any
5. Fiat shows an increase of mass and emissions, this is not due to technology choices, it is caused
by the acquisition of the heavier and more emitting firm Chrysler.
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FIGURE 4.1 – Sales-weighted fuel economy of main OEMs in Europe
indexed to the average mass in 2011 and 2016 and fuel economy stan-
dard compliance lines in 2015 and 2020. Source: ICCT, 2017.
difference between OEMs.
∀ year i CAFEi =
∑nj=1 XijEij
SALESi
≤ TARGETi (4.3)
where TARGETi is the enacted European target.
In order to show the differences in the optimal choice of technologies whether
the CAFE constraint takes the mass into account or not, we modify eq.4.3 to account
for the CAFE policy with a mass index parameter. The objective is to show how the
optimal conditions change and how does the mass impacts the final result,
∑nj=1 xj(Ej − aMj)
SALES
≤ TARGET − aM0 (4.4)
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Initial ConditionAbatement Only Abatement + Mass Increase Abatement + Mass Decrease 
CAFE Target line
CO2  Target line
Mass Decrease Mass Increase
Increase of Stringency of Target 
Decrease of Stringency of Target 
(Mref, Eref)
(Mlight, Elight)
(Mheavy, Eheavy)
100 100*a
FIGURE 4.2 – Detail on the technology options for abatement: from
an initial condition the different options to comply. Every technology
that is placed below a given target line is compliant. Source: The
Author.
where Mj is the vehicle mass in kg with technology j, a is the index factor in gCO2/km/kg
and M0 the reference mass of the standard in kg.
If we compare all technology options to a baseline, we obtain an Abatement
ratio in eq.4.5 that is used to rank potential solutions according to their abatement
costs and potential emission reduction. This ratio is a comparative measure of the
abatement cost to identify technologies that are less costly in terms of CO2 emissions.
A low ratio means that the technology is either cheaper, less emitting or both.
Abatement Ratioi =
Cbaseline − Cabati
Eabati − Ebaseline
(4.5)
where Eabati defines the emission of technology i and Baseline defines the reference
technology. The abatement of technology i is the difference in the numerator of eq.
4.5.
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The optimal choice in the case of a mass-indexed CAFE changes from an opti-
mal abatement cost (cost/emission) to a modified optimal cost by the mass (cost/(emission-
mass)). The best option now depends on cost and technology attributes: mass and
emissions and a regulatory parameter a. If we compare all technologies with a refer-
ence we can obtain the CAFE ratio that is used in the same way than the Abatement
ratio. The aim is to rank abatement technologies according to their abatement costs
under a mass indexed fuel economy standard defined in eq.4.6.
CAFE Ratioi =
Cbaseline − Cabati
Eabati − Ebaseline + a(Mbaseline −Mabati)
(4.6)
Appendix C develops the mathematical difference of a fuel economy standard with
and without mass indexation in optimal conditions. This difference results in the dif-
ferent rankings presented in Table 4.2 and obtained with the Abatement and CAFE
ratio in eqs. 4.5 and 4.6.
4.2.3 Modeling the mass-indexed CO2 emission regulation in the OML-
CAT framework
The technology choices that a car manufacturer makes to prepare a CAFE tar-
get depend on the state of the technology mix on the previous years. Therefore a
dynamic approach of this policy compliance is needed to consider how the tech-
nology mix evolves in time whereas other assessments of cost curves use a static
approach (Hill et al., 2016; Krause, Donati, and Thiel, 2017; FEV, 2015; Singh, 2012).
In the remaining of this chapter we will use a version of Optimization Model of
Low Carbon Automotive Technologies (OMLCAT). This model is basically a supply
model of the powertrain technologies that a manufacturer can develop in a mar-
ket constrained by public policies and diffusion of technology limits on technology
growth. The focus of the model is on powertrain technologies because they have
the largest abatement potential. It is based on data of the emission level, the cost
and mass of the main powertrain solutions that are available in the market from
advanced ICE engines to EVs.
The model does not represent endogenous technological improvements nor
cost reductions. Every technology diffusion is limited by an endogenous diffusion
function in the shape of sigmoid curve that was constructed using historical evi-
dence on automotive technologies diffusion in the European and North American
markets and is calibrated initially to 2014 conditions and sales shares from data
found in International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT) (ICCT, 2015) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA, 2016) technology diffusion reports.
Every year the diffusion constraint sets the limit of growth for a given technology
for that year according to the sales share of the past year of that technology. The
constraint then covers all the entire time spam except for the initial year and applies
to all technologies. The diffusion profiles of every technology in the model can be
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calibrated to the closest historical parent of the same technology family. In this appli-
cation of the model all diffusion profiles are calibrated to a lower diffusion profile:
LOW, defined in Chapter 2, meaning that a technology has high inertia so that it
diffuses slowly. The complete description of the model can be found in Chapter 2.
The optimization algorithm of the model is summarized in the following gov-
erning equations: the objective function and the constraints of the model are de-
scribed below.
min ∑mi=1
1
(1+r)(i−1) ∑
n
j=1 Xij ∗ Cij
s.t. ∀ year i > i0
n
∑
j=1
xj = SALES (4.7)
s.t.∀year i > i0 and ∀technology j : SSij − SSi−1j ≤ Di f f usion limit(SSi−1,j−1)
(4.8)
where r is the discount rate equal to 4%, SS is the sales share of a technology.
The policy package of the model includes a fuel economy standard constraint
as seen in eqs.4.2 and 4.4. The Volume of sales for a manufacturer is defined ex-
ogenously which is held constant through out the simulation in eq. 4.7. The op-
timization algorithm is a minimization of discounted costs of compliance with the
CAFE objective under constraints. In this Chapter, the focus is on the fuel economy
standard brick and the related technology attributes: Cost, Emissions and Mass. For
more details about the Model of Optimization of Cost of Low Carbon Technologies
refer to Chapter 2.
We use the OMLCAT for a lower medium vehicle segment. The following
section presents the data on this vehicle segment in Europe to study the impact of
the diffusion constraint in the optimization of powertrain technologies.
4.2.4 Technology Assumptions: Focus on Lightweight Technologies
The application of the OMLCAT considers a realistic case of choice of tech-
nologies: a medium vehicle segment with powertrain options to comply with the
fuel economy standard. First we define a representative medium car segment in
Europe in Table 4.2 and second we include light-weighting options. We do not in-
clude the 5 year step-wise condition of the fuel economy standard in Europe, which
increases complexity, refer to Chapter 3 for the study of intermediate targets. Our fo-
cus is the mass index impact on the choice of technologies so we model only a single
CAFE target in 2030, since the final target is yet to be known we take a range of pos-
sible targets from 70 to 84 gCO2/km in NEDC. This estimate of the range of possible
targets should be higher than the actual target, since there is no other technology
component other than powertrain to lower emissions (5-10 gCO2/km potential de-
pending on efforts on rolling resistance, electric energy consumption, aerodynamics
and lightweight engineering).
4.2. Modeling the Mechanism of the CO2 Regulation in Europe 111
TABLE 4.2 – Assumption of Powertrain Technologies for a lower ve-
hicle segment and ratios for optimal choices
Technology Emissions Powertrain Cost Mass Sales Share Abatement c. r. CAFE c. r.
gCO2
km
e kg %2014
ekm
gCO2
ekm
gCO2
Gasoline 105 1950 1000 45
Gasoline 12V 98 2350 1020 3 57.14 52.18
Gasoline 48V 91 3150 1040 2 85.71 78.27
Diesel 95 2950 1070 40 100.00 81.10
Diesel 12V 89 3350 1090 3 87.50 73.70
Diesel 48V 83 4150 1110 2 100.00 85.73
Gasoline HEV 80 4650 1130 1 108.00 92.06
Gasoline PHEV 40 5950 1230 1 61.54 55.05
BEV 0 7950 1450 3 64.52 50.01
Our model does take into account all low carbon technology options as op-
posed to (Krause, Donati, and Thiel, 2017; Hill et al., 2016; FEV, 2015) and it does not
take into account supercredits and off cycle technology credits. Therefore the actual
target should be lower. Giving that the WLTP upgrade is currently on going we treat
emissions measures in NEDC. Moreover, we include the Abatement choice ratio and
CAFE choice ratio of an abatement only fuel economy standard and a mass indexed
fuel economy standard respectively calibrated to Europe .
The assumptions on lightweight technologies are obtained in three steps. First
we obtain the relationship between fuel consumption and mass reduction. Second
we estimate the cost of the lightweight technology to achieve a given mass reduction.
And third we combine both assumptions to obtain the cost of abatement of applying
a lightweight technology. We describe below each one of these steps.
The first step aims at relating how a change in mass saves fuel consumption.
There is a physical relationship between mass and energy demand that determines
fuel consumption(González Palencia et al., 2015; Wilhelm et al., 2012; Palencia et
al., 2017). The basic principle is that a heavy vehicle requires more energy to move
which translates in an increase in fuel consumption. We approximate the physical
relationship with a linear function based on data provided by experts and litera-
ture estimates (FEV, 2015; Kollamthodi et al., 2015; Singh, 2012; Krause, Donati, and
Thiel, 2017). The resulting equation of Abatement in percentage and mass reduc-
tion in percentage is presented in eq. 4.9 with primary and secondary effects 6. Our
estimates include secondary mass-reduction because we include an engine tuning
where we allow maximum potential of the lightweight technology with a change in
the number of transmission gear ratios for medium weight reductions and a down-
sized engine for high weight reductions. Both adaptations move down the curve to
allow more abatement reduction.
6. As defined by Kollamthodi et al., 2015 primary mass-reductions are those that are achieved by
reducing the mass of vehicle’s components and secondary mass-reductions are those that are achieved
by redefining components specifications due to a lighter body for example suspensions specs and
downsizing.
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The second step is a cost assessment of the different lightweight technologies.
There are many combinations of lightweight technologies to produce a mass reduc-
tion, it is difficult to select bundles of lightweight solutions to provide a mass reduc-
tion. When we name lightweight technology we are describing a family of solutions
from light materials: high strength steel, aluminum, composite materials and carbon
fiber, to redesigning architecture. The cost estimates were based on the curve of cost
from expert estimate of Renault to obtain the marginal mass reduction cost and eq.
4.10 is the fitted curve of these estimates that are more costly than what is found in
ITF (International Transport Forum), 2017; Singh, 2012; Kollamthodi et al., 2015. We
obtain the cost of mass reduction in efrom a given mass reduction in kg, shown in
eq. 4.10.
The third step is to combine the function of abatement potential and mass
reduction in eq. 4.9 and the cost of mass reduction in eq. 4.10 to obtain the abatement
cost curve of lightweight technologies in eq. 4.11. The Gasoline Light technology
can have a range of mass reduction up to a technical limit of 15% , we explore all the
range of possible mass reduction.
Emission Reduction = a1Mass Reductionc1 + b1 (4.9)
Where Emission Reduction is in % of fuel economy reduction [gCO2/km], Mass Re-
duction is also in % of [kg] and a1, b1 and c1 are the function coefficients.
Cost o f Mass Reduction = a2Mass Reductionc2 + b2 (4.10)
Where Cost of Mass Reduction is in e, Mass Reduction is in kg and a2, b2 and c2 are
the function coefficients.
Cost o f Emission Reduction = a2(Mre f (
Emission Reduction + b1
a1
)1/c1)c2 − b2 (4.11)
Where Mre f is the Mass of the baseline technology.
Mass reduction is applied in an incremental manner, we have explored the
mass reduction range from 1% to 15%. To create a lightweight alternative from the
technology assumptions, first we fix an amount of mass reduction of the reference
technology: Gasoline. Second we use the cost curve to obtain both the incremental
cost of lightweight technology and we use the mass reduction and the fuel economy
performance curve to obtain the abatement cost of the introduction of lightweight.
Third we introduce the lightweight technology option in the model as a competing
technology of the Gasoline 12V: a less emitting version of standard Gasoline option
but more expensive and heavy than Gasoline Light. We calibrate the same initial
sales share to Gasoline Light and Gasoline 12V taking away a small share of Gaso-
line. Both abatement options are more expensive and less emitting than Gasoline
option but Gasoline 12V increases mass and Gasoline Light decreases mass.
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FIGURE 4.3 – From left to right, lightweight abatement potential,
lightweight cost curve and lightweight abatement cost curve.
4.2.5 Scenarios
In order to isolate the effect of the CAFE constraint, we study 4 Scenarios of
CAFE representation. First, Scenario 1 is a climate change emission reduction type
of constraint where the objective is to reduce carbon emissions only, this type of fuel
economy standard constraint is only based on cost and emissions. It would be the
only Scenario that one could simulate when data on mass is not available. Second,
Scenario 2 has the same type of constraint but it has been set to the initial position of a
manufacturer in the mass axis. Third, Scenario 3 is a CAFE Europe type of constraint
where the attributes that contribute for a fuel economy standard compliance are cost,
emission and mass. Fourth and final, Scenario 4 has the same type of constraint of
Scenario 1 and 2, no mass in the constraint, but instead of correcting the mass with
the initial position we set the emission target at the final position to be equal to the
mass-indexed emission target of Scenario 3 at the final position. All Scenarios were
tested under the same vehicle and diffusion market hypothesis and we are changing
the mechanism of the fuel standard to test for change in stringency and change in
the technology choices. For simplicity we can name the Scenarios as follows:
1. Scenario 1: Simplified CAFE constraint
CAFEi ≤ TARGETi
2. Scenario 2: Simplified CAFE constraint corrected target with initial average
mass
CAFEi ≤ TARGETi + a(Mt=0corporate −M0)
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3. Scenario 3: Mass Indexed CAFE constraint
CAFEi ≤ TARGETi + a(Mt=icorporate −M0)
4. Scenario 4: Simplified CAFE constraint with corrected final target from Sce-
nario 3
CAFEi ≤ TARGETt=2030 f romSc.3
The following section presents the Results on the stylized medium vehicle seg-
ment and the lightweight alternative option.
4.3 Results of the mass indexed constraint on a vehicle seg-
ment
To show the difference on the technology mix when changing the mechanism
of the constraint of the fuel economy standard, we use the results of our four Scenar-
ios. We model a CO2 emissions target of 75 gCO2/km in 2030 and a Gasoline Light
version at 10% of mass reduction.
We start by looking at the impact of the change in the type of constraint on
the effective CO2 target compared to the policy target. In all 4 Scenarios, we have
interpreted the CO2 target policy differently. Results show that this interpretation
can lead to different technology choices.
The first difference is in the final fuel economy performance of the average
vehicle at the year of compliance, 2030. If we neglect mass from the policy model
as in Scenario 1, the average fuel economy in 2030 is equal to the CO2 target in 2030
as can be seen in Table 4.3. Scenario 2 assumes that the average mass in 2030 will
be equal to the mass in 2014. The policy model translates the CO2 policy target of
75gCO2/km to the mass indexed target using the reference average mass of 2014, the
final target in 2030 is lower than the policy target because the reference average mass
is below the M0 market reference of the policy. It is also the more stringent target of
all scenarios therefore the estimated target is more ambitious than what the real CO2
target should be in 2030. The reverse would be true if M0 < Mcorporate at t = 0.
Scenario 3 does not make an assumption on the evolution of the average mass
of a vehicle, instead it optimizes the fuel economy of the mix taking mass as a com-
ponent of the fuel economy constraint. The final target in 2030 of Scenario 3 is at
67.6 gCO2/km which is the same target of Scenario 4 by construction. The emission
level of Scenario 3 is between emission levels of Scenarios 1 and 2 which is expected
because the target gives an incentive to increase mass and thus relax the emission
constraint.
When comparing the average mass at every year in Table 4.3, all Scenarios
have an increasing average mass. The less stringent target of Scenario 1 corresponds
to the lowest average mass because there is no increase in stringency. The technology
mix does not require to develop high potential low carbon technologies that are
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TABLE 4.3 – Average Mass and Emissions Level in 2030 for all Sce-
narios at CAFE target of 75 gCO2/km and Gasoline Light with a mass
reduction of 10 %
Scenario Average Mass (kg) Average Emissions (gCO2/km)
1 1090 75
2 1134 64.2
3 1150 67.6
4 1119 67.6
also the heaviest (EV and PHEV). Although Scenario 2 is the more ambitious, the
average mass in this scenario is lower than Scenario 3 which shows that in order to
achieve a more stringent target, Scenario 2 prefers lighter technologies. The same
remark is obtain when comparing the average mass of Scenarios 3 and 4 although
they are subject to the same compliance limit. This result is consistent with the fact
that allowing the model to optimize the technology choices using vehicle’s mass is
an incentive to develop heavier technologies. For the same CO2 emissions target in
2030 Scenario 3 has chosen more heavier technologies.
Considering the content of the technology mix, we are interested in the share
of sales of each technology, specially at the end of period which is the year of compli-
ance for our fuel economy constraint. In Fig.4.4 we can see that the share of sales in
2030 of Gasoline12V is identical in all Scenarios and Gasoline Light is almost identi-
cal among Scenario 1, 2 and 4. However Gasoline Light is absent in Scenario 3, this is
an indicator that the mass index fuel economy standard has an incentive for heavier
technologies. The upgrade to a lightweight technology is absent in Scenario 3, the
share of Gasoline is highest in Scenario 3. Further details on the technology mix and
the diffusion of technologies can be found on Appendix C for this same example.
The results of the model application in a stylized vehicle segment example
confirm the impact of a mass indexed fuel economy standard in the choice of tech-
nologies as seen in eq.4.4. The incentive is to develop technologies that are heavier.
First, the target has become more stringent when correcting the final objective with
the initial mass (Scenario 1 to Scenario 2). Second, the optimization of technology
choices considering both mass and abatement show that the target is less stringent
(Scenario 2 to Scenario 3). And third, the only difference between Scenario 3 and 4
lies on the incentive to choose heavier technologies in Scenario 3 and thus eliminat-
ing the choice of light technologies.
When checking for the compliance with the policy framework in Europe in
2030, the technology mix in Scenario 3 is exactly at the compliance limit which is
expected by construction it develops the least cost solution for this policy. In contrast
Scenario 4 fails to comply with the policy in Europe because the lower average mass
increases the target stringency. Two questions remain to be answered: first, does
the difference between Scenario 3 and 4 hold for other cases of mass reduction and
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FIGURE 4.4 – Output of technology mix optimization with different
Scenarios of fuel standard constraint with Light Tech: Technology
Mix in 2030 for lower vehicle segment.
CAFE targets? and second, what is the economic impact on the social cost of the
heavier average vehicle?
We have seen an example of application of our model for a given CO2 emis-
sions target and one type of lightweight option. In the remaining of this Chapter, we
will focus on the difference between Scenario 3 and 4. Both achieve the same CO2
emission target for corporate average in 2030. However, they do not have the same
mechanism to comply with a fuel economy policy. One neglects mass of a vehicle
(Scenario 4) and the other does not (Scenario 3). We will explore a broad range of
fuel economy targets and mass reduction percentages. This allow us to highlight the
cases where the technology choice is affected by looking at the lightweight version
of Gasoline technology in our model. In Fig. 4.5 we show the difference on the share
of sales of Gasoline Light between scenarios (Scenario 4 – Scenario 3) in absolute
value in 2030.
For low percentage of mass reduction the difference between both scenarios
is low. Likewise, for a mass reduction above 14% and not so stringent targets, the
difference is also low. In both of these cases, the share of Gasoline Light is also low
for both Scenarios. A low mass reduction is not optimal, the cost of reduction of
CO2 emissions with lightweight technologies is optimal for a range between 8 and
13 %. In this range the difference between the Scenarios is the highest. In this re-
gion the Gasoline Light technology is more than 20 points more present in Scenario
4 than Scenario 3. The maximum difference is equal to the saturation diffusion limit
of Gasoline Light in 2030 at 23%. This difference has an impact on the average mass
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of the vehicle: in Fig.4.6 the average mass difference in 2030 (Scenario 3-Scenario 4)
follows the trend seen for Gasoline Light Technology but the effect is small since av-
erage mass is the result of every technology contributions to the average mass. There
is a particular region around 12 to 14 % of mass reduction and 70 to 78 gCO2/km of
CO2 emission target where the difference in mass is at a maximum.
FIGURE 4.5 – Contour Plot of the Difference in Lightweight Share
Technology in 2030 between Scenarios 3 and 4 in percentage of
sales share for a range of CO2 emissions target (70-84) and different
amounts of mass reduction (0-15%) .
Thus, the change in the technology mix when preparing for a mass indexed
fuel economy standard is not conditional to one case, it holds for a range of applica-
tions of lightweight technology and fuel economy targets. It is high for medium to
high mass reduction percentages in most of CO2 emission targets and specially for
more stringent targets. We saw that we could achieve the same emission reductions
by two different means. First, not using lightweight technologies and increasing the
share of heavy technologies in the mix. Second, having a mix that uses lightweight
technologies but fails to comply with the current policy because a lighter mix would
mean a more stringent CO2 target with the mass-indexed CAFE. In terms of the so-
cial impact of the mass indexed fuel economy standard, we assess the cost of both
scenarios in the context of a mobility solution, we will look at the cost of having a
technology mix on the road in France for both Scenarios 3 and 4. The social cost here
is defined as the total mobility cost of a vehicle composed of the cost of the vehicle
plus the cost of usage of the vehicle.
The cost of a vehicle is reduced to a simpler form of the cost of producing a
low carbon technology. The cost of producing the technology mix in 2030 to comply
with the fuel economy target is the average of the discounted cost to produce the
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FIGURE 4.6 – Contour Plot of the Difference in Average Mass in 2030
between Scenarios 3 and 4 in percentage of sales share for a range of
CO2 emissions target (70-84) and different amounts of mass reduction
(0-15%).
technology mix. The cost of usage of the vehicle is defined in Eq.4.12
Cost o f Usagei =
10
∑
k=10
1
(1+ r)k
10
∑
j=10
Xij ∗ Fuel Consumptionij ∗ Fuel Costij ∗ kmi (4.12)
Mobility Costi = Production Costi + Cost o f usagei ∗ 1
(1+ r)i
(4.13)
Total Ownership Cost2030 = Production Cost2030 + Cost o f usage2030 (4.14)
where i is the year of simulation from 2014 to 2030, r is the social interest rate de-
fined at 0.04 and km are the annual kilometers driven by an average user at 11000
km (CCFA, 2017) and the average possession period is 9 years (ACEA, 2017). Fuel
Consumption is defined as the amount of fuel to drive one km in L/km 7. Fuel Cost
is defined as the cost of energy (fuel price or electricity price without taxes) in France.
We obtain this by looking at current market prices and subtracting taxes for each fuel
or electricity prices 8.
7. In order to convert CO2 emission per km to fuel consumption we apply the amount of carbon
dioxide contained in a liter of Gasoline and a liter of Diesel: CO2Diesel = 2640g/L and CO2Gasoline =
2392g/L from ecoscore.be. For EV technology we have an equivalent to fuel consumption, the electric
consumption is the amount of kWh to drive one km.
8. Taxes applied on Gasoline and Diesel demand are: VAT to the overall cost and TICPE ("Taxe
Intérieur de Consommation sur les Produits Energétiques" applied on the consumption of Fossil Fuels.
TCIPE has different tax level for Gasoline and Diesel in 2017. The reference Gasoline and Diesel prices
with taxes in 2018 in France are respectively 1.462 and 1.374e/L (IEA, 2018). Taxes applied to Elec-
tricity demand are: VAT to the electricity cost, TCCFE and CSPE and a lower VAT to the subscription
rate and CTA. TCCFE is a local tax fixed on electricity demand, CSPE is a national tax to contribute
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We make the assumption that all car owners drive the same distance as would
an average driver and that the average possession does not change depending on the
type of technology. In practice, frequent drivers tend to own cars that have a lower
usage cost. Car owners also keep their vehicle more or less time depending on pow-
ertrain technology, when BEV are frequently used they need a battery replacement
that is not included in the model. The goal of this Chapter is to isolate the effect of
the mass-indexed fuel economy standard thus we subtract taxes from energy prices.
We also assume future energy prices are equal to current prices which is a limiting
factor of this cost assessment because we are modeling future usage of passenger
vehicles where energy prices might change.
We show the results for the example introduced at the beginning of this sec-
tion, we found that the difference in cost of producing a technology under Scenario
4 is less than 6 eper vehicle compared to Scenario 3 in Fig.4.7. The inferior cost of
Scenario 4 is expected since the fuel economy standard constraint with Scenario 4
is open to all solutions whereas Scenario 3 has the mass-index bias. The main re-
sult is that this difference is very small, therefore the technology bias does not have
an impact on technology costs. This difference is also small for all mass reduction
percentages and CAFE targets.
Gasoline Gasoline Light Gasoline 12V Gasoline 48V Gasoline HEV
Gasoline PHEV Diesel Diesel 12V Diesel 48V BEV
FIGURE 4.7 – Comparison of Mobility Cost: cost of usage, Produc-
tion Cost and Share of Sales in 2030 between Scenarios 3 and 4 for 75
gCO2/km emissions target and 10% of mass reduction.
to projects and equity on the electric sector and CTA is supplier fee that is different for an electric
supplier profit. The reference electricity price with taxes for a household in France in 2018 is 0.1483
e/kWh from EDF standard rate
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The cost of usage changes as the fuel mix and average consumption evolves
with the technology choices for the CAFE standard but the difference between Sce-
narios is also small in Fig.4.7 we can see that they are almost equal in 2030. Despite
the small differences in cost, we can see that the weight of each technology is not
the same, BEV technology production cost is slightly higher in Scenario 3 and this
compensates the increase in cost when chosing Gasoline Light instead of Gasoline
in Scenario 4. In terms of mobility cost, a BEV has a very low cost of usage while
the difference between Gasoline and Gasoline Light is small. The combination of
costs of production and usage of a vehicle is the total cost of possession of a vehi-
cle which is negligible under our assumptions from a consumer perspective. The
JRC report (Krause, Donati, and Thiel, 2017) found that to comply with an emission
regulation the cost to the end-user will be negligible over the entire lifetime of the
vehicle because the technology cost is compensated by the fuel economy savings.
Appendix D shows the diffusion profiles compared with their speed limits,
the dynamics of the technology mix, weighted distribution of technology choices in
2030 in two dimensions: CO2 emissions and vehicle mass and the comparison of the
ranking of technologies with and without mass indexation.
The mass-indexed fuel economy standard is an indirect constraint on the mass
of the vehicle and therefore it does not allow to explore the whole optimum frontier.
The mass of a vehicle plays a crucial role in determining the future target of the pol-
icy according to mass evolution it might increase or decrease the overall stringency
of compliance. Lightweight technologies are not compatible with the mass-index
fuel economy standard because they suffer of a policy penalty proportional to the
mass reduction. When looking at the cost of the fuel economy standard with and
without a mass indexation we see that the most expensive solution is the mass index
fuel economy both in usage and production but this difference is small.
Here we have studied the effect of engine technologies and lightweight tech-
nologies but other vehicle attributes might be changed in order to increase fuel econ-
omy and not changing mass for example acceleration and horse power that have
both an impact on powertrain and vehicle mass.
4.4 Discussion & Conclusion
The fuel economy standard based on an index parameter was set from present
weight and fuel economy distribution of carmakers, in theory no assumption of
the mass evolution of vehicles is done. This opens the door to comply with the
fuel economy standard by increasing the index parameter, mass instead of reduc-
ing emissions. In practice we showed that if an OEM acts on its own and assumes
that the competitors do not change mass, it will choose a heavier abatement solution
instead of a light alternative. This is counter productive because in usage a lighter
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vehicle will be less expensive and will reduce emissions (ITF (International Trans-
port Forum), 2017). Furthermore all low carbon powertrains solutions are heavier
than the gasoline baseline, thus the final average mass will be higher than the initial
mass if some abatement effort is performed. Not knowing the future average mass
might lead to over-compliance (Scenario 2) or not compliance (Scenarios 1 and 4) at
all of the standard because a change in average mass will change the OEM specific
fuel economy target and it can lead to not choosing the required technology mix for
compliance.
We highlight a caveat of this policy in the incentive to increase vehicle mass.
Although adjustments on the reference mass are made on a three-year basis, there
can be manufacturers that opt to increase mass. The M0 adjustment is identified in
Kollamthodi et al., 2015 as a policy weakness that can lead to push a manufacturer
in or out of compliance depending on the direction of the adjustment. If the mass
of our segment was continuing to increase with time up to M0 then Scenario 1,3
and 4 will be equivalent in terms of the emissions target. The policy implications
of the adjustment of M0 can be studied in the context of game theory. First, there
is a disincentive to be the first to introduce lightweight technologies because the
emission reduction potential will be diminished by the policy mechanism so the
first mover will certainly face higher costs at a smaller benefit to comply with the
policy. Second, a manufacturer might choose to be a free rider in the case where it
will benefit from the actions of its competitors without facing any investment risk
(Kollamthodi et al., 2015). When a car manufacturer does not reduce weight and
the remaining firms do, the average mass will decline and so does the reference
mass M0. Keeping the same mass in a market decreasing vehicle mass will reduce
the stringency of the CO2 emission target under a mass index policy, making policy
compliance easier. In the case when the majority of firms increase mass, the policy
incites a manufacturer to follow the mainstream trend of increasing mass because
keeping the same mass would increase policy target stringency.
From a technology perspective, the optimal choices when preparing for an
abatement only scenario and a mass indexed fuel economy standard are different.
We proved that when choosing for the least cost solution the ranking of optimal
solutions changes if the mass index mechanism is taken into account. Preparing for
compliance (Scenario 3) includes heavier abatement technologies than preparing for
abatement only (Scenario 4). For Scenarios of abatement only type of constraint,
lightweight solutions are an effective and cheap way to increase fuel economy up to
the point where it becomes too costly. There is only a small window of opportunity
for lightweight technologies under a fuel economy standard that is limited by the
index coefficient in Scenario 3. Today, despite a wide range of lightweight options,
a manufacturer is more inclined to produce heavy vehicles and does not have an
interest on investing on lightweight technologies because they are not cost effective
from a fuel economy standard perspective. A decrease of the index coefficient is key
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to obtain a more technology neutral standard and discourage OEMs from changing
the index parameter instead of reducing emissions.
We performed a cost assessment on the two mechanisms to apply a CO2 regu-
lation in the automotive industry: with and without a mass-index to show the eco-
nomic impact of the different types of fuel economy standards for society. We have
optimized the technology cost for each policy framework, the objective function of
the model aims at reducing technology costs. Cost in usage are obtained from the
technology mix of the model and energy prices assumed constant. We choose to fo-
cus on the 2030 technology mix instead of the total cost for every mix from 2014 to
2030 because the gap between Scenarios in terms of emissions and mass is low in the
first period of simulation and is highest in 2030. We found that the gap in total cost to
prepare for the two variants of the fuel economy standard is small. We saw that the
difference in technology choices were significant but the difference in cost is not, this
is not intuitive. There is a compensation effect in technology cost: the heavier vari-
ant of Gasoline technology is favored in a mass index policy and is less expensive.
At the same time BEV is also favored by the mass indexed CAFE, it is heavier but
more expensive thus creating no difference in technology cost from a policy without
mass indexation. In terms of cost of usage, we also observe a compensation effect:
the cost of usage of Gasoline Light is less expensive therefore a scenario without a
mass index has lower cost of usage for fossil-fuel vehicles. However, plug-in vehi-
cles have much lower cost of usage than fossil-fuels vehicles. Plug-in vehicles are
more present in a policy with mass index thus reducing the cost in usage gap.
There are several limitations with this cost assessment, first energy prices are
kept constant in our model. First, we assume that fuel cost in 2030 will be equal
to those in 2017 neglecting any evolution of fossil fuels cost and electricity cost. If
fossil-fuel prices were to rise the cost of usage for Gasoline and Diesel vehicles will
also increase because there is a direct effect. For plug-in vehicles the effect is indirect,
it depends on the carbon intensity of the electricity mix. If carbon intensity is high,
it is probable that electricity prices will increase with an increase in fossil-fuel prices.
If carbon intensity is low such as in France, with a high share of nuclear, fossil fuel
prices will have a smaller impact on cost of usage of plug-in vehicles.
Second, the CO2 emissions externality has two compounds: tail pipe emissions
that are covered by the fuel economy standard and well to tank emissions that are
not covered by the standard. Tank-to-wheel emissions are indirectly covered by
the fuel economy standard, the policy limits the average carbon intensity of new
vehicles but it does not target how many kilometers and in what conditions are
those kilometers driven. Thus the fuel economy standard does not apply directly
to tailpipe emissions. Well to tank emissions are potential negative externalities that
might affect results since different ways of obtaining fuel and electricity are more
or less emitting. The energy mix of electricity is different from one country to the
other and further research is needed to assess this externality. We fail to consider the
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indirect emissions of the type of fuels used in the technology mix thus we can not
tell which technology is better from well-to-wheel basis, we are limited in scope to
tank-to-wheel analysis.
Third, on technology assumptions, we do not model learning effects or economies
of scale, these would potentially decrease the cost of plug-in vehicles. Having less
expensive plug-in vehicles in the technology mix will favor PHEV, BEV is already
close to the saturation point. We have a limited set of technologies other technology
families such as aerodynamics or rolling resistance have an emission reduction po-
tential and further research should investigate if these technologies are also affected
by a fuel economy standard indexed to mass.
Fourth, we assumed that all vehicles are driven the same yearly distance.
However the technology choice of high mobility drivers is more influenced by fuel
cost thus preferred technology choices might be sensitive to the type driver. We
should expect long distance drivers choosing BEV however the driving range, charg-
ing infrastructure and upfront cost of a BEV keeps them out of choosing plug-in
vehicles. Instead they are attracted by high fuel economy fossil-fuel vehicles such
as Diesel. We did not weight more the technologies that might be favored by high
mobility drivers in the evaluation of cost of usage.
Fifth, we assumed an average possession equal for all technologies. In practice,
there might be technologies that can resist more to intensive use and last longer.
Some fossil-fuel vehicles have been used for more than two decades, in contrast
the first plug-in vehicles to enter the market have been sold less than a decade ago
therefore we are not certain if drivers will keep their plug-in vehicles as long as fossil
fuel vehicles.
Our approach includes different ways of modeling the fuel economy constraint
to show how the mass indexed policy translates into a different mechanism of tech-
nology choice than an abatement technology rationale. We quantify the impact of
the fuel economy standard in the automotive sector. On the first objective, we have
judged the index parameter as a negative component of the fuel economy standard
this is true for the mass index but other index parameters lead to different conclu-
sions, in the USA the effects of the footprint parameter are not negative (Ullman,
2016) and public reports suggest that it might be a better index parameter (German
and Lutsey, 2010; Kollamthodi et al., 2015). On the second objective, we showed that
a mass indexed fuel economy standard can lead to a high share of plug-in vehicles
that are key to achieve a low carbon mobility. Thus the fuel economy standard in-
dexed can help develop plug-in vehicles however the reference mass must catch up
to avoid failing to reach the European emission reduction objective for passenger
vehicles.
We have used the OMLCAT to focus on the technology choice from a car man-
ufacturer perspective when it is limited by a fuel economy policy and diffusion of
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new technologies in a market with some inertia. The features of the model pre-
sented in this analysis are fitted to study a simple vehicle segment for the purpose of
studying the policy implications, further studies could extend the model to a vehicle
fleet but for simplicity and comprehension we choose to reduce the model appli-
cation to the minimum. One of the limits of the model is that it does not include
market competition therefore there is no effect of what other competitors are do-
ing in the choice of the technologies. Including other competitors might be useful
to explore other policy implications. Another limitation is that the model does not
include consumer choices that have different preferences according to type of vehi-
cle technologies. There are many studies that have focused on consumer behavior
to quantify the preference for plug-in vehicles (Plötz, Gnann, and Wietschel, 2014;
Gnann and Plötz, 2015; Gnann, Stephens, et al., 2017; Al-alawi and Bradley, 2013;
Coffman, Bernstein, and Wee, 2017).
The mechanism of modeling a fuel economy standard policy requires a level
of technology detail that is very complex, we have neglected several aspects of the
policy that might change the results.
First, supercredits multiply the sales of low or zero emissions vehicles by a
factor on the CAFE calculation. They decrease the level of stringency of the policy
but like the mass index they are not technology neutral because only very low carbon
technology can benefit from this scheme. Nevertheless, the trend is to decrease the
supercredit coefficient in the future so its role will become less important.
Second, eco innovation or off cycle technologies, as defined by the regulation
are innovative technologies that help cut emissions, but in some cases it is not pos-
sible to demonstrate the CO2 reducing effects during the test procedure used for
vehicle type approval. They are key to enable compliance from OEMs when the
compliance target is close but they are difficult to compare in terms of fuel economy
performance to other technologies because they can not be fully captured by the test
cycle 9. This type of technologies must be treated separately since their applications
differs from the other technologies treated in this article. Literature suggests that the
potential benefit of use of off-cycle technologies should be revised specially if their
use and eco-innovations permits tend to increase (Lutsey and Isenstadt, 2018).
Third, the compliance period of the fuel economy standard was simplified,
instead of having three targets in 2020, 2025 and 2030 we chose to have a single
target in 2030. Due to implications of the choice of a short term technology mix when
preparing a long term target we do not want any bias introduced by a set of targets
that might deformed an optimal response when preparing a long term abatement
target.
9. Some examples from the list of eco-inovations from the European Comission are 12V motor
generator, battery charging photo-voltaic roof, LEDs, coasting functions. The eco-innovation credit is
capped at 7 gCO2/km.
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In practice the introduction of new technologies does not happen without
drawbacks or unintended consequences, in the case of lightweight technology, stud-
ies have agreed on the potential on increasing fuel economy (Luk, Saville, and Maclean,
2016). Nevertheless, researchers have risen concern on road safety from two unde-
sirable effects: a change in size might cause more road accidents because the size
distribution of the overall fleet will change (Bento, Gillingham, and Roth, 2017),
making driving conditions more dangerous; whereas a change in mass, will either
reduce the amount of fatal accidents since the vehicle will have less kinetic energy
making multiple car accidents less mortal or it will increase fatalities since a lighter
vehicle is more vulnerable when it crashes with a heavier object (White, 2004; An-
derson and Auffhammer, 2014). Road safety is not the main interest of this research
and dedicated literature (Bento, Gillingham, and Roth, 2017) studies these effects.
For lightweight technologies the report by Singh, 2012 requires the technology al-
ternative to have the same crash-testing rating than the baseline technology, so the
lightweight packages proposed in that studied do not have this externality.
Our results demonstrate that the CAFE indexed to mass does not lead to higher
social costs to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Nevertheless this result is condi-
tional to the type of externalities that we included in the model. As stated above, a
safety issue might imply that an increase in mass might have a negative externality
when looking at an overall safety risk but it can be seen as positive externality when
considering an individual safety risk. The cost gap between both policy mechanisms
might be smaller if we consider that the cheapest alternative will suffer from a re-
bound effect due to lower mobility cost, we have not explored this effect but it can be
a negative externality on the least social cost Scenario of the fuel economy standard
without a mass index.
Although we obtain a production cost of a vehicle we do not take into account
the potential externality of the manufacturing process and raw materials. Studies
focused on life cycle analysis examine the different energy inputs to extract all raw
materials to produce a vehicle (Raugei et al., 2015; Lewis, Kelly, and Keoleian, 2014).
The usage of key chemical elements such as rare earth elements in batteries has risen
concern on the extraction process of these elements. Taking the end of life of the
vehicle will also require to study the disposal of a vehicle. The externality in this
domain comes from a supplementary CO2 emissions and a potential pollution cost
of those environments where the extraction and disposal if any of a vehicle occurs.
A different class of emissions, pollutants that cause an air quality concern are
not addressed in this Chapter. They might affect the result because there is a high
difference between pollutant emissions (NOx and particles) from a Diesel vehicle
and a EV. A first guess is that the Scenario with the highest share of EV and lowest
share of Diesel will have the lower externality from an air quality perspective. Fi-
nally, the noise from a vehicle is an externality that is not addressed in this Chapter.
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Vehicles having a electrical driving mode: EV, PHEV and some HEV produce very
little noise at low speeds and reduced noise at high speeds.
A fuel economy standard is interesting only if there is an incentive to lower
emissions no matter where a manufacturer is positioned however Durrmeyer and
Samano, 2018 showed that this is not the case when a manufacturer is already com-
pliant it will not seek any further abatement efforts. In terms of the technology
portfolio, the mass-indexed fuel economy standard does not allow to develop all
potential abatement solutions, therefore it fails on its mission to be technology neu-
tral. The incentive to develop heavier vehicles can have either a positive effect on
emissions, when the technology alternative is an EV or a negative effect where an
increase in mass and a marginal change in emissions is operated to comply with the
target and allow for a change in segment: from sedan to SUV. Some countries are
complementing a fuel economy standard with a ZEV mandate that creates a quota
of low to zero emission vehicles (mostly EV) on the sales share of a carmaker. The
emission credits assigned are avaialbre for trade either with absolute emissions or
with ZEVs among other manufacturers, emission credits have been analyzed by Fis-
cher, 2008. The ZEV mandate is integrated in the model in Chapter 5.
The mass-indexed fuel economy standard has several impacts on the abate-
ment efforts that an OEM will do to comply with the enacted target. From a Cli-
mate Change perspective what matters the most is CO2 emission cuts of new vehicle
sales in order to have a cleaner vehicle fleet therefore all technologies that cut CO2
emissions are interesting. The automotive sector is not composed of homogeneous
vehicle products and thus some mechanism of sharing the reduction efforts among
all OEMs needs to be created. The mass index standard effectively does the job of
distributing the share of reduction between the manufacturers. It requires lighter
OEMs do more efforts than their heavier peers and on average it can lead to a low
average emissions from new vehicles. However, some caveats come from the mech-
anism of the regulation that do not allow to explore the full scope of abatement tech-
nologies for deeper reductions. Further research on the potential lock-in of the fuel
economy standard on technologies that have low abatement potential but are heavy
is important to understand the impacts of the mass based fuel economy standard.
A reduction in mass from a low carbon technology is penalized by the compensat-
ing impact of a resulting more stringent target, therefore the standard is biased in
detriment of those potentially cost-effective solutions that reduce weight. There are
several ways to correct this bias as proposed by Kollamthodi et al., 2015 :
— Mass reduction credits for OEM demonstrating a downward trend in sales-
weighted average mass
— Banking of CO2 emissions reductions where a downward sales-weighted
average mass trend is demonstrated
— Link targets to mass by setting more stringent targets for heavier vehicles
and more lenient target for smaller vehicles or setting a ceiling that affects
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only the heavier vehicles and a floor for smaller vehicles
— Mass reduction credits and debits) for vehicles based on their density rela-
tive to the overall average density
The most promising option is mass reduction credit for vehicles based on their den-
sity relative to overall average density, this option include both footprint and mass
into consideration but requires more investigation since it will introduce more com-
plexity into the standard.
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Chapter 5
Overlapping Automotive
Emissions Policies, a double
challenge: CO2 and Air Pollution
5.1 Introduction
Vehicles’ emissions contain a mixture of different gases, including greenhouse
gases (GHG) such as CO2 and local pollutants such as nitrogen oxides NOx or Par-
ticle Matter (PM). The former contribute to global climate change, the latter to local
air pollution. While the contribution of road transport to climate change is undeni-
able, its climate consequences are not directly experienced at the place of emission.
By contrast, local air pollutants are directly affecting communities where there is a
dense and intensive use of road vehicles, with clearly visible health impacts, causing
premature deaths and illness (related to the exposure to high concentration of gases)
(International Energy Agency, 2016). Tail-pipe emissions thus produce two differ-
ent externalities. In this Chapter, we focus on the automakers and policymakers
responses to these joint externalities.
Most vehicles today integrate an Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) that emits
GHG and pollutant gases. Some technologies are fitted to reduce one type of emis-
sions only. There are three types of emission reduction technologies. In the first case
the technology acts on GHG emissions only and has no or a negative impact on local
pollutants, e.g. Gasoline Direct Injection or Diesel engines. The second type acts
on local pollutants only but has no or negative impact on GHG emissions, e.g. Se-
lective Catalytic Reduction after-treatment technology. In the third type both types
of emissions are positively impacted, for example Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs).
Since air pollution is a combination of harmful gases, reducing all emissions with
a single technology is very difficult. The effect of a technology on air pollutants
is more complex than the effect on GHG emissions because of the different perfor-
mance on each type of gases. Therefore, we analyze a combination of technologies
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to respect a regulatory limit instead of focusing on a single air de-pollution technol-
ogy. In this Chapter we focus on the distinction between two families of externalities:
GHG emissions and air pollutants. The technology solutions developed for a climate
change objective might differ from those developed for an air pollution objective.
The policy instruments that have been developed to regulate tail-pipe emis-
sions are not sufficiently comprehensive to consider all emissions, with the exception
of Zero Emission Programs. In terms of climate change policy, the low carbon path-
ways developed for mitigation show overall co-benefits in reducing local air pollu-
tion on the long term, only a small impact is observed in the short term (Takeshita,
2012). Some policy instruments such as fuel economy standards and energy effi-
ciency standards focus on reducing the carbon intensity of the road transport sector
but have failed to consider air pollutants. Local emissions have been regulated in
two scales: national and local. National or regional emission standards, e.g. the
Tier 1 emission standard introduced in California, are a minimum requirement for
all new vehicles at a national level. Local governments have promoted the use of
less polluting vehicles at the city level for example the London Congestion Charge.
Today, local policies in cities act on the vehicle fleet with a few also acting on new ve-
hicle sales. Policy tools for vehicle emissions have various mechanisms that can have
positive or negative effects on the reduction of GHG emissions or air pollutants.
Our work offers a new combined assessment of policy analysis on the exist-
ing literature. Many previous studies examine the isolated effect of a policy im-
plemented on the automotive sector (Klier and Linn, 2016; Whitefoot, Fowlie, and
Skerlos, 2017; Luk, Saville, and Maclean, 2016). While a comparison of policies on
GHG emissions exist, the literature focuses on policy efficiency and finding the best
fit for carbon emissions reduction (Anderson, Parry, and Sallee, 2011; Liu, Greene,
and Bunch, 2014; Fischer, Harrington, and Parry, 2007). However on a national scale
few have gone beyond GHG emissions to expand the scope of vehicle emissions
to air pollutants. There are two combined cost assessments of CO2 and pollutants
emission reduction technologies in Europe (FEV, 2015; Hill et al., 2016) and USA
(National Rearch Council Board on Energy and Environmental, 2015) that address
both type of emissions. We contribute to this technical-economic literature by intro-
ducing different policy scenarios requiring change in the technology portfolio.
We do not focus on a single shot examination of policies, we acknowledge fu-
ture uncertainties of policy targets thus we analyze a range of possible outcomes
and we also consider the pathways to reach such ambitions instead of restraining
to a single picture of the future. This approach is common in the Climate Change
community, as observed in the uncertainty of mitigation actions in Integrated As-
sessment Models (Bauer et al., 2015). We conduct an analysis of several possible
outcomes for each automotive policy.
The literature is focusing on the local scale of the automotive market for two
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reasons: the electric vehicle transition requires a dedicated infrastructure that grows
at the same pace than the market and policy instruments applied at a local scale try
to incentivize low emission technology adoption. The electric vehicle transition has
been described as a chicken or the egg problem (Leibowicz, 2018). This logic is that
the electric charge infrastructure is deployed only if Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEV)
are adopted and vice-versa PEVs are adopted only when the infrastructure is de-
ployed. A zero air pollution objective does not rely only on low emission vehicles, it
has to reduce the impact of tyre use and other sources of pollution from household
heating and industry activities (Hooftman et al., 2018). Our interest is on the litera-
ture treating emerging local policies at the city level, also known as Low Emission
Zones.
Next, we briefly introduce the two type of policies new to this Thesis: Low
Emission Zones and the Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate.
5.1.1 Low Emission Zones
One of the first application of Low Emission Zones (LEZ) was introduced in
the city center of Stockholm in 1996 to diesel trucks and buses with a weight over 3.5
tonnes. A LEZ policy constraint is an area restricted to some categories of vehicles
that do not exceed emissions limits (Pasquier and Andre, 2017). This translates to
a technology ban that spreads over time due to the diffusion of local policies. The
mechanism is a step change in normal fleet turnover, resulting in lower emissions
than would have occurred without the LEZ (Holman, Harrison, and Querol, 2015).
There are more than 200 LEZs in the EU with different applications and rules applied
to different vehicle types, urban area coverage, vehicle emissions labels, restriction
hours, penalties, enforcement instruments and national frameworks.
The impact of LEZ on the reduction of emissions has to be analyzed on the
basis of local conditions. The urban landscape and activities in the urban area deter-
mine the type and efficiency of a LEZ. The London Congestion Charge (LCC) is not
a ban on circulation but a circulation charge on high emitting vehicles, it has shown
an increase share of HEV sales inside the LCC zone and its neighbor urban areas
too (Morton, Lovelace, and Anable, 2017). The air quality in London has shown
limited (Ellison, Greaves, and Hensher, 2013; Wolff, 2014) or no improvement in air
quality (Hooftman et al., 2018) after the LCC application. However both studies
highlight the difficulty to isolate the policy impact on air pollution. In Germany
a study conducted on multiple cities shows that there is a more rapid decrease on
certain pollutants: Particle matter concentration smaller than 10 µ m (PM10) inside
the LEZ compared to areas outside the LEZ (Jiang et al., 2017). Originally a LEZ
is intended to reduce air pollution but the results of different LEZ are ambiguous.
However, they have already changed the technology mix and reduced traffic in re-
stricted areas.
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5.1.2 Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate
We have based our analysis on the fuel economy standard that regulates car-
bon emissions because it is widely adopted in the automotive industry and it clearly
affects technology choices. The policy based on a fuel economy standard has been
combined with a Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate (ZEV). The ZEV Mandate was first
implemented in California in 1990 as one of the policy instruments to reduce air
pollution (Collantes and Sperling, 2008). It is a policy that sets a minimum quota
of Zero Emission Vehicle for carmakers at a country or regional level. The quota in
practice works as a credit system that can be transferred to a CAFE compliance, to
others manufacturers or carried back and forward depending on construction. Al-
though the first implementation occurred almost thirty years ago, only few regions
have already applied it, namely the ZEV states in the US, the province of Quebec and
China have implemented a ZEV Mandate (Lutsey et al., 2018). The EU is studying
the potential introduction of a ZEV Mandate type requirement in the next carbon
emissions regulations (European Commision, 2017).
The economic efficiency of the ZEV Mandate has been treated in literature, this
technology specific policy is not the most efficient but it can be useful to incentive
the construction of a zero emission vehicle ecosystem (Fox, Axsen, and Jaccard, 2017;
Bergek and Berggren, 2014). This policy seems to have more political acceptability
(Wesseling et al., 2014) and more importantly it gives a clear signal to automak-
ers, fuel providers, and other stakeholders to progress on lowering adoption barri-
ers that may be difficult for regional governments to influence directly (Sykes and
Axsen, 2017; Bergek and Berggren, 2014; Greene, Park, and Liu, 2014). Fox, Axsen,
and Jaccard, 2017 discuss the application of two types of technology specific stan-
dards: a standard based on low emission vehicles and a standard based on a single
technology (plug-in vehicles). The study finds that the more technology selective
standard is more efficient but some risks emerge on the uncertainty of cost reduc-
tions and the path dependency of a policymaker choosing the "winner" technology.
If the policymaker assessment of a technology is wrong it can lead to higher costs.
The introduction of a ZEV Mandate in California has forced the deployment of EV,
the patent count shows an increase in ZEV technology (Sierzchula and Nemet, 2015)
but it can led to a path dependent low carbon trajectory (Contestabile, Alajaji, and
Almubarak, 2017) if the EV ecosystem fails to deliver.
5.1.3 Method
To identify the effect of policy combination we have modeled the isolated effect
of a policy and the combined effect of the fuel economy standard with the other
policies. The national policies such as standards and the ZEV Mandate affect all
vehicles sold in a region. In contrast, local policies such as LEZ affect the acquisition
of a vehicle in urban areas only, therefore the policy effect applies to a part of all
vehicles sold in a region. For that purpose, we modeled the policy coverage of local
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policies in France. A cost analysis of the total cost of the mobility service: technology
cost and mobility cost is used to compare how the cost evolves with changes in the
portfolio of technologies when policies are combined together.
This Chapter explores the implications of applying two policies that answer
two problems found in the same product: local air pollution and global warming.
The main question is how to assess the effects of overlapping policies under three
different perspectives. First, we look at the difference in technology choice to see
what are the preferred technology requirements for each policy and then what is
the effect when they are combined. Second, we study the overcost that a policy and
the combination of policies would imply for society from a baseline without poli-
cies. Third, we investigate how policies perform on the two dimensions of vehicle
emissions: GHG emissions and air pollutants. Based on these two externalities of
vehicle emissions we study the relationship between a change in stringency in the
policy package and the performance on these two dimensions. This Chapter exam-
ines the impact on technology choices when a car manufacturer is constrained by a
policy framework of various combinations of environmental policies. Since technol-
ogy choices are strategic decisions that require time to be mass-diffused in a market
we develop a model that includes economic inertia to take into account the dynamics
of low emitting technologies.
A technology can be adapted for multiple policy objectives which allows a
firm to solve various externalities with a single solution, however when there is no
such technology or when the potential of this technology is limited a car manufac-
turer will develop other technologies that are not fit for all policy ambitions. For
the comparison of policy impacts on technology choices, we start by identifying the
change in sales share from a case where a policy is applied alone and a case where
two policies are combined. We show the gap in technology sales share of the single
policy scenario and the combined policy scenario. We identify how the preferred
technology changes when overlapping policies.
In a technology portfolio the effect is similar, whilst some combination of poli-
cies do not require a change in mix, others alter the portfolio of technologies. When
the technology content required for a policy is similar to another policy or when a
policy is already compliant with another policy objective, the change in the portfolio
to prepare for the combination of these policies is small. In other cases when policies
show little common technology choices, the combination of policies shows different
technology choices than the single case scenario. We can identify which technologies
suffered from the introduction of a combined two-policy package and which have
not. We check if the behavior of interaction between policies holds when we vary
the stringency of the targets.
A policy framework implies a new constraint for the technology mix which
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can increase cost if the policy is binding. We identify the technology cost of appli-
cation of each single policy analyzed in this Chapter and then we compare with the
combination with a fuel economy standard. We obtain the overcost of the two policy
package from the baseline of a Scenario without policies to check when policies are
binding and how is this cost compared with the single policy scenarios.
Policies have multiple objectives when considering different externalities. Thus
building a policy package is complex when different levels of performance are ex-
pected in each of the regulated externalities. In the case of automotive emission ex-
ternality, multiple policymakers, (e.g. in France: international: EU, national: french
government and local: major of Paris,) create different mechanisms to correct each
externality thus a coherent policy package is difficult to obtain with diverse actors
having different visions. The climate change and air pollution externalities are tar-
geted by different policies in various mechanisms. We focus on the impact of a single
policy and a combination of two policies on two dimensions: CO2 emissions and air
pollutant emissions. To check for this impact we vary policy goals and observe how
does the environmental performance changes on these two dimensions.
5.1.4 Summary of Results
Our results show that the application of two policies, in some cases deviates
the technology mix from its optimal response to a single policy. For low stringent
fuel economy standards, the other policy has a stronger effect and decreases CO2
emissions below the fuel economy target. We found a range of CAFE targets, where
there is a similar response in technology choices of the CAFE policy, the LEZ policies
and the ZEV Mandate.
A LEZ that forces ZEV in city centers and a ZEV Mandate will favor EV which
is in line with the policy objective, however they will also produce the higher share
of the most polluting technology category. The ZEV Mandate has modified the ra-
tionale of a fuel economy standard, ZEVs count more under this scheme thus the
distribution of abatement efforts is also different. We find that there are two opposite
effects: when the share of ZEV increases, the share of non-abatement technologies
also increases. This means that the car manufacturer has directed all efforts on ZEV
solutions and chooses to keep the share of profitable cheap technologies with high
emissions. We will see that this problem resembles to the results found for renew-
able quotas combined with a Emissions Trading System (ETS) in the energy sector
(Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010) however the scope of the policy in the energy sec-
tor is different.
Concerning the interaction between the two dimensions of vehicle emissions
externalities: air pollution and climate change, we can define a positive relation-
ship between both dimensions of environmental performance when an increase in
policy stringency improves the environmental performance of a vehicle in the two
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dimensions. A negative relationship implies that an increase in policy stringency
only improves the environmental performance on one of the two dimensions. For
most of policy applications we observe a positive relationship with our model as-
sumptions. For an improvement in CO2 emissions, there is an improvement in air
pollutant emissions too. The only exception is the air emission standard that seems
to have no effect on improving CO2 emissions. In this latter case, there is only an
improvement on air pollutants performance.
The total cost of the mobility service is lowest for the CO2 only Scenario. When
analyzing both components of this cost: technology cost and usage cost, the com-
bined policy scenarios having a high share of EVs are less costly in usage but are
more expensive in technology cost. Focusing on technology costs we compare the
overcost of different policy packages from the baseline No Policy Scenario, we find
that overall the gap in cost between single and combined policy scenarios is small
except for the emissions standard where the overcost of the two policy scenario is
higher than the sum of the overcost of each policy applied independently.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
methods, data and scenarios used for the analysis. Section 5.3 describes and analyses
the results. Section 5.4 discusses the limitations of the study and the implications of
the results for the anticipation of a fuel economy standard policy and concludes the
Chapter.
5.2 Methodology
The technology choice that a carmaker does to prepare the adapted solutions
for policy constraints is determined by stringency and timing of policy targets. The
industry is looking for least cost solutions to guarantee maximum profit of vehicle
sales in a competitive market. We use OMLCAT that will be enriched with a broad
policy package to study more applications and completed with technology solutions
for air pollution. The baseline version of OMLCAT presented in Chapter 2 will be
modified to address a broader scope of vehicle’s emissions. The policy package will
incorporate three types of policies, described in section 5.2.4 that are not included in
the other Chapters: an emissions standard (air pollutants), a Zero Emission Vehicle
(ZEV) Mandate and a city restriction in the form of Low Emission Zones (LEZ). The
CAFE policy, treated in fully in Chapter 4 is modeled without mass indexation with
a single target in 2030 and with mass indexation in Appendix E. The technology
options available in this model include the basis of low carbon technologies that are
combined with de-pollution technologies described in section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Modeling Local Policies on passenger vehicles
The impact of a local policy in overall emissions of vehicles of a country is lim-
ited to vehicles entering the boundaries of an urban area defined by the policy. In
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comparison the fuel economy standard is an average corporate fuel economy regu-
lation that is calculated on a region or country basis. Our goal is to estimate the share
of total vehicles sales that is affected by local policies and model the implementation
of local policies in a country.
First, we define the share of vehicle sales that will be concerned by the city
policy. We assume that city policies on new vehicle sales affect both internal and
external sales that are close to the city. Daily usage of vehicles often experience
inter-departmental trips as seen in Île De France. We assume that all vehicles sold
in a department where a city adopting a local policy is will have to comply with the
restriction. In the case that urban areas expand to more than one department, we
consider all vehicles sales from all departments involved. This approximation does
not require community level data on vehicle sales, it requires car registrations on a
department basis. The assumption of a city policy affecting the entire department
means that the weight in mobility demand of a city in a department concentrates
most of passenger vehicle demand thus affecting all vehicle department sales. To
refine this assumptions a more precise study on mobility patterns is required, we
will discuss this in section 5.4.
Based in France we will model where local policies will be implemented to
simulate the coverage of policies applied at a city-scale for future sales. We define
four criteria to decide the share of new car registrations affected by a local policy: we
choose two criteria based on the city size (100k or 150k inhabitants) and two criteria
based on urban area size (300k or 500k inhabitants). We have gathered two sets
of information from INSEE: first the population of cities above 100 000 and 150 000
inhabitants and the population of urban areas above 300 000 and 500 000 inhabitants,
second the new car registrations in each of the departments where a city or urban
area is established according with the previous criteria, this data is shown in Table
5.1. For each criteria we collect the new car registrations of the department where
the city/urban area is and divide this by total registrations to obtain the maximum
coverage of an urban policy if all cities where to apply a local policy as seen in eq.5.1.
Second, the other main assumption is that we consider that a local policy is
implemented first in larger cities before smaller cities. We model the implementation
of local policies in France starting at the city of Paris and then spreading to other
large cities that satisfy the size criteria. We assume that cities or urban areas smaller
than the size criteria will not implement a LEZ. The rate of spread of the LEZ policy
is an increment of 10% of total new vehicle sales. The diffusion is capped at the
maximum policy coverage defined in Table 5.1.
Maxcoverage =
∑np=1 Salespin department?
∑np=1 Salesp
(5.1)
where n is the total number of departments in France, Salespin deparment? is the
number of new vehicles registered in the department satisfying the city/urban area
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size criteria and Salesp is the number of new vehicles registered in department p.
Population Size criteria French Population Share % New Car Registration Share %
City >100k 15.2 54.8
City >150k 10.9 35.7
Urban area >300k 51.2 61.1
Urban area >500k 42.0 50.8
TABLE 5.1 – Definition of urban criteria: Population Size of cities and
urban areas under the four criteria for local policies as share of total
French population and share of total new car registrations in depart-
ments affected by the same criteria.
In Table 5.1 we compare the population share of each of the urban criteria and
the coverage size in vehicle sales. The relationship between the French population
and new car registrations does not coincide because the geographical limits are dif-
ferent from one criteria to the other. A larger share population should have a large
coverage in vehicle sales but the assumption of taking new vehicle sales at the de-
partment scale instead of urban area/city scale creates this distortion. The difference
lies on the fact that some urban areas touch more than one department, e.g. IDF. The
maximum coverage for city criteria are: 35.7% for 150k inhabitants and 54.8% for
100k inhabitants and for urban areas: 50.8% for 500k inhabitatns and 61.1% for 300k
inhabitants. The start coverage is IDF with 18.2% of new car registrations that in-
creases with the propagation of the policy. The incremental change is constant and
represents a rapid progression meaning that many cities or urban areas follow Paris
example. Each year an additional 10% of total new car registrations will be con-
cerned by a LEZ policy until reaching maximum coverage or until the model stops
which ever comes first. In section 5.3 we will model the more severe case that corre-
sponds to urban areas of more than 300k inhabitants or a maximum coverage of 61.1
% of new car registrations.
Level 1
Access forbidden 
to old vehicles 
and high 
polluters
Me
trop
olitan Area
Me
trop
olitan Area
Me
trop
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technology 
family, e.g. Diesel
Level 3
LEZ of Level 2 and 
ULEZ allowing 
electrified 
vehicles only
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LEZ of Level 2 or 3 
and CFZ with ban 
for all vehicles
FIGURE 5.1 – Four different levels of LEZ that are currently imple-
mented or planned by cities. An Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ)
only allows very low emission vehicles to circulate in city centers. A
Car Free Zone (CFZ) bans vehicles from city centers. Source: The
Author.
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There are many types of LEZ that change in stringency and mechanism to
charge or ban vehicles from city centers. We can however draw four levels of LEZ
based on the impact on the vehicle fleet, shown in Fig. 5.1. The first level of LEZ
only limits the existing fleet and forbids access to the zone to polluting vehicles 1.
The last level of LEZ bans all vehicle types in Car Free Zones (CFZ). We simulate two
models of LEZ policy based on our profiles: the second level of LEZ model is a city
that will progressively ban ICE engines which starts with a Diesel ban first and then
continues with an all ICE ban eq.5.2 and the third level of LEZ model where only
Ultra Low Emission Vehicles are allowed in city center which means only Battery
Electric Vehicles (BEV) and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV) are allowed all
other technologies are excluded eq.5.4.
The first LEZ model is called a LEZ ICE ban and the expansion of this pol-
icy starts in the city of Paris and then spreads, therefore the model will increase the
Urban exposition of the policy until maximum coverage of the urban area criteria de-
scribed above. The share of restricted vehicles is the sum of all technologies banned
by the policy and can not be greater than the rural exposition (1-urban exposition)
of the mix. Thus, the constraint guarantees that only non-polluting vehicles can be
sold in cities and their influence area.
MS( f amily)i ≤ (1−min(Urbanexpo( f amily)i, Maxcoverage)) (5.2)
∀i > year start Urbanexpoi = Urbanexpoi−1 + 10% (5.3)
The second LEZ model is called LEZ ZEV force and it will have the same progression
in policy coverage. In contrast to the our first model of LEZ, the share of allowed
ZEV by the policy must be greater than the urban exposition of the mix. Thus, the
constraint guarantees that only ZEV are sold in cities and their influence area.
min(Urbanexpo( f amily)i, maxcoverage) ≤ SS( f amily)i (5.4)
where SS( f amily)i is the sales share of the family at year i, Urbanexpo( f amily)i
is the urban exposure of a family to sales in cities with local policies and Maxcoverage
is the maximum coverage of urban policies in new car registrations. This constraint
only applies for technologies affected by the policy.
1. Polluting vehicles are often classified by two criteria age and the emission standard if it is
applied. Thus a prohibition can take the form of a ban of vehicles with an standard less stringent than
a limit or a ban of vehicles produced before a given year.
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5.2.2 Variation of OMLCAT
ZEV mandate constraint
We will model a ZEV Mandate with a credit system without trading with other
car manufacturers and without banking mechanisms of credits 2 as follows:
n
∑
j=1
MSijCreditscorej ≥ ZEVtargeti (5.5)
where Creditscoreij is the credit associated to technology j at year i: 1 for BEV 1/2 for
PHEV and 0 for all others and ZEVtargeti is the ZEV Mandate target at year i. The year
of the target is intended to begin at the end of the period or a few years early, it will
not be applied at the start of the simulation. Today the credits given for ZEV under
the Chinese scheme depend on the range of the battery. In California they depend
on drivetrain type and electric range. The policy trend is to reduce the advantage
of some EV that can earn as much as 4 credits. For simplicity our BEV technology
counts as 1.
Air Quality Emission Standard constraint
The Emission standard works as a technology ban over new vehicle sales: at
the time of application a technology that is not compliant is banned from the tech-
nology mix. The policy modeled by the air quality emission standard constraint
is the EURO emission standard regulating European passenger vehicles since 1992.
The policy regulates pollutants from tail-pipe emissions of the following gases: car-
bon monoxide (CO), unburned hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxydes (NOx), particle
matter (PM) and particle number (PN) (Nesbit et al., 2016). This policy had different
limits for diesel and gasoline engines, with less stringent limits for diesel vehicles.
Today this gap is reducing and both NOx and PM limits of all ICE engines are be-
coming more stringent.
In our model we will base the emission standard compliance on two steps.
A first step will introduce the last Real Driving Emissions package of the EURO 6
RDE policy. This policy called Air Quality 1 is intended to consider real driving
conditions to reduce the gap between tested and on road emissions. A second step
will introduce a more stringent policy such as a future EURO 7 standard that we call
Air Quality 2 that will require state-of-the art emission control technologies from
gasoline and diesel engines.
The constraint in the model is modeled as follows, a technology in the mix is
identified according to the compliance with the EURO Standard. The ban acts on
2. Trading between manufacturers allows a car manufacturer that has an excess of ZEV sales to
sell the credits earned from its production to other companies. Banking is the mechanism of saving or
owing a part of ZEV credits if the car manufacturer is over-compliant or under-compliant respectively.
The saving or debt of credits can be used in future years for compliance.
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technologies that are not compliant, therefore the mix will have to compensate with
technologies that can be commercialized.
∀ j technologies Xij ≤ Compliance pollutionij ∗ SALES (5.6)
where Xij is the number of units of technology j at year i and Compliance pollutionij
is 1 when the technology is compliant with the Air Quality emission standard at year
i and 0 otherwise.
We do not check for compliance for each pollutant separately. Instead we pro-
duce a technology option that is compliant with the limits of standard for all pollu-
tants.
5.2.3 Technology Assumptions
Air quality policies have shaped emissions control technology vehicles since
its first introduction. This section will detail the areas of technology development
to reduce vehicle emissions and the estimates that we consider for our simulation.
The emission reduction technologies have a carbon emission component that is the
same set of vehicle technologies used in previous chapters and a pollutant emission
component that will be coupled with the previous package. Technology to reduce
pollution from tail pipe emissions, described in Table 5.2 can be divided in two fam-
ilies: Gasoline and Diesel technologies.
The cost of emission reduction technologies is obtained from Sanchez, Bandi-
vadekar, and German (2012) and resumed in Table 5.3.
The pollution reduction technologies where applied in Gasoline and Diesel
vehicles in two levels: a first level that is compliant with EURO 6D Full Standard
and a second level compliant with a potential EURO 7 standard from a basis that is
compliant with EURO 6 c. Table 5.5 summarizes all technology hypothesis. More
detail on the emission control technologies used in this study and the requirements
for each policy can be found in Sanchez, Bandivadekar, and German, 2012. In Table
5.4 we describe the standard requirement for EURO 6 since 2016. Integrating a new
technology component has an impact on the environmental performance and an
increase of vehicle’s mass. The impact on the environmental performance and mass
is overall small or has no impact and was obtained from FEV, 2015.
The emission control technologies are a particular type of technology that is
sometimes retrofitted into existing engines. Most emission technologies are capable
of diffusing faster because they are based on the core engines of the segment and
are only an incremental innovation. They can be deployed much faster than low
carbon technologies that are more radical innovations. Therefore we change the
diffusion profiles in this section, introduced in Chapter 2, the last column in Table
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Technology Description
Gasoline Technologies
Gasoline Vehicle In-cylinder emission control
Air-fuel
management
system
Deliver a specific amount of fuel according to the amount of air that is
being drawn into the engine. Different injection systems have been
developed Throttle Body Injection (TBI), Multi-point Injection systems
and more recently Direction Injection (GDI).
Improved fuel
burning
Variable Valve Timing (VVT) reduces NOx by improving mixture
circulation.
Exhaust Gas
Re-circulation
(EGR)
Traps NOx emissions on the combustion chamber.
O2 sensor
Hardware required for in-cylinder control. They are part of the
On-Board Diagnosis (OBD) systems required since Euro3 standard.
Low thermal
capacity manifold
Keeps exhaust gases hot during cold starts to reduce the catalyst
activation time.
Water Charge Air
Cooler (Water
CAC)
Air-to-liquid intercooler that transfer intake char heat to a fluid,
usually water which finally reject heat to the air. through a radiator.
Gasoline Aftertreatment Systems
Catalytic
Converter Reduces HC, CO and NOx by a Three-way Catalytic Converter (TWC).
Gasoline Particle
Filter (GPF) Wall flow PM filter for Gasoline Engines necessary with GDI.
Heating Grid Used to warm up air flow input of the engine used in cold-start.
Diesel Technologies
Diesel In-cylinder emission control
Variable Geometry
Turbocharger
(VGT)
Change the geometry of either the nozzle or the turbine ring area to
account for changes in engine speed.
Intercooler Required to reduce the intake air temperature for better performanceand to reduce combustion temperature for lower NOx.
EGR In Diesel engines, requires fuel sulfur level below 500 ppm to avoidpipe corrosion with sulfur compounds.
High Pressure Fuel
Injection
Increases in fuel injection pressure to improve fuel penetration and
atomization, and mixing of air and fuel near the nozzle. High pressure
fuel pump and fuel sytem at 1800 bar.
Diesel Aftertreatment Systems
Selective Catalytic
Reduction (SCR)
Uses ammonia (known as AdBlue in Europe) to reduce the exhaust
NOx on a catalytic surface. High conversion efficiencies regardless of
the engine-out NOx and tolerance for sulfur content.
Diesel Oxidation
Catalyst (DOC)
Uses precious metals such as platinum and platinum-palladium to
oxidize HC, CO and the soluble organic fraction of PM. Effective at
low temperature %50 reduction of PM. DOCs are in many cases an
integral part of DPF.
Diesel Particle
Filter (DPF)
Traps the solid fraction of PM, including soot. Two types: flow
through PM filters: free of maintenance and reduction efficiency of
40-70 % and Wall-flow PM filters with efficiency higher than 95% but
the accumulation of PM solid fraction needs to be carefully monitored
to avoid increasing exhaust backpressure, which directly reduces
engine performance.
Lean NOx Trap
(LNT)
Used in lean-burn engines, based on materials that can absorb NOx
during periods of low temperature, or lean periods, and then release
them during minimal periods of rich operation to be reduced in a
TWC function.
TABLE 5.2 – Description of Emission Control Technologies in Gaso-
line and Diesel Engines. Gasoline Vehicle engine technology try to
set conditions for stoechiometric combustion (ideal mix of air and
fuel in the combustion chamber) and Diesel engine technology try
to increase fuel pressure to improve mixture of air and fuel in the fuel
intake. Source:(Sanchez, Bandivadekar, and German, 2012)
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Technology Cost in USD Cost in e
Gasoline Technologies
Engine Modifications 20 15.6
EGR 39 30.4
O2 Sensor set 40 31.2
Low thermal capacity Manifold 45 35.1
Water CAC 45 35.1
TWC 82 64.0
GPF stand alone 88 68.6
GPF + TWC 121 94.4
Heating Grid 100 78
Diesel Technologies
Turbocharger 128 99.8
Intercooler 30 23.4
EGR 92 71.8
Fuel System High Pressure 399 311
SCR 508 396
DOC 68 53
DPF 323 252
LNT 388 303
TABLE 5.3 – Technology Cost of pollutant emission reduction tech-
nologies for a lower-medium segment.
Pollutant Euro 6 Light-DutyGasoline Diesel
CO 1.0 0.5
HC 0.1
HC+NOX 0.17
NOX 0.06 0.08
PM 0.005a 0.005
PN (#/km) 6.0 e11b 6.0e11
TABLE 5.4 – Light-duty Euro 6 vehicle emission standards on the
New European Driving Cycle (NEDC). a applicable only to Direction
Injection engines, 0.0045 g/km using the PMP measurement proce-
dure. b applicable only to Direct Injection engines, 6 e12 #/km within
the first three years of Euro 6 effective dates. Source: Williams and
Minjares (2016)
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5.5 shows that all Baseline ICE Engines and their emission control variants have a
HIGH diffusion profile meaning that they can diffuse faster.
Technology Description Cost in e
CO2
Emissions
in gCO2/km
Mass in
kg
Initial
Share %
Diffusion
Profile
Gasoline O2 sensor set +
TWC
1950 105 1000 22 HIGH
Gasoline EURO
6d Full
+ GPF + TWC un-
derfloor
2044 105 1010 23 HIGH
Gasoline EURO 7 + e-Water CAC
+ enhanced EGR
+ GDI + Heating
Grid
2204 100 1020 2 HIGH
Gasoline 12V Euro 7 Compati-
ble
2350 98 1020 2 MED
Gasoline 48V Euro 7 Compati-
ble
3150 91 1040 1 MED
Gasoline HEV Euro 7 Compati-
ble
4650 80 1130 1 LOW
Gasoline PHEV Euro 7 Compati-
ble
5950 40 1230 1 LOW
Diesel EGR + High Pres-
sure Injection +
DOC + SCR
2950 95 1070 25 LOW
Diesel Euro 6d
Full
+ LNT + SCR
underfloor +
enhanced EGR *
3300 94 1095 15 HIGH
Diesel Euro 7 EGR enhanced +
CR lower **
3315 93 1095 2 HIGH
Diesel 12V Euro 6dFull Com-
patible
3350 89 1090 2 MED
Diesel 48V Euro 7 Compati-
ble
4150 83 1110 1 MED
BEV Zero emissions 7950 0 1450 3 LOW
TABLE 5.5 – Summary of Cost, Emissions, Mass, Initial Share and Dif-
fusion Profile of vehicle technologies for a lower-medium segment.
The hypothesis of Gasoline and Diesel variants of emission control
technologies are build as follows: Baseline + Technologies for first
compliance + Technologies for second compliance. *In Diesel engines
there are existing elements of the first compliance that are enlarged
or enhanced for the next target. Underfloor means that the aftertreat-
ment element is bigger and is located under the cabin. In this case cost
increases by 10% of elements that were already present.**CR means
Compression ratio and is an engine modification to improve combus-
tion.
To compare the Air quality performance of a technology portfolio, we define
an pollution emission note for each technology. To relate to the emission standard
we took the same categories and assigned a note from 0 to 4, shown in Table 5.6. The
total note for a portfolio is the average note of the technology portfolio. It is high for
a more polluting mix and low for a more clean mix.
5.2.4 Scenarios of CO2 and Air Quality Policies
The objective of building different scenarios is to test different combinations
of environmental policies and show the impact on technology mixes. In terms of
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Technology Pollutant Emission Note
Euro 6 Technologies 4
Euro 6d Full Technologies 2
Euro 7 1
BEV 0
TABLE 5.6 – Pollution Emission Note depends on the EURO emis-
sion compliance shown in Table 5.5 for each Technology. A high note
means that the technology is a high pollutant.
comparison of policies we want to see how the combination of policies changes tech-
nology choices. These changes are visible in terms of the CO2 emission level of the
mix, the type of technologies favored by a policy, the cost of the mix and the emis-
sion performance on the two dimensions of vehicle’s emissions. The fuel economy
standard serves as a common policy that is combined with other policies to test its
effects from a common basis.
At the technology level, we can identify which technologies are preferred un-
der different policies. For example, the analysis of a Diesel vehicle from the perspec-
tive of policy compliance of multiple objectives shows that it will probably be absent
from the technology portfolio in 2030. It is not among the most cost-efficient solu-
tions to reduce CO2 emissions, this technology is restricted from both types of LEZ,
it does not provide ZEV credits and it can not be certified with the more stringent
Air Quality emission standard. The opposite case is seen with BEV, it is compatible
with all policies and produces an improvement from incumbent technologies. We
will see what happens for more technology choices in section 5.3.
The trend at the portfolio level is less obvious, the policy conditions require
different technology mix adapted to each of the policy specifications. When a policy
is applied alone, a technology mix will evolve to the least cost solution adapted
to the policy objective. When we compare the technology mix of the application
of policies independently we expect to find different mixes or similar mixes if the
policy objectives are similar. However when policies are overlapped the expected
results are less obvious because the policy package has more conditions that limit
choices. We wish to quantify the difference between cases of application of a single
policy and cases of application of two policies at the portfolio level. We only check
for a policy package containing a CAFE policy, we do not study other combinations.
In section 5.3 we will see how the technology mix evolves in each scenario.
From a policymaker perspective the objective is to create a policy package with
the least cost to society to solve passenger vehicles externalities. There are combina-
tion of policies that perform better: they have a better carbon and pollutant emission
levels and they cost less. This type of optimal combinations are a suitable policy in-
strument.
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Since environmental policies are not yet established in the long term we ex-
plore a range of possible values for each policy. Each Scenario is a possible policy
framework that is based on existing policies. There are 5 types of policies: CAFE,
ZEV Mandate, LEZ ICE ban, LEZ ZEV force and Air Quality Standard. Scenarios of
application of single policies are analyzed to test the technology choice when there
was a choice only with the policy mechanism independently. To assess overlapping
policies we construct Scenarios that have a two policy package that try to identify the
effect of policy when combined with a common CO2 constraint. A Baseline Scenario
called No Policy without policy efforts is also modeled to see the cost gap between
the base Scenario and the Policy Scenarios.
— The CO2 only scenario corresponds to a strategy aiming to respect a fuel
economy standard in 2030. For this scenario, the range of possible targets
is 60 to 80 gCO2/km. The model of CO2 emissions constraint and targets is
common to all Scenarios.
— The CO2 and Air Quality emission regulation scenario corresponds to a
strategy aiming to respect the 2030 target and a vehicle emissions regula-
tion that does not allow registration of non compliant vehicles. This sce-
nario has to both optimize technology choices over the time horizon to
minimize the overall discounted compliance cost for the 2030 target and
comply with the minimal requirements of the vehicle emissions regula-
tion. The vehicle emission regulation is based on EURO standard with a
two consecutive increase on stringency in 2020 and 2025.
— The ZEV Mandate scenario corresponds to a combined strategy on CO2
emissions with a fuel economy standard and a minimum requirement on
low emission vehicles as seen in China and California. This scenario looks
at satisfying both an average emissions target in 2030 an a minimum low
emissions vehicles (BEV and PHEV) quota in 2030.
— The CO2 and LEZ ICE ban scenario corresponds to a strategy that would
optimize technology choices for a national scale policy on CO2 emissions
and a local scale policy led by local policymakers that will progressively
ban the use of ICE vehicles in urban areas. The ban starts with diesel fol-
lowed by an all ICE vehicles ban 5 years later.
— The CO2 and LEZ ZEV force scenario corresponds to a strategy that has the
same aim of CO2 and LEZ ICE ban scenario that is to reduce local air pol-
lution in urban areas. However, this scenario goes beyond on technology
ban and only allows low emission vehicles in urban areas from 2030. The
difference relies on HEV that are allowed on LEZ ICE ban scenario but are
not allowed on LEZ ZEV scenario.
Table 5.7 and 5.8 summarize the scenarios and environmental policies consid-
ered. There is a difference in the nature of policies that affects how a car manufac-
turer prepares for each policy. On the one hand, the CO2 policy, CAFE is based on
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the average of new vehicle sales. On the other hand, all other policies are at tech-
nology or vehicle level in various forms a ban, a quota of technologies or a minimal
requirement of local pollutants regulated.
Scenario Climate Change
Policy
Urban Pollution
Policy
Target Horizon Other
No policy None None - - CAFE target fixed at
initial CAFE
CO2 only CAFE target in 2030 60-80 gCO2/km 2030 without Mass-
indexed*
Air Quality stan-
dard
None intended EURO standard 6dFull and 7 2020 and 2025
ZEV Mandate Quota for ZEV 25-37 credits 2030 1 credit/EV 1/2
credit/PHEV
LEZ ICE ban fossil-fuel engines
ban
tech restriction in
cities
start:Paris
+10%/year
Diesel start:2022-
2025 Gasoline
start:2027-2030
Max coverage
varies
LEZ ZEV force ZEV push tech restriction in
cities
start:Paris
+10%/year
ZEV start:2027-2030 Max coverage
varies
TABLE 5.7 – Scenarios of Environmental Policies for Passenger Vehi-
cles. For each Scenario, we separate policies that aim at a Climate
Change mitigation and policies that aim at reducing air pollution in
urban areas. *CAFE standard is also modeled with mass-index mech-
anism in Appendix E
Scenario Climate Change Policy Urban Pollution Policy
CO2 & Air Quality Standard CAFE target EURO standard
CO2 & ZEV Mandate CAFE target and quota for ZEV None
CO2 & LEZ ICE ban CAFE target tech restriction in cities
CO2 & LEZ ZEV force CAFE target tech restriction in cities
TABLE 5.8 – Scenarios of Combination of Environmental Policies for
Passenger Vehicles. For each Scenario, there is a fuel economy stan-
dard component common to all. Target values and time horizons are
the same of the application of a single policy in Table 5.7.
5.3 Results
In this first part of Results we will model a CAFE target of 77 gCO2/km, a ZEV
target of 37 credits as defined in 5.2.2, an introduction of LEZ ICE ban for Diesel
in 2022 vehicles and Gasoline and Diesel vehicles in 2027 and an introduction of
LEZ ZEV force in 2027. From these assumptions we have varied the CAFE target in
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.6.
The application of an environmental policy on passenger vehicles has an im-
pact on the overall carbon emission performance of a technology mix. In order to
assess this impact we have isolated the effect of a policy by applying one policy at
a time and comparing it with the application of a two policy package with CAFE.
Figure 5.2 shows the gap to the CAFE target in 2030 of 4 scenarios with CAFE policy.
If the gap is negative the scenario has an average emissions lower than the CAFE
target meaning that CAFE is not the restrictive policy. The application of the policy
requires efforts that go beyond the application of CAFE target only.
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The conditions that can explain a need for lower emissions of the technology
mix are related to the policies objectives: a quota of ZEV at a national or local scale
and a ban on ICE vehicles in LEZ. The CO2 & AQ scenario produces always an emis-
sion level equal to the CAFE target, this means that for all targets, CAFE is binding.
For CO2 & LEZ ZEV force and CO2 & ZEV Mandate scenarios, the minimum quota
for ZEVs reduces carbon emission levels below the CAFE target. The same effect is
seen in the CO2 & LEZ ICE ban scenario because of a need to transition out from
Diesel and Gasoline engines locally. Figure 5.2 is an indicator of which policy is
more demanding in terms of CO2 emissions.
To check if technology choices are different between the two policy package
scenario and the CO2 only scenario we analyze the gap on sales share for selected
technologies from the CO2 only scenario in 2030 in Figure 5.3. If the gap is zero, it
means that the CO2 only scenario and the combined scenario have made the same
choices. We can see that for stringent targets of CAFE, the gap is small which means
that choices are closer together. But for less stringent targets, the gap is large and the
logic of the policy that is not the fuel economy standard prevails. The CO2 + LEZ
ICE ban scenario is different in Gasoline and Diesel share because it can not develop
the share of optimal Gasoline and Diesel due to the technology ban thus developing
other types of engines, more HEV and PHEV, as seen in Figure 5.4 with the dynamic
mixes of technologies. The only scenario that always produces less EVs is CO2 &
AQ standard because it is using less cost efficient technologies for reducing carbon
emissions, it is the only scenario that develops the second level of compliance of the
Gasoline variant which is more expensive.
When two policies demand for the same type of technologies independently,
the application of these two policies results in a similar output than the result where
the policy was applied independently. On the contrary when the technology require-
ments to comply with a policy differ from another policy, the combination of both
results in a technology mix that is different or a technology that is the same of one of
the policies thus suggesting that one of the policies is not binding.
Looking more closely at how each policy responds to reduce average carbon
emissions, we investigate how efforts are distributed in the technology mix. We
can look at the distribution of technologies according to CO2 emission levels. Fig.
5.5 shows that when applying a ZEV Mandate the share of BEV is highest which is
the intended objective of the policy but the share of the dirtiest (highest CO2) emis-
sion technology Gasoline is also highest. Therefore, the distribution of efforts is not
uniform as opposed to the case of CAFE only where the share of the dirtiest tech-
nology is lower. This is seen in other policies similar to the ZEV mandate in the
energy sector when applying energy renewable quotas in combination with an ETS
sector (Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010). The difference between these policy mech-
anisms is that CAFE does not regulate actual total emissions but only fuel economy
or emissions/km (on a normalized cycle). Actual emissions will depend on how
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FIGURE 5.2 – 2030 CAFE Gap of a Scenario compared to the target.
There are two types of scenarios: Policy only scenarios: a CO2 only
policy and two package scenarios: that include a CO2 policy + other
policies. Positive values mean that a Scenario has a higher CAFE per-
formance than the target.
FIGURE 5.3 – 2030 Technology choice Gap between the CO2 only Sce-
nario and the selection of two policies Scenario. Positive values mean
that the technology share in the two policy scenario is higher than the
share of that technology in the CO2 only Scenario.
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BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline
FIGURE 5.4 – Dynamic technology mixes of selected two policy sce-
narios compared to the CO2 only scenario.
many km driven by each type of vehicle and on the gap between on road emissions
and normalized cycle emissions. In the ETS case, emissions do not change because
the scheme is built to act on emissions at electric energy supply. With a CAFE pol-
icy, emissions can be more than what the fuel economy average says if the dirtiest
vehicles are driven more.
In the same figure we can see that a LEZ ZEV force scenario is close to a ZEV
Mandate policy. In absolute terms a ZEV Mandate does not constraint the place of
use of a ZEV whereas a LEZ policy requires using the low emission vehicles in urban
areas. The Air Quality policy changes the type of Gasoline technologies compared to
the CO2 only scenario where Gasoline technologies are not compliant with a second
Air Quality standard. We have said above in the scenario definition that an HEV is
allowed in a LEZ in scenario LEZ ICE ban but it is not allowed in the LEZ ZEV force
scenario. This is why we can see HEV appearing in CO2 and LEZ ICE ban scenario.
To see the effect of policy compliance on the overall environmental perfor-
mance: air pollution + climate change, we have first analyzed what is the tendency
of the combination of policies compared to the application of the policy alone in
terms of two criteria: the CAFE performance and emissions performance measured
in share of polluting vehicles. The pollutant emissions performance is represented
with a note that is high for a more polluting mix and lower for a more clean mix, as
described in section 5.2.3. On the one hand, we have compared the single applica-
tion of X policy with CO2 only scenario. On the other hand, we have compared the
two policy package policies: CO2 + X policy with CAFE only scenario.
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BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel E 7
Diesel E 6
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline E 7
Gasoline E 6
Gasoline 
FIGURE 5.5 – Comparison of the distribution of technology choices
in a CO2 emissions dimension for 4 Scenarios: CO2 only and selected
two policy scenarios.
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First, when modeling policies independently in panel a of Figure 5.6 the dif-
ference in each point of the figure is a different stringency for the policy modeled for
example in the case of ZEV Mandate it is a change on the ZEV target. A ZEV Man-
date, a LEZ ICE ban and a LEZ ZEV force have all a positive trend meaning that the
CO2 Target and Vehicle’s emissions note improve when the other policy condition
improves. A CAFE only policy always positively relates CO2 and other pollutants
which means a policy that focuses on climate change only can produce an improve-
ment of air pollutant emissions too. A more stringent CAFE target will improve the
CO2 emissions performance and Other Pollutants emissions too. The AQ standard
only scenario is different, for a variation of the policy condition there is no improve-
ment in CO2 emissions. Compared to the baseline scenario without any policies, the
AQ scenario produces the same CO2 emissions in 2030 but only a better air pollution
note. Therefore this policy alone does not produce any effect on CO2 emissions.
Second, we focus now on panel b of Figure 5.6 to analyze the combined effect
of policies. In this second figure, the policy condition are the same as before defined
in the introduction of this section. The variation of each point in the figure comes
from a change in the CAFE target. We can see that an Emission standard appears to
have a positive effect with CAFE for all targets but the trend is almost equal to the
scenario of CAFE only, thus the effect is minimal. For the CO2 + ZEV Mandate, CO2 +
LEZ ZEV force and CO2 + LEZ ZEV ban there is a change in the relationship between
the air pollutant note and CO2 emissions. There is a point where the slope is steeper,
meaning that when the CAFE target gets less stringent the pollutant emission note
gets worse but the CO2 emissions perform better than the expected target. If we
relate to Figure 5.3 we can see that the turning point correspond with the point where
the gap in BEV share is higher in both ZEV Mandate and LEZ ZEV force Scenarios.
Since a BEV has the lowest pollutant emission note one should expect that the note
should be better, however the share of pollutant Gasoline variant is highest in these
scenarios which makes the average pollutant emission note increase more rapidly.
The fact that both the LEZ policies and the ZEV mandate have higher air pol-
lutant emissions is surprising because all three policies are intended to reduce local
air pollution. The difference lies on where does the air pollution occur, in the case of
the ZEV mandate we have already seen that it contained the dirtiest technology in
terms of CO2, Figure 5.6 shows that it also contains a high share of polluting vehicles,
specially when the CAFE target is less stringent. For the case of LEZ, the difference
is that only a part of new vehicles sales is bound by the policy. Which means that the
other part of new vehicles sales does not have a requirement to have low pollutant
emissions.
To complete the study of the impact of policy application for a car manufac-
turer, we perform an analysis of the Total Cost of Possessions of a vehicle that will
tell the cost for society of the application of a policy. This cost is divided in two
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(A) Single Policies
(B) Combination of two policies
FIGURE 5.6 – CO2 Performance and Other Vehicle’s emissions with
Environmental policies with different levels of stringency. (A) Appli-
cation of a single policy at each time. An increase of stringency in
each case is: CAFE policy: a lower target, ZEV Mandate: a higher
target, both LEZ and QA (Emission Standard): a year earlier. (B) Ap-
plication of a combination of CAFE with other policies. The increase
of stringency in Scenarios is only due to a change in the CAFE target.
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components the cost of technology and the cost of mobility of a vehicle. This anal-
ysis uses the same framework employed in Chapter 4 to obtain the cost of fuel, the
kilometers driven and fuel consumption. In Table 5.9 we show that a CO2 only sce-
nario is the least cost scenario when preparing a CAFE policy in terms of cost of
production which is expected since this model has fewer constraints than the other
scenarios. However, in terms of Cost of Mobility a CO2 only scenario produces the
worst performance, the cost of usage of a car fleet deriving from this scenario will be
higher. Combining all costs it is still the CO2 only policy scenario that is the best in
terms of cost of usage and cost of production. Other externalities such as pollutant
emissions are not monetarized and might change the result.
When the overcost is higher than any of the single policy scenarios, both poli-
cies are binding. In the absence of an increase in cost of the two policy scenario
compared to either one of the single policy scenarios we can deduce that a policy
dominating is the other, meaning that one policy has stricter technology conditions
that are also compatible with the other policy.
When comparing the single policy cost and the combination with CAFE Fig.
5.7, the Total Cost of Production per vehicle is higher when combining policies due
to an increase in constraints. First of all, we can see that for the case of LEZ policies
and ZEV Mandate, the combination with CAFE yields the same cost, the emission
level of the LEZ policy scenario applied independently already complies with the
CAFE target thus the CAFE policy is not really adding any constraint. The overcost
for complying with a CAFE policy is the lowest among these three policies, in these
conditions we also saw that all these policies overcomplied with the CAFE target
thus adding a CAFE policy does not changes the result and there is no impact on
cost. For policies that are compatible, it is expected that the Total Cost of Production
also read as the total cost of compliance will be lower than the sum of the appli-
cation of the two policies. We see this degree of shared effort between the policies
when the cost of application of the two policy package is smaller than the sum of
compliance cost of each policy independently. CAFE and LEZ ICE ban policy, CAFE
and LEZ ZEV force and CAFE and the ZEV Mandate show this behavior. In Fig.
5.8 we perform the same comparison of Scenarios from the No Policy Scenario basis
but with a more stringent CAFE target of 62 gCO2/km in 2030. In this more strin-
gent case, the CAFE target is binding, adding a policy to the CAFE policy does not
produce a significant increase in cost. The air quality emission standard shows a
very different behavior, the compliance of both policies costs more than the sum of
each policy applied independently showing that between these policies there are no
shared efforts.
Appendix E will describe the effect of CAFE indexed to mass when combined
with the policies treated in this Chapter. We show that the mass indexation fa-
vors heavier vehicles which creates more compatible conditions in technology choice
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Scenario Total Cost of Pro-
duction in ke
Total Cost of Mo-
bility in ke
Total Cost of Pos-
session in ke
CO2 only 2.01 1.37 3.38
CO2 & Air Quality
standard
2.26 1.31 3.57
CO2 & ZEV Man-
date
2.17 1.33 3.50
CO2 & LEZ ICE ban 2.14 1.35 3.48
CO2 & LEZ ZEV
force
2.10 1.35 3.45
TABLE 5.9 – All Scenarios without mass index. Summary of Total
Cost of Possession per vehicle: sum of Total Cost of Mobility and
Total Cost of Production.
CO2 
Only
LEZ ZEV 
force 
Only
CO2 & 
LEZ ICE 
ban
LEZ ICE 
ban Only
CO2 & 
AQ 
standard
AQ 
standard 
Only
ZEV 
Only
CO2 & 
LEZ ZEV 
force
CO2 & 
ZEV
FIGURE 5.7 – Comparison of the overcost of compliance with one sin-
gle policy and the combination with CAFE policy from a policy Sce-
nario.
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CO2 
Only
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Only
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ban
LEZ ICE 
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CO2 & 
AQ 
standard
AQ 
standard 
Only
ZEV 
Only
CO2 & 
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force
CO2 & 
ZEV
FIGURE 5.8 – Comparison of the overcost of compliance with one sin-
gle policy and the combination with CAFE policy from a policy Sce-
nario with a CAFE target of 62 gCO2/km.
with two policies: LEZ ZEV force and the ZEV Mandate but it reduces the compat-
ibility of LEZ ICE ban and worsens the differences of an Air Quality Standard and
CAFE.
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Environmental policies have an impact on carmaker’s technology choices, the
abatement of carbon emissions and the reduction of pollutant emissions. Today
there is a growing number of policy instruments that focus on a fraction of emis-
sions but not all emissions. We have analyzed the independent and combined effect
of policies and found that the selection of technologies is different from policy to
policy, thus a several conditions are key to determine what is the effect of the com-
bination of policies. Stringency and timing are elements that determine whether a
policy will be more difficult to comply. The reasons of these differences in choice are
also due to the nature of the policy if it is a technology-based instrument or not and
the technologies at disposal that are more or less adapted to policy criteria.
When policies are combined more criteria is included to assess the cost-optimal
technology thus making the selection of technologies more challenging since there
will be less adapted solutions for the given constraints. The impact of the ZEV Man-
date and LEZ ZEV force policies on technology choices has two implications: first,
it is a technology specific policy that produces a high share of EV and second, they
do not push for incremental improvements of ICEV. Therefore, it has a path depen-
dency on EVs and do not decrease the carbon emissions of conventional vehicles. A
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CAFE standard and a LEZ ICE ban distribute abatement efforts more evenly. Such a
behavior is similar to a Renewable quota combined with an emission trading scheme
in the energy sector where an increase in the share of Renewable energy is compen-
sate with an increase in non renewable energy such as carbon plants, this effect is
defined as "the green promotes the dirtiest"(Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010). The
fuel economy standard combined with a policy promoting plug-in vehicles (ZEV
Mandate and LEZ ZEV force) produce the same effect. However, the difference with
the energy sector is that CAFE applies on fuel economy and does not bind real emis-
sions driven by vehicles. Final emissions from vehicle’s usage will depend on how
many km they are driven and the gap between test cycle fuel economy and real fuel
economy.
The combination of policies were studied from three perspectives: technology
choices, overcost of policy compliance and environmental performance on both di-
mensions of vehicle’s emissions. Analyzing technology choice determines how close
the requirements of a policy are to other policies. We show that depending on the
stringency of a policy, the technology requirements can be more or less demanding
which in turn can change how similar technology choices of two policies are. Look-
ing at the portfolio of technologies we saw that some technology mixes are very
similar to the scenario with a CAFE policy only. This proofs that the CAFE policy is
the dominant policy, the one that constraints the most.
In terms of social cost of the policy we have obtained the technology cost and
the cost of usage for different policy scenarios. We found that for a CAFE policy
not stringent, there is no overcost for a policy package combining a fuel economy
standard with another policy. For the case of a very stringent CAFE policy target,
there is an overcost to comply with the fuel economy standard because it is more
difficult to comply. For all cases, low or high stringency CO2 targets, the emission
standard with a CAFE policy requires the most expensive social cost showing that
the air quality emission standard and the CAFE policy do not help each other.
In the case of the two main dimensions of vehicle emissions CO2 and air pol-
lutants we have studied how a change in policy stringency changes the performance
on these dimensions and what happens when they are combined with a CAFE tar-
get. In the CO2 dimension we observed that a change in policy stringency produces
lower CO2 emissions for all cases except for an emission standard. In the air quality
dimension, a change in policy stringency produces a better air quality note. When
policies are combined we have lower performance on the air quality dimension for
the two types of LEZ and ZEV Mandate but better performance for some CO2 targets
after the threshold. The combination of a fuel economy standard and an emission
standard produces very little variation from the scenario of a CAFE only application.
When the emission standard is applied alone there is no effect on CO2 emissions.
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The model of a LEZ is based on the assumption that all urban areas in a coun-
try will apply the same type of scheme. Although some countries do apply similar
policies in cities such as the "vignette" (labels) restrictions in French cities, Italy does
not have a common framework. Thus a common model of LEZ is not adapted for
regions with high diversity of LEZ. The application of LEZ are related to local gov-
ernment willingness to control air pollution. The LEZ policy produces an impact on
the entire vehicle fleet, although we consider a large impact of the policy in depart-
mental sales, further research on the consumer reaction to a LEZ policy is necessary.
Despite increasing concern on air pollution there is no certainty that LEZ scheme
will spread to other cities or will become more restrictive.
Our model of local policy impact estimates that the departmental sales are
affected by the urban policy. In practice, this assumption holds for people driving
in and out the restricted area. However for people doing peripheral driving outside
the restricted zone they might not be limited to choose a technology that is more
expensive but allows them to enter the city-centers. To check if this assumption
holds a detailed analysis of mobility of passenger vehicles is required to check for
the share of vehicles affected by a LEZ in a department. Data on community level
will reduce the mesh of vehicle registrations and can improve the model.
The assessment of vehicle usage is only focused on fuel consumption and the
cost of usage is derived from how much fuel is burned during a vehicle service.
The other externality that we treat in this Chapter, air pollution, is not quantified
we do not know the quantity of a given pollutant emitted by vehicle usage. We
could make an assumption on the policy limits of the Air Quality emission standard.
Nonetheless real driving performance of technologies on each type of pollutant is
required to make an assessment on air pollution. The challenge of quantifying air
pollution is that, unlike carbon emissions, the location of the source is important
to determine the concentration of emissions at a given location. Thus a vehicle sales
model at the community level is a potential tool to make an air pollution assessment.
Different policy mechanisms are implemented to correct a variety of externali-
ties resulting from vehicles emissions. These mechanisms induce technology change
in vehicles that increases vehicle cost. The technology solutions that solve for more
than one externality: CO2 and air pollution perform better than those focusing on a
single externality. When preparing a future portfolio of technologies a firm should
choose technologies that have good performance among all externality indicators to
avoid the risk of having a technology that is not adapted to a policy. The emission
standard is a policy that has technology requirements different from other policies,
neglecting adaptation for this policy might put the technology portfolio at risk if a
future change in the policy package includes an emission standard. With more pol-
icy pressure on environmental externalities car manufacturers will face a future of
more overlapping policies that will reduce the margin to maneuver the technology
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portfolio. In this Thesis with the current assumptions the best solution from the
perspective of climate change and air pollution is a BEV.
A policymaker has different tools to regulate the passenger vehicle market,
they vary in scope, stringency and mechanism. The scope of policies should be as
large as possible to avoid compensating effects seen in a technology specific policy
such as the ZEV Mandate. When policies apply to all vehicles there is less risk that
very polluting vehicles are still present in the market. The effect of a ZEV Mandate
alone does not guarantee that the average emissions of a fleet reduce year by year.
The advantage of a ZEV Mandate is that it sets a strong signal to develop a plug-in
vehicle ecosystem (Fox, Axsen, and Jaccard, 2017) that requires a joint effort of tech-
nology development, infrastructure deployment and change in consumer behavior.
Policies on new vehicle sales are based on estimations on the vehicle usage
that can be wrong, emission test cycle have failed to capture real driving emissions.
Thus a policymaker should create instruments that are as wider as possible includ-
ing the new and existing fleet. A fuel economy standard and an emission standard
are designed from assumptions on vehicle mileage and environmental performance
on test-cycles. These policies work best if the assumed vehicle mileage is close to
real vehicle mileage and the assumed performance on test-cycles is close to on road
performance. After vehicle sales there is room for policy instruments that regulate
the entire vehicle fleet.
Stringency of policy instruments can considerably change the difficulty of com-
plying with an objective, when preparing a new target an assessment on the impact
on other policies is necessary to understand how the technology change will be ori-
ented. Various mechanisms are applied in the passenger vehicle market that are not
always complementary. When there are opposing selection criteria between policies
the final policy package cost will be high, thus a policymaker should consider how
to effectively solve a group of externalities without creating these type of effects as
much as possible. In some cases this is challenging since technology requirements
might be very different between policies, we saw this type of situation in the combi-
nation of a fuel economy standard and an emission standard.
The four challenges that a policymaker face are a selection challenge that is
intended or unintended bias on technologies favored by the policy, an stringency
challenge that is the policy goal, a stability challenge that is the coherence of policy
over an extended period of time and a scale challenge that is the balance of the policy
budget (Bergek and Berggren, 2014).
Time horizon of various policy instruments is different with some policies pro-
ducing long term signals and other policies only having a shortsighted objective.
The difference in planning makes a policy more urgent than the others. Timing tech-
nological change such that it suits all policy objectives requires studying different
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policy outcomes and promoting solutions that are compatible with a large range of
objectives.
The overlapping of policies is not limited to two policies, in current markets
there are more than two policies on vehicle’s emissions that can produce less obvious
implications. In the French market, three distinctive policies are applied to vehicle
emissions: a CO2 emission regulation, an Air Quality emission standard and a fee
and rebate based on CO2 emission. We have not analyzed the combination of three
policies, further research should investigate what are the implications of a larger
policy package. There are policy announcements that show a willing to transition
from fossil-fuel vehicles to electric vehicles. These policy signals are more severe
policy constraints, in France the government plans to ban all ICE vehicles in 2040.
The Netherlands and Norway plan to ban the same category of vehicles as early as
2030 and 2025 respectively.
Recent efforts from the Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI) have considered
a label of a larger set of externalities upon a notation mechanism which considers
tailpipe emissions, energy efficiency and noise called GreenNCAP. Although this
program is based on safety New Car Assessment Programme (NCAP) tests which
rates vehicle’s safety but do not require specific compliance for a carmaker, it can be
a potential multidimensional indicator of environmental performance. With such a
label, the impact of such policy mechanism depends on consumer’s value of a vehi-
cle’s note. Such mechanism deserves further research to check if it is complementary
with existing instruments and how it will steer current automotive technologies.
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Conclusion
The future technology mix of light-duty vehicles will determine if car manu-
facturers are successful in developing a clean vehicle fleet, and ultimately the emis-
sions externalities associated with the vehicle fleet use to provide mobility services.
This thesis has shed some light on the evolution of technology choices under emis-
sions policy and technology diffusion inertia constraints, with three perspectives
applying a technologies choices optimization model developed within the thesis.
All three perspectives study a specific aspect of the corporate average emissions
standards that regulate car manufacturers. The first focused on the dynamic aspect
of the standards with consecutive targets that increase in stringency over time. It
studied how the anticipation (or not) of a long-term target changes short-term tech-
nology choices, and how how reaching short-term targets enables or hinders the
attainment of long-term targets. The second perspective focused on the design of
the standard that in some jurisdictions, notably Europe and China, indexes the tar-
get on the average mass of vehicles sold, making it less stringent for heavier vehicles.
It analyzed how such indexation influences technology choices, emissions and the
cost of respecting the regulation. The third perspective was centered on the overlap
of several policy instruments, the CO2 emissions standard, zero emissions vehicles
mandates and local air quality policies. This last section of the thesis will summa-
rize the main results in section 6.1 then it will cover the potential improvements and
further paths for this work in section 6.2. To conclude this thesis I will discuss the
implications for an automotive firm and for policymakers in section 6.3.
6.1 Summary of Results
The policy instruments that are implemented in the automotive market try
to solve the externalities of the negative impacts of vehicle’s emissions. We have
focused on two impacts: global warming and air pollution. The fuel economy stan-
dard is the central policy of this thesis that has been studied under three perspec-
tives. First, the anticipation of long term fuel economy targets defines how a firm
will prepare for an intermediate target. Second, the fuel economy standard when in-
dexed to mass does not give an incentive to develop all low carbon technologies but
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leads to limited additional compliance cost. Third, overlapping policies with differ-
ent objectives can collide or help each other, some combinations of the fuel economy
standard with other policies do not produce a significant change in the optimal tech-
nology choices and some others require a new solution to fit two policies.
The anticipation of consecutive targets
The first perspective on policy issues of the fuel economy standard showed the
implications of the type of anticipation of consecutive targets in the future. When a
firm prepares a portfolio for the near term if the long term policy signals are strong
they will consider a near and long term targets to optimize technology solutions. In
contrast when there is no long term signal or there is doubt about the stringency
of the final target a firm can prepare for a near term waiting for the long term to
be strong enough to perform a change in the mix of technologies. We showed that
when firms do not anticipate the long term target, there is a technological lock-in that
emerge on low abatement technologies that are cheaper to produce. The path depen-
dency on this short term technology portfolio leads to unfeasible long term targets.
Our estimates showed that these conditions occur for a range of possible long term
targets, and result from the inter-temporal dynamics of technology diffusion.
We illustrated that the type of choices made in the near term condition the
achievement of a long term target. We showed that neglecting the long term target
would prioritize the least cost technologies for a lenient target. However when us-
ing this very same portfolio of technologies to prepare stringent long term targets,
it reveals ill prepared. The mix has chosen technologies that have low abatement
potential thus creating a lock-in in high carbon technologies.
The indexation of the stringency of the target on the vehicles average mass
The second application on policy issues of the fuel economy standard quanti-
fies the impact of the mass indexation of the target on technology choices, emissions,
compliance cost and total mobility costs. The principle of indexing the stringency of
the target on the average mass of the vehicles sold aims at being more acceptable
for car manufacturers that specialize on heavier types of vehicles. It obviously in-
troduces an incentive to increase vehicles mass, or, at least, a disincentive to reduce
vehicles mass. Because different powertrain technologies imply mass changes, in
particular battery vehicles are heavier, and because lightweight technologies con-
stitute an abatement option, the standard is not technology-neutral when its strin-
gency is indexed on the mass. The mass-indexed fuel economy standard conditions
the scope of technologies that can be chosen by a firm in favor of heavy technolo-
gies. There is an incentive to develop heavier technologies that causes a reduction
of the overall stringency of the target. We studied how indexing the stringency of
the target on the average mass of vehicles changes the overall emissions, the tech-
nology choices, the compliance cost for the car manufacturer and the social cost of
mobility. We illustrated with a quantified example taking plausible numbers for the
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CAFE target, the coefficient of mass-indexation and the technologies characteristics
in terms of mass, emissions and costs.
We found that mass-indexation of the target does lead to higher emissions
of the cost-optimal technology mix complying with the target, and quantified the
increase on an illustrative case where it amounts to 5% increase of emissions. When
comparing cases where the overall emissions are forced to be equal, we found that
technology choices are significantly different when the target is indexed on the mass
or not. The lightweight variant of a mainstream technology is only developed in the
case without mass indexation. In our illustrative case, it reaches about 20% of the
sales. However, we find only very limited differences on the compliance cost and
on the social cost of mobility when preparing a CAFE policy with or without a mass
index.
Fossil fuels vehicles that are heavy consume more fuel than lighter versions
thus a policy that incites heavy technologies should also be more expensive. Our
result does not find a significant difference in social cost because plug-in vehicles
are heavy technologies favored by a mass indexed standard that do not follow the
logic stated above. A BEV is heavier than all fossil fueled vehicles but it is cheaper
to use due to a difference in fuel price: electricity is cheaper than gasoline or diesel.
Thus there are two compensation effects. First, in terms of technology costs a mass-
indexed policy develops more plug-in vehicles which enables the absence of lightweight
technology. Second, in terms of cost of usage a mass-indexed policy develops a
cheap BEV which compensates a more costly fossil-fuel vehicle without lightweight.
Overall these two compensation effects make the gap between a fuel economy stan-
dard with and without mass index very small.
The small difference found for total social cost is subject to a number of as-
sumptions that might change the result. First, we do not model an evolution of
energy prices, our fuel cost is always constant thus we can not tell how future elec-
tricity cost and oil prices will affect cost in usage in the end of period. Second, we
assumed that all vehicles are driven the same mileage and they are owned the same
number of years. In practice, consumers that have higher mileage are sensitive to
fuel economy and tend to choose a vehicle that has high fuel economy, with high
driving range and easy access to refueling/recharging infrastructure. The best cost
in usage technology is a BEV however range anxiety and a lack of infrastructure
does not push high mileage drivers to choose plug-in vehicles. The effect of differ-
ent driving behaviors, and years of possessions for different technology types might
affect the cost in usage assessment.
Overlapping policy instruments
The third perspective analyzed the effect of overlapping policy instruments
with multiple objectives on technology choices. We have considered two types of
vehicle emissions externalities: climate change and air pollution. On top of CAFE
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standards, we have modeled four other passenger vehicle policies to show the di-
versity of mechanisms: a Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Mandate, a local pollutants
emission standard and two types of Low Emission Zones (LEZ).
We showed that when stringency in CO2 emissions related policies increases,
the air pollution performance of vehicles also improves. In contrast when stringency
in air pollution ambition increases, we did not see improvement on climate change
ambition. We also found that when LEZ policies and ZEV Mandate are binding they
improve the average climate change performance but they deteriorate the average
air pollution performance compared to a fuel economy standard alone. In the case
of LEZ, urban vehicles have a different technology mix than non urban vehicles but
in the case of a ZEV Mandate this condition is not guaranteed.
We showed that for each policy there is a portfolio of technologies that is the
least cost solution to comply with the policy. Comparing the least-cost choices for
each policy instrument shows that some policies require the same type of technolo-
gies. The reasons why are a similar type of policy mechanism or an equivalent
stringency on the amount of low carbon technologies. Stringency and technology
specific requirements such as a share of low emission vehicles determine how close
CO2 emission policies are. Policies treating air pollutants demand different types of
technologies.
The combination of a LEZ where only ZEV are permitted or a ZEV Mandate
with a fuel economy standard produce the highest share of low carbon technologies
which is expected by the objective of the policy. However because the CAFE stan-
dard regulates the average emissions of vehicles sold, the increase of ZEV shares are
compensated by an increase in the share of high emitting technologies. Therefore,
this type of overlapping policies cause a polarized distribution of emission reduc-
tion efforts where only low carbon technologies are making the abatement efforts
for the entire technology mix. We have seen this same behavior appear in the elec-
tricity sector where a renewable quota combined with an emission trading scheme
produce an increase in the share of renewable energy but produce also an increase in
high emitting energy from fossil-fuels, such as coal power plants. In the automotive
sector the difference lies in the scope of application, in electricity the emission trad-
ing scheme is applied to direct emissions unlike the automotive sector where the
policy applies to fuel economy based on tank-to-wheel assessment on a test cycle.
Actual emissions resulting from the usage of the vehicles sold are not directly reg-
ulated and will depend on vehicles mileage and on the gap between real emissions
on the road and emissions measured on a test cycle.
We investigated the impact of overlapping policies on the additional cost of
the technology mix compared to a baseline without policies. We found that if one of
the overlapped policies is not binding or demands little change then the cost of com-
pliance is determined by the more binding policy. We saw that depending on target
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stringency a policy can change from binding policy to not binding policy. This type
of behavior was found for all policies except the emission standard that is always
binding and implies an additional cost that is more than the sum of the compliance
costs of each policy applied alone.
6.2 Discussion of limitations and avenues for further research
In this section, we will discuss the limitations of our modelling approach and
sketch out some avenues for further research.
The modelling approach we developed rests on, and our results are driven by,
the representation of a limit to the speed at which a technology diffuses in the mar-
ket. A change in the automotive ecosystem is not only limited to technology research
and development, it impacts all actors related to a vehicle passenger mobility. The
rate of change of the ecosystem is difficult to estimate since there are supply-side
and demand-side dynamics that affect how fast a technology can diffuse. Our sim-
plifying assumption was that such complex process of the diffusion of technologies
can be approximated with an S-shaped function. This assumption allowed us to cap-
ture the inertia limiting technology diffusion in a simplified model that is focused on
the choices in a technology portfolio. However, it is a first approximation that cap-
tures the stylized fact but does not represent in detail the underlying mechanisms of
actual technology diffusion process. Moreover, the S-shaped function used to repre-
sent the constraint on technology diffusion that is sensible to two parameters: speed
of diffusion and initial sales share. The assumption of modeling a new technology
under a given speed defines how fast a technology will diffuse in the future. If the
market conditions for diffusion of a technology are more difficult to implement than
expected, then the actual speed will be slower than predicted. Conversely, if a mar-
ket is capable of putting all market conditions to get a faster pace, then the actual
speed will be faster. We are limited in our approach to fit a technology diffusion
speed to an observed diffusion speed seen in the past. In addition, the initial share
of a technology in new vehicles sales determines the start point of diffusion. Our
model does not allow instant growth of a technology, this conditions affects more
those technologies with a low sales share. Thus, our results are sensible to the initial
sales share of the technology mix. Varying the initial share will result in more or less
growth of low carbon technology, the shape of diffusion will remain the same but it
can start sooner or later. In extreme cases where the initial share of a cost-effective
solution is too low, the model will have to find additional technologies to comply
with policy objectives. Therefore, this modeling approach is not suited to include
completely new technologies that do not exist in the market yet, such as fuel cell
technologies for instance.
Second, our model of technology choices is based on the principle that a firm
would minimize technology production costs to comply with a policy scenario (or
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compliance costs), without pricing and volume of sales adjustments. However an
automotive firm does not sell technology, a firm sells vehicles that have different
margin of profits. According to the type of technology a firm can raise or decrease
the margin of profits, this element of price adjustment does not appear in our model.
Each car manufacturer can have different strategies to put a higher or lower price on
certain types of technologies depending on its own technology costs and expertise.
We have modeled a single vehicle segment of a car manufacturer but in reality a car
manufacturer produces more than one segment, thus it can develop those segments
that are more profitable than others. We model a single segment with constant vol-
ume, a complete model of a car manufacturer would include different segments and
allow a change in size although it will not change our results on policy mechanisms.
Third, the mechanism of technology choice of a car manufacturer models a
firm that acts based on cost optimal choices of its own portfolio of technologies. The
automotive market is a very competitive market where technology trends and expec-
tations on technology pathways are high. Therefore choices made by a different car
manufacturer influence the rationale of the technology choice of car manufacturer.
Some firms decide to bet on a single technology such as Tesla developing plug-in ve-
hicles. We model a single car manufacturer that is independent of choices made by
others. This is limiting in the diversity of technology solutions, a promising solution
that is cost optimal can fail to diffuse if there is no car manufacturer supporting its
development. For example, hydrogen vehicles are suffering from a lack of support
because all manufacturers are turning massively to plug-in vehicles.
Furthermore, we have a model of partial equilibrium where an automotive
firm minimizes technology costs but faces a non responsive demand. We assume
that the increase in vehicle cost due to the introduction of low carbon technologies
does not affect vehicle demand. This is a limitation of scope of our model that do
not consider how consumers will react to the increase in vehicle price, and to the
different characteristics of alternative powertrain, such as limited autonomy of bat-
tery electric vehicle. Considering both vehicle price and cost in use, low carbon
vehicles are not more costly than conventional vehicles because they are cheaper to
use. A consumer that completely neglects potential savings in cost in use of low car-
bon technologies will be more resistant to adopt these type of vehicles. In contrast
if a consumer considers the reduction in future cost in use, demand of low carbon
vehicles will not suffer. Thus how consumers see future costs is important in the
acceptability of low carbon vehicles. We have assumed that the demand is only lim-
ited by technology diffusion constraints but we did not include an explicit reaction
of price.
We have shown three policy issues using the same framework of technology
choices under technology diffusion and vehicle emissions policy constraints. Each
application focuses on a distinct aspect of policy construction. We have not cover
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all potential issues next we list some further hints that can assess other policies or
perspectives.
We centered our policy analysis on the fuel economy standard. However other
policies have the goal to reduce vehicle emissions. The assessment of more policies
will contrast the result of the fuel economy standard and can also study which in-
strument is more effective on the scope of a car manufacturer. Therefore a policy
that could be implemented in the model is a feebate scheme. This instrument fo-
cuses mainly on consumer adoption, it is less adapted to our model since we do not
maximize the utility of a consumer thus we can only take into account the profit
maximization of a car manufacturer. To assess the welfare effects of the policy we
have to combine the model of this thesis with an consumer utility model.
We have limited the scope of the model to 2030 to coincide with policy ambi-
tions that are visible up to 2030. After 2030 the policy scenario is less clear, however
a growing number of countries and cities are announcing their engagement to the
objective of carbon neutrality at horizons varying between 2035 and 2050. This objec-
tive concerns all sectors and would not necessarily be directly translated to a carbon
neutrality for the transport sector, but would imply very stringent emissions reduc-
tions from all sectors. In this same movement, several countries have announced
goals to end ICE vehicles sales in the coming decades. If the status of these an-
nouncements are yet unclear, and it remains to be seen if and how they would be
translated in legally binding policies, these announcements are a signal that future
policies are likely to become more stringent. Therefore, the 2030 horizon we have
adopted in our studies is not an end-point in itself but rather an intermediate transi-
tion point. The dynamics beyond 2030 implies further issues of technology diffusion,
but also innovations and disruptions. Increasing the time span of the model would
allow to explore those dynamics, but would require lifting a number of limitations.
In particular, it poses the question of how to represent technological learning and the
assumption of constant technology costs would not hold anymore. Furthermore, it
would require modeling the innovations and how new technologies enter the mar-
ket. Finally, policy mechanisms that would imply a ban of certain types of vehicles,
and possible a large class such as all ICE, would radically change the market con-
ditions in which technology choices would be made, both on the car manufacturer
side and on the consumer side.
We have applied the model to a single vehicle segment of a particular car man-
ufacturer that is large enough to represent the vehicle market but it is still more or
less competitive in some areas. To assess a firm strategy the model will need to study
all vehicle segments produced and distribute efforts between segments under differ-
ent strategies. Likewise the role of game theory between car manufacturers under
a policy context is key to determine whether some actors might become free riders.
Our stylized model could provide a simple supply-side perspective of policy com-
pliance to be used in game theory models. On the same note, an application of the
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model to another main automotive market should help challenging the results from
another start point with less Diesel vehicles such as Japan and the USA.
The impact of urban policies on new vehicle sales can be improved to find
which type of sales are affected. To do so, first an assessment on the mobility of
the urban area and non urban area is required to identify the daily trips that enter a
potential restricted area. Second, the relationship between new vehicle registrations
and the place of usage is important to check the assumption that a vehicle registered
in a given community is used in that place. Third, some LEZ are already announced
but do not immediately affect new vehicle sales, therefore some consumers might
be aware that a future car restriction will impact them and some others might not
know or neglect such impact. The consumer perception of the LEZ policy signal de-
termines the share of consumers thinking about choosing other types of powertrains
because of LEZ. Finally applying the LEZ restriction to other countries with different
types of LEZ will help identify or confirm trends on technology choice.
The model used in this thesis is focused on new vehicle sales of a car manufac-
turer. To have the complete emission assessment of passenger vehicles a stock model
is needed to obtain the vehicle emissions from the entire fleet stock, new and used
car. Such assessment requires studying new vehicle sales from all firms and data
of the existing fleet stock, to be in position to model the dynamics of the vehicles
stock evolution. We have only used a simplified assessment of car usage but many
improvements are possible in the estimation of distance driven, the change in price
of energy and the effect of policies of vehicle usage.
6.3 Implications of our results
Notwithstanding these limitations, and recognizing that our results constitute
an illustration of stylized mechanisms concerning technology choices under emis-
sions policy and technology diffusion constraints, this last section concludes the the-
sis by drawing some implications of our results, for an automotive firm and for
policy makers.
Implications for an Automotive Firm
The model developed in this thesis allows a greater technological detail of low
carbon technology families. It allows to assess how cost optimal a low carbon tech-
nology is compared to others when preparing for a policy target. A car manufacturer
requires such information to orient investments on new resources to be able to pro-
duce new vehicles at the expected rate.
The industry has been structured to optimize each vehicle component to re-
duce costs to increase profits, it has developed a specialized know how on each
subsystem. This silos structure favors incremental improvements on the incumbent
technology that retrofit existing architectures. Disruptive technologies that change
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how the automotive firm is organized create a discontinuity and need more efforts to
diffuse. There is no silver bullet technology to solve all requirements, constant trade-
offs are made to obtain a final product that is compliant with the policy framework
and competitive. Despite basing it success on increasing returns on development of
ICEV, the car maker faces major challenges to engage a low carbon transition. An
equilibrium is required between solidifying a new solution to produce economies
of scales and searching for new niches that can help the low carbon transition. Past
evidence on technological transition shows that disruptive technologies rarely de-
velop inside the dominant system, they are exogenous and develop in niches that
later find applications in the dominant system to offer an improved performance.
When studying the potential of low carbon technology the constraint on technology
diffusion is also a measure of how fast does the existing structure of a car manufac-
turer can change to deliver low carbon vehicles in a mass market. The inertia of the
structure of a car manufacturer is difficult to measure but we have modeled different
diffusion speeds for technologies that require less change.
An automotive firm develops a business plan which defines the portfolio of
technologies for the following five years in general with a more precise vision for
the next three years. This anticipation of the future contrast with a long-term ambi-
tion of policymakers to engage a low carbon transition that aims at limiting global
warming to 2ºC by the end of the century. Even though long term signals exist, plan-
ning for the firm’s future only occurs in the near term. When the long term context
is not clear, a firm will find more difficult to fix a target. What seems to be a prof-
itable plan for a near term target can lead to an unfitted portfolio of technologies in
the future when more stringent policy targets are decided. A car manufacturer can
decide to take into account weak policy signals in the future and anticipate changes
in technologies. Or, it can wait and see how policy negotiations evolve and defend
a less ambitious target in the future. The result of our first application study, on the
anticipation of consecutive targets, highlights the risk of lock-in that a strategy that
would not account for a long-term target.
The fuel economy standard when indexed to mass produces an incentive to
develop heavy technologies. Lightweight technology is the field most penalized
because it reduces vehicle’s mass. The indexation parameter of a fuel economy stan-
dard produces an advantage, a penalty or no effect on emission reduction technolo-
gies. When a firm chooses to exploit this incentive, it is risking the chance to achieve
real emission reductions instead of some reductions and a relaxation of the target
thanks to a change in the parameter. If the policymaker were to change the param-
eter or reduce the advantage of exploiting mass instead of emission reductions, a
firm focused on heavy technologies to reduce stringency of target will be in a dif-
ficult position to adapt to a new policy. The mass indexed fuel economy standard
also produces an incentive to develop plug-in vehicles because they emit less and
are heavy although the increase in share for plug-in vehicles comes with a decrease
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in the development of incremental technologies for fossil fuel vehicles. A car man-
ufacturer that is positioned to develop a large number of plug-in vehicles will be
favored by the fuel economy standard at the condition that consumers choose plug-
in vehicles massively. In contrast a car manufacturer that is focused on incremental
improvements of fossil-fuel vehicles does not depend on plug-in vehicles adoption
but can suffer from a more stringent fuel economy target.
We have identified a similar effect with a different kind of policy, the ZEV
Mandate and a LEZ ZEV force are two policies that also incite diffusion of plug-in
vehicles. The difference with a mass-indexed fuel economy standard is that there
are other ways to comply with the fuel economy standard in contrast the minimum
quota on zero emission vehicles does not leave other possibilities to comply. Both
the ZEV Mandate and the LEZ ZEV force are policies that send a clear signal for
the development of zero emission vehicles, the mass-index fuel economy standard
is not a clear signal, plug-in vehicles are favored because they contribute to reducing
average emissions and they reduce target stringency.
When different policies overlap to regulate vehicle emissions, car manufactur-
ers need to assess what are the adapted solutions for multi-objective policy frame-
work. There technologies that are more or less adapted to solve one type of exter-
nality. The technology that seems to be adapted to a large source of externalities is a
BEV since it does not produce direct emissions in use. There are not yet automotive
policies that consider well-to-wheel emissions except for a fuel tax. There are combi-
nation of policies that require more costly technologies to respect policy limits. This
is the case when the emission standard is combined with CO2 emissions standard.
To comply with the double challenge of vehicle emissions current technology mix
needs to drastically change. Today we see that such rapid changes are occurring in
the automotive market. In France the diesel share of new vehicles sales has fallen
from 70 % in 2010 to 39 % in 2018.
Implications for Policymakers
Emissions policies have a regulatory role to push car manufacturers to develop
low carbon technologies and low air pollution technologies. They also have the role
to pull consumer to incentive adoption of such technologies. Our results can give
some insights for the former.
Determining future policy targets requires an assessment on the low carbon
pathways to evaluate how to share abatement efforts among energy sectors. The
policy ambition of vehicle passengers abatement depends on how fast the energy
system changes in other sectors. The long term goal can be estimated but how fast
should the sector move is a matter of debate. A policymaker is asked for intermedi-
ate targets to orient technological change in the near future, the industry requires a
signal that can be interpreted in the present context. Setting this intermediate target
has to balance between a feasible near term technological change and a compatible
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milestone with a long term goal. Moreover, in energy sectors where there is a risk of
carbon lock-in there are two elements that have to be monitored: the compliance of
the target and how the sector has selected technologies to reduce emissions. These
two elements are necessary to avoid creating carbon lock-ins.
To set an adequate intermediate target a policymaker should take into account
the consequences of near term technology choices on long term technology choices.
To prepare for a long term target, we found that in some plausible cases the com-
pliance to the near term target is not a sufficient nor necessary condition to comply
for a range of long term targets in the fuel economy standard. Setting the short-term
target is a difficult task since it requires fine evaluation of abatement technology po-
tentials. This information is produced by the automotive sector thus a policymaker
only has partial information of future technology potential. Therefore, if setting a
short-term target is necessary, it also calls for caution and for the need to announce
and construct the credibility of the long-term target. From the monitoring point of
view, our result also calls for caution: respecting the aggregate emission target on
the short-term may not be a reliable indication that the structural changes are on the
right track to meet the longer-term target. This calls for indicators that go beyond
the aggregate result in terms of emissions, to be able to monitor and track structural
changes.
Some policies are thought to be technology-neutral, and aim at letting the
firms choose the most adequate technologies to meet an environmental target. How-
ever, some details in the design of the policy can in practice render the instrument
technology-oriented. We illustrated an example of such mechanism: the mass-index
fuel economy standard which produces an incentive to increase mass to reduce strin-
gency of the target and favor technologies such as electrified vehicles but excludes
technologies that reduce vehicles weight. A policy instrument can prematurely close
the door for promising low carbon technologies before they have been tested to eval-
uate their potential. An equilibrium between cost-effective policies that are market
instruments to obtain a cost-effective abatement solution and research or technol-
ogy incentives that are targeted policies on specific technologies to develop a niche
market is needed at an early stage of the low carbon transition.
The overlap of policies, with multiple objectives, can create unintended con-
sequences. For instance, we illustrated that an overlap of corporate average fuel
economy standards and a zero emissions vehicles standard may lead to the polar-
ization of emissions reduction creating a fleet of vehicles split into zero emissions
vehicles, or very low emissions vehicles, and high-emitting vehicles. Because the
CAFE standards regulate the emissions on a test-cycle of vehicles sold, but not di-
rectly the actual emissions on the road, there is a risk that resulting emissions are
higher than expected. Furthermore, such polarization may lead to inequalities be-
tween households and territories with different access to the very low emissions
vehicles.
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Vehicle emissions cause multiple negative externalities the climate change and
air pollution impacts have been addressed by policy instruments. There are policy
mechanisms that produce higher compliance costs than others. Some elements that
require attention are potential carbon lock-ins, a polarized distribution of emission
reduction and the risk to exclude potential solutions. We have illustrated all three of
these elements.
The policy environment is a combination of different instruments that have
different mechanisms. In the case of climate change and air pollution externalities,
the actors engaged for each policy are different and may have different interests.
There are actors that are common such as the car manufacturer and vehicle clients
but the policymaker changes. There are multiple regulators or public offices that
dictate policies affecting car technology. Overlapping policies produce an effect on
the technology mix but overlapping policymakers are also a challenge that creates
multiple and simultaneous debates on different externalities. The coordination effort
of different network of actors is difficult to correct multiple market failures.
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Appendix A
Difference in diffusion modeling
in optimization models:
We have compared the optimal abatement technology choices of three models:
a model with learning without constraint on speed of diffusion, a model without
learning with constant constraint on speed of diffusion and OMLCAT which has no
learning and a endogenous constraint on speed of diffusion.
(Goulder and Mathai, 2000) The difference between the R&D problem and the
Learning By Doing model is the change in the Ψ() function: for learning-by-doing
induced knowledge growth is a function of the current level of abatement rather
than R&D investment. In the learning by doing formulation of a cost-effective model
of abatement policies, there are three effects in the value of the implied reduction
in the CO2 concentration. The negative shadow-cost effect, the positives effects of
knowledge-growth effect and learning-by-doing effects.
The optimization problem is defined as follows:
minAt
∫ ∞
0
C{At, Ht}e−rtdt
s.t. S˙t = −δSt + E0t − At
H˙t = αtHt + kΨ(At, Ht)
S0, H0 given
and St ≤ S¯ ∀t ≤ T
(A.1)
where C is the cost of abatement, At is the abatement of emission, Ht is the knowl-
edge stock, r is the discount rate, δ is the natural rate of removal of atmospheric CO2,
E0t is the baseline emissions, αt is the rate of autonomous technological progress,
k indicates the degree of induced technological change, Ψ is the knowledge accu-
mulation function, S¯ is the target concentration and St the CO2 concentration The
Hamiltonian associated of this problem is:
Ht = −(C(At, Ht)− τt(−δSt + E0t − At)− µt(αt + kψ(At, Ht))
+ηt(S¯− St)
(A.2)
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where τ, µ and η are the Lagrangian multipliers. The firs-order condition for abate-
ment is given by:
CA(·)− µtkΨA(·) = τt
τ˙t = (r + δ)τt − ηt
µ˙t = µt(r− αt − kΨH()) + CH(·)
(A.3)
(Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014) The optimization problem does have learn-
ing instead it has a limit on the available abatement at a point in time.
minxt
∫ ∞
0
C{xt}e−rtdt
s.t. mt ≤ B
m˙t = ere f − at
a˙t = xt − δat
at ≤ ere f
(A.4)
where r is the discount rate, mt are cumulative emissions at date t, B is the carbon
budget, m˙t is the emissions at date t, ere f are baseline emissions, at is the abatement
at time t, a˙t is marginal abatement or speed of abatement, xt is investment and δ is
the depreciation rate. The Hamiltonian associated to this problem is
Ht = e−rt(C(xt) + λt(at − ere f ) + νt(δat − xt)
+µt(ere f − at) + φt(mt − B))
(A.5)
where λ, ν,µ and φ are the Lagrangian multipliers. The firs-order condition for abate-
ment is given by:
Cx(·) = νt
ν˙t = (r + δ)νt − µt
µ˙t = rµt − φt
(A.6)
The optimization problem applied to optimal allocation of abatement invest-
ment results in different abatement options.
minxit
∫ ∞
0
∑
i
Ci{xit}e−rtdt
s.t. mt ≤ B
m˙t =∑
i
(a¯i − ait
a˙it = xit − δait
ait ≤ a¯i
(A.7)
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where a¯it is the abatement potential of sector i. The Hamiltonian associated to this
problem is
Ht = e−rt(∑
i
Ci(xit) +∑
i
λit(ait − a¯i)
+∑
i
νit(δait − xt) + µt∑
i
(a¯i − ait) + φt(mt − B))
(A.8)
The firs-order condition for abatement is given by:
Cxi(·) = νit
ν˙it = (r + δ)νit − µt
µ˙t = rµt − φt
(A.9)
(Vogt-Schilb, Hallegatte, and De Gouvello, 2015) When applied to one vari-
able of abatement and definition of a speed of abatement the resulting optimization
problem is describes as follows:
minxit
∫ ∞
0
∑
i
Ciaite−rtdt
s.t. ∑
i
aiT = a∗
ait+1 ≤ ait + vi
ait ≤ Ait
(A.10)
where Ci is the cost of abatement i, ai is the abatement potential of i, Ai is the max-
imum potential of i, vi is the speed of diffusion of i and a∗ is the abatement target.
The Hamiltonian associated to this problem is
Ht = e−rt(∑
i
Ciait +∑
i
λit(ait − Aij)
+φt∑
i
(aiT − a∗))
(A.11)
where λ and φ are the Lagrangian multipliers. The firs-order condition for abate-
ment is given by:
ν˙it = (r + vi)νit + λit − φt + Ci (A.12)
184 Appendix A. Difference in diffusion modeling in optimization models:
OMLCAT: In our model to technology choice the resulting optimization prob-
lem is describes as follows:
minxit
∫ ∞
0
∑
i
Cixite−rtdt
s.t. ∑i
xiT ∗ ei
∑i xiT
= E∗
xit+1 ≤ xit +Vxit
∑
i
xit ≤ R¯
(A.13)
where ei is the emission level of i, E∗ is the emission target: fuel economy standard,
V(xi) is a function of speed of diffusion and R¯ is the volume target. The Hamiltonian
associated to this problem is
Ht = e−rt(∑
i
Cixit +∑
i
λit(∑
i
xit − R¯)
+∑
i
νit(V(xit) + φt∑
i
xiTei − E∗∑
i
xiT))
(A.14)
The firs-order condition for abatement is given by:
ν˙it = (r +Vxit)(xit)νit + λit − φt(ei − E∗) + Cit (A.15)
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Variant of Myopic Scenario:
The Myopic Scenario used in Chapter 3 is built in a two step fashion defined
as follows: a firm finds the optimal mix from 2014 to 2020 under a policy constraint
in 2020. Then, the mix in 2020 of the first step is the input of a second optimization
of technology choices from 2020 to 2030 under a policy constraint in 2030. The first
period does not take into account the technology costs after 2020, this is a short-
sighted perception of the future. What if the firm is able to see beyond 2020 but do
not considers the policy target in 2030.
We tested a variant of the Myopic Scenario that we call Myopic v2 where a
firm also has a two-step optimization of the technology mix but the first step is ex-
tended until 2030 with a policy constraint in 2030 equal to the target in 2020. This
implies that in 2014 a firm considers technology costs between 2020 and 2030. This is
different from the first version of Myopic. In 2020, a firm in the Myopic v2 Scenario
will run a second optimization that starts from the 2020 technology mix of the first
step and includes the more stringent 2030 policy target. In 2020, the firm is aware
or assumes that the 2030 target is close enough to be prepared, before 2020 the 2030
target is not considered. The impact of Myopic v2 Scenario on the regions of the
compliance of the 2030 target is that it reduces the size of Region 2 in Fig. B.1 and
B.5 because Myopic v2 is able to comply with more stringent targets in 2030.
Myopic v2 Scenario considers both long-term technology costs and optimal
compliance in 2020. The effect of Myopic v2 on 2020 technology choices is different
from Myopic Scenario because of the type of anticipation of future technology costs.
The resulting technology mix shows a higher share of Gasoline that is cheaper in
the long-term without any increase in policy stringency. We show the comparison
of the two Myopic Scenarios and the Foresight Scenario in Fig. B.2. The Myopic v2
Scenario produces the same technology mix in 2020 as the Foresight Scenario that
has a 2030 target equal to the 2020 target. We can see in Fig. B.2 that as the 2030
target becomes less stringent the technology mixes in 2020 are more similar.
In 2030, we have still different choices in 2030 with the Myopic v2 Scenario,
the gap is slightly reduced between the new Myopic and Foresight seen in Fig. B.3.
The new Myopic v2 is in fact a step between Myopic and Foresight because it fails to
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Not Sufficient
1 Nor Sufficient
Nor Necessary
2
Sufficient
but different Technology
choices
3
Myopic v2 Scenario
Not Feasible
FIGURE B.1 – CO2 emissions gap in 2020 between the 2020 CAFE Tar-
get of 95 gCO2/km and two Scenarios - the 2030 Only Scenario and
the Foresight Scenario - as a function of the 2030 target. A positive
gap means that emissions in the scenario considered are higher in
2020 than the CAFE Target, a negative gap means that the scenario
over-complies with the target in 2020. The Myopic v2 Scenario is able
to comply with the 68 gCO2/km target.
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BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline
FIGURE B.2 – Technology mix in 2020 of Foresight Scenario for dif-
ferent 2030 targets and two Myopic Scenarios for a common 95
gCO2/km target in 2020. Myopic v1 Scenario only sees up to 2020
and the 2020 target. Myopic v2 Scenario sees from 2014 to 2030, the
2020 target but does not sees the 2030 target.
take into account the 2030 fuel economy target in 2014 but it is capable of anticipating
future technology costs.
BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline
M: Myopic
F: Foresight
M F M FM FM FM FM FM FM FM FM F M FM F M F
FIGURE B.3 – Technology mix in 2030 of Myopic v2 Scenario (left) and
Foresight Scenario (right) for each 2030 target from 68 to 79 gCO2/km.
In terms of the gap of technology cost of the Myopic v2 Scenario with the 2030
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Only Scenario, we show that there is convergence between Foresight and Myopic
Scenarios for low stringent 2030 targets. We saw that the technology choices were
identical in this region therefore overall costs are also the same. This is different
from the result found with the first version of the Myopic Scenario where there was
always a gap in cost, although small, between Myopic and Foresight Scenarios in
Fig. B.4.
FIGURE B.4 – Gap of Total Discounted Cost of technologies between
Scenarios Myopic (version 2) and Foresight to Scenario 2030 Only.
The gap is the relative difference of cost of Myopic v2 and Foresight
Scenarios to 2030 only Scenario for a range of 2030 CAFE targets.
The Compliance conditions of the 2020 target with Myopic v2 Scenario do not
change very much in Fig.B.5. Region 1 based on the gap between Foresight Scenario
and the 2020 target is identical. Region 2 is smaller than with the first version of
Myopic, there are more cases where the 2030 target is feasible. This is because the
Myopic v2 Scenario has a fraction more of BEV sales share in 2020 which allows for
more stringent targets in 2030. In Region 3, since Foresight and Myopic v2 Scenarios
are similar for low stringent 2030 targets we found cases were technology choices
are identical in 2020 which did not happen with the first version of Myopic. This is
consistent with the convergence in cost gap seen in Fig.B.4 between Myopic v2 and
Foresight.
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FIGURE B.5 – Change in the conditions of compliance of the 2030 tar-
get for a range of 2020 and 2030 targets. The three regions identified
are described above in Fig. B.1 which describes in detail the case for
95 gCO2/km target.
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Appendix C
Additional Description on
Lagrangian Multipliers
C.1 Optimization of Technologies under simplified fuel stan-
dard constraint without mass
The optimization function is the sum of technology costs and the optimization
constraints are: a volume constraint, a fuel economy standard constraint and a non
negative constraint.
min ∑nj=1 xj ∗ Cj
s.t. ∑nj=1 xj = SALES
∑nj=1 xjEj
SALES ≤ TARGET
f or every technology xj ≥ 0
Where n is the total number of technologies in the simplified case this is 3. The
corresponding Lagrangian of this optimization problem is the following:
L(x1, x2, x3, λk) =
n
∑
j=1
xj ∗ Cj − λ1(
n
∑
j=1
xj − SALES)− λ2(TARGET ∗ SALES−
n
∑
j=1
xjEj)
−λ3x1 − λ4x2 − λ5x3
(C.1)
Let’s assume that x1 and x2 will be positive and that the constraint on the fuel econ-
omy standard is binding. In this case the Lagrangian multipliers are:
λ1 = C2 + (C1−C2E2−E1 )
λ2 =
C1−C2
E2−E1
λ3 = 0
λ4 = 0
λ5 = C3 + C2 + E2(C1−C2E2−E1 ) + E3(
C1−C2
E2−E1 )
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The Lagrangian multipliers that will define the optimal choice are based on the ratio
of cost over emissions. If we now assume that x1 and x3 will be positive and that the
constraint on the fuel economy standard is binding, the Lagrangian multipliers are:
λ1 = C3 + (C1−C3E3−E1 )
λ2 =
C1−C3
E3−E1
λ3 = 0
λ5 = 0
λ4 = C2 + C3 + E3(C1−C3E3−E1 ) + E2(
C1−C3
E3−E1 )
We are interest at the Lagrangian that compares a low carbon technology with the
baseline technology if the baseline technology is 1 the lagrangian of interest to rank
the abatement technologies as a function of abatement cost is in the form of:
λi =
C1−Ci
Ei−E1
This equation defines the Abatement ratio that enable us to compare different low
carbon solutions.
C.2 Optimization of technologies under complete fuel stan-
dard constraint
We have changed the fuel economy standard constraint to include mass as the
index parameter.
∑nj=1 XjEj
SALES − a(
∑nj=1 xj Mj
SALES ) ≤ TARGET − aM0
All other constraints remain equal, the resulting Lagrangian is:
L(x1, x2, x3, λk) =
n
∑
j=1
xj ∗ Cj − λ1(
n
∑
j=1
xj − SALES)
−λ2((TARGET − aM0) ∗ SALES−
n
∑
j=1
xj(Ej − aMj)− λ3x1 − λ4x2 − λ5x3
(C.2)
Let’s assume again that x1 and x2 will be positive and that the constraint on the fuel
economy standard is binding. In this case the lagrangian multipliers are:
λ1 = C2 + (E2 − aM2)( C1−C2E2−E1+a(M1−M2) )
λ2 =
C1−C2
E2−E1+a(M1−M2) (
λ3 = 0
λ4 = 0
λ5 = C3 + C2 + (E2 − aM2)( C1−C2E2−E1+a(M1−M2) ) + (E3 − aM3)(
C1−C2
E2−E1+a(M1−M2) )
Again if we change the non negative assumption to x1 and x3 and assume that the
fuel economy standard is binding, the resulting Lagrangian multipliers are:
λ1 = C3 + (E3 − aM3)( C1−C3E3−E1+a(M1−M3) )
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λ2 =
C1−C3
E3−E1+a(M1−M3) (
λ3 = 0
λ5 = 0
λ4 = C2 + C3 + (E3 − aM3)( C1−C3E3−E1+a(M1−M3) ) + (E2 − aM2)(
C1−C3
E3−E1+a(M1−M3) )
The Lagrangian multiplier that compares a low carbon technology with the base-
line technology is key to rank all abatement options in the case of the fuel economy
standard indexed to mass this lagrangian multiplier is of the type:
λi =
C1−Ci
Ei−E1+a(M1−Mi)
This equation defines the CAFE ratio that enable us to compare different low carbon
solutions in the case of mass indexed fuel economy standard.
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Appendix D
Scenario of 9 Powertrain
Technologies and 1
Powertrain+Lightweight
Technology
Additional information on technology choices from Chapter 4.
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Appendix D. Scenario of 9 Powertrain Technologies and 1
Powertrain+Lightweight Technology
GasolineGasoline LightGasoline 12VGasoline 48VGasoline HEV
Gasoline PHEVDieselDiesel 12VDiesel 48VBEV
FIGURE D.1 – Technology pathways of the 9 powertrain technologies
and one powertrain and lightweight option for the 4 Scenarios with
Diffusion Constraints: (top left) Scenario 1: no mass constraint, (bot-
tom left) Scenario 2: no mass constraint but target corrected to initial
mass, (top right) Scenario 3: mass constraint and (bottom right) Sce-
nario 4: no mass constraint but target corrected with final mass of
Scenario 3. In dash lines: the maximum allowed diffusion of tech-
nologies.
Gasoline Gasoline Light Gasoline 12V Gasoline 48V Gasoline HEV
Gasoline PHEV Diesel Diesel 12V Diesel 48V BEV
FIGURE D.2 – Technology Mix of the 9 powertrain technologies and
one powertrain and lightweight option for the 4 Scenarios: (top left)
Scenario 1: no mass constraint, (bottom left) Scenario 2: no mass con-
straint but target corrected to initial mass, (top right) Scenario 3: mass
constraint and (bottom right) Scenario 4: no mass constraint but tar-
get corrected with final mass of Scenario 3.
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FIGURE D.3 – Scatter plot of Weighted Sales of the technology mix
of powertrain mix with lightweight from Scenario 1 in black and Sce-
nario 2 (left) and Scenario 3 in cyan and Scenario 4 in red (left) and in
green the CAFE compliance line indexed to the mass.
FIGURE D.4 – Comparison of Abatement and CAFE Ratios for the
abatement technologies (powertrain and a lightweight alternative of
Gasoline), left and Difference between Abatement and CAFE ratios,
right.
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Appendix E
Additional Results of
Environmental Policy impacts with
a CAFE indexed to mass
Chapter 5 has treated the combination of a fuel economy standard with other
policies. To capture the full effect of the CAFE policy we introduce the mass indexa-
tion in the same manner modeled in Chapter 4. Here we will describe the differences
in results with the modified fuel economy constraint. Vehicle’s mass is an important
parameter for this constraint, Table E.1 shows the vehicle’s mass of the technologies
treated in this section.
Technology Mass in kg
Gasoline 1000
Gasoline EURO 6d Full 1010
Gasoline EURO 7 1020
Gasoline 12V 1020
Gasoline 48V 1040
Gasoline HEV 1130
Gasoline PHEV 1230
Diesel 1070
Diesel Euro 6d Full 1095
Diesel Euro 7 1095
Diesel 12V 1090
Diesel 48V 1110
BEV 1450
TABLE E.1 – Vehicle’s mass assumptions for a lower-medium seg-
ment.
First, we will check if there is any difference in CO2 emissions, second we focus
on technology choice and third we will see if there is any difference in tradeoff and
synergy effects. What we expect is to see heavier vehicles in the technology mix.
E.1 Results
The fuel economy standard indexed to mass has an incentive to develop heav-
ier vehicles in order to reduce stringency of the CAFE target, recall E.1. In this section
we have modeled the same CAFE targets than the case without indexation. How-
ever due to the mass indexed constraint, the actual emission target is lower because
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indexed to mass
average mass is below market average. Thus the scenarios in this chapter will search
for lower CO2 emissions. Therefore when we show a CAFE target it means the pol-
icy target and conversely when talking about CO2 emissions target we mean the real
target. In 5 both of these targets were equivalent.
CAFEi = TARGETi + a
(
Mcorporate −M0
)
(E.1)
where TARGETi is the enacted European target in gCO2/kmfor year i
a = 0.0457 gCO2/km/kg in 2015 and 0.0333 from 2020 is the mass index coefficient
Mcorporate is the average mass in kg of corporate sales for year i
M0 is the estimated average mass in kg of all new vehicles by the regulator
First, to check for a deviation from all scenarios compared to their CAFE tar-
gets we obtain the gap of the CAFE performance to the actual target in E.1. The dif-
ference lies in the section that remains common for all Scenarios, up to 73 gCO2/km
all Scenarios perform equally. This is due to the mass correction that makes a CAFE
target with a mass indexation coefficient more difficult to achieve for a light car man-
ufacturer.
FIGURE E.1 – 2030 CAFE Gap of a Scenario compared to the target.
There are two types of scenarios: Policy only scenarios: CAFE only
and two package scenarios: that include a CAFE policy + other poli-
cies. Positive values mean that a Scenario has a higher CAFE perfor-
mance than the target.
Second, technology choices will vary more for stringent CAFE targets because
these targets are more severe and require significant mix adaption that will oppose
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to the other policies constraint. For example the EURO standard does not allow high
pollutant emitters therefore the share of Diesel family that is the technology that has
more problems to adapt for the standard is well below the other scenarios. Likewise,
the share of ICE engines in LEZ limited by ICE scenario is lower for stringent CAFE
targets due to the stringency of the LEZ standard.
FIGURE E.2 – 2030 Technology choice Gap between the CAFE only
Scenario and the selection of two policies Scenario. Positive values
mean that the technology share in the two policy scenario is higher
than the share of that technology in the CAFE only Scenario.
In this Appendix we will also model a CAFE target of 77 gCO2/km, a ZEV
target of 36 credits, an introduction of LEZ limited by ICE for Diesel in 2022 vehicles
and Gasoline and Diesel vehicles in 2027 and an introduction of LEZ limited by
NEV in 2027. From these assumptions we have varied the CAFE target in Figures
E.1, E.2 and ??. The technology mix with mass indexation does show a different
trend compared to the technology mix without mass indexation. The share of EV is
higher, we will check this in Fig. E.4
Looking more closely on how each policy responds to reduce average carbon
emissions. We can look at the distribution of technologies according to CO2 emis-
sion levels. Fig. E.4 shows the effects of policies: a ZEV Mandate and ICE limited
by NEV develops zero and high emissions technologies. The stringent carbon emis-
sions targets requires a higher share of low carbon technologies. From all options
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FIGURE E.3 – Dynamic technology mixes of selected two policy sce-
narios compared with the CAFE only scenario.
available, the one that is prefered is EV : all Scenarios have a higher share of EVs
when CAFE is indexed to mass.
To analyze the synergy and trade-off effects, we will distinguish two compar-
isons: policy focused compliance and policy efficient. In the first case we check for
the trade off and synergy of policies in the policy context in the second case we
will show the real performance and analyze policy efficiency in terms of real perfor-
mance. Fig.E.5 treats the tradeoff in terms of CAFE targets and in absolute emissions
reduction.
There is a change in the trend of trade off curb: this means that two policies
have a trade off when the slope of the tradeoff curve is negative that becomes a syn-
ergy when the slope is positive. This threshold is located at a target of 66 gCO2/km
or a emissions level of 60 gCO2/km and is true for the CAFE only, CAFE & QA,
CAFE & LEZ limited by ICE, CAFE & LEX limited by NEV and CAFE & ZEV Man-
date. The gap between CAFE and emissions level is 6 gCO2/km, in the case of lower
than average car manufacturer the impact of mass indexation is positive for policy
efficiency because it requires lower emissions. However we do not check for the
effect of all new vehicles.
The Total Cost of Possessions of a vehicle comparison results in E.2 in higher
costs except for the ZEV Mandate and LEZ limited by NEV, the production costs
are the same meaning that in presence of CAFE indexed by mass and these policies
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BEV
Diesel 48V
Diesel 12V
Diesel E 7
Diesel E 6
Diesel
Gasoline PHEV
Gasoline HEV
Gasoline 48V
Gasoline 12V
Gasoline E 7
Gasoline E 6
Gasoline 
FIGURE E.4 – Comparison of the distribution of technology choices in
a CO2 Emission dimension for 4 Scenarios: CAFE only and selected
two policy scenarios.
there is no significant change in technology choices. This is what we expected since
these two scenarios favor heavy baterry electric vehicles.
When comparing the single policy cost and the combination with CAFE Fig.
5.7, the Overcost comparison gives higher costs than the case without mass indexa-
tion which is expected because of the increase of the stringency on carbon emissions
reductions and the same gaps between single and combined policies despite the in-
crease in emissions target stringency, the exception is EURO standard which is more
costly to comply when combined to CAFE with mass index E.6.
Scenario Total Cost of Pro-
duction in ke
Total Cost of Mo-
bility in ke
Total Cost of Pos-
session in ke
CO2 only 2.09 1.35 3.44
CO2 & Pollution
regulation
2.32 1.29 3.61
CO2 & ZEV Man-
date
2.17 1.33 3.50
CO2 & LEZ limited
by ICE
2.14 1.35 3.48
CO2 & LEZ limited
by NEV
2.11 1.34 3.45
TABLE E.2 – Summary of Total Cost of Possession per vehicle: sum of
Total Cost of Mobility and Total Cost of Production.
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(A) CAFE target tradeoff
(B) CO2 emissions tradeoff
FIGURE E.5 – Tradeoff and Synergy effects of CO2 Performance and
Other Vehicle’s emissions with Environmental policies with different
levels of stringency. (A) Effects when compared to the policy targets.
(B) Effects when compared with emissions levels.
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Only
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Only
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FIGURE E.6 – Comparison of the overcost of compliance with one
single policy and the combination with CAFE policy from a policy
Scenario.
This Appendix proved that the fuel economy standard indexed to mass changes
the emissions target due to the index coefficient. The mass index has favored more
heavy technologies and leads to better synergy between CO2 policies and those poli-
cies favoring ZEVs.
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Titre : Choix des Technologies sous contraintes politiques sur les émissions et diffusion des technologies : le cas des véhicules légers.  
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Résumé : Les instruments politiques sur les émissions de 
véhicules passagers visent à réduire les externalités négatives sur 
l'environnement causées par l'usage des véhicules. Des 
réglementations sur les émissions de CO2 ont été mises en place 
en Europe, aux États-Unis, en Chine et ailleurs. La cible 
réglementaire basée sur la moyenne des émissions des véhicules 
vendus par un constructeur devient plus contraignante au fil du 
temps. Cette thèse analyse comment les constructeurs 
automobiles anticipent et préparent leurs futurs portefeuilles de 
technologies afin de respecter les futurs objectifs politiques. Pour 
conduire cette analyse, cette thèse développe un modèle 
d'optimisation des choix technologiques sous la contrainte de 
diffusion technologique. 
 
Avec ce cadre de modélisation basé sur la limitation de la vitesse 
à laquelle une technologie peut se diffuser dans un marché, cette 
thèse étudie trois questions politiques. Dans un premier temps, 
nous analysons comment le type d'anticipation du futur peut 
modifier les choix technologiques faits à court et à long termes. 
Nous montrons qu'une anticipation du futur focalisée sur les 
objectifs de court terme peut empêcher l'atteinte de la cible à long 
terme. Respecter la cible à court terme n'est une condition ni 
nécessaire ni suffisante pour permettre le niveau d'émissions 
requis par la cible à long terme. De plus si l'anticipation du futur 
n'est pas parfaite, les choix technologiques vont être verrouillés 
dans des technologies à faible potentiel d'abattement créant ainsi 
une dépendance au sentier qui limite l'abattement potentiel à long 
terme. 
Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous intéressons à évaluer 
quantitativement comment l'indexation sur la masse des véhicules de 
la réglementation CO2 change les critères optimaux de choix. Nous 
montrons qu'il n'existe pas de différence significative dans le coût 
social de la mobilité entre les deux mécanismes de réglementation 
CO2 avec et sans indexation sur la masse pour une même cible 
d'émissions. Cependant les choix technologiques entre ces 
mécanismes sont différents, la réglementation CO2 indexée à la masse 
ne développe en aucun cas les technologies d'allègement. 
 
Dans un troisième temps, nous étudions comment les choix 
technologiques changent quand des politiques à objectifs multiples se 
superposent. Nous centrons notre analyse sur deux externalités 
associées à la mobilité : les émissions CO2 et la pollution de l'air 
locale. Nous montrons trois types d'impacts de la superposition de 
politiques. Premièrement, une politique technologiquement 
spécifique tel que le Mandat de Véhicule à Zéro Émission en 
combinaison avec la réglementation CO2 provoque le développement 
de technologies vertes coûteuses et empêche les technologies sales et 
peu coûteuses de disparaître. Dans le cas de l'application de la 
réglementation CO2 seule nous n'observons pas ce comportement. 
Deuxièmement, la superposition de politiques peut mener à un coût 
élevé quand les technologies adaptées à chacune des politiques sont 
très différentes. Troisièmement, nous trouvons un effet ambigu de la 
superposition de politiques relative à l'application d'une politique 
seule sur la performance environnementale. 
 
 
Title : Technology Choices under Emissions Policy and Technology Diffusion constraints: the case of Passenger Vehicles 
Keywords : automotive technologies, inertia, diffusion, supply model, air emission vehicle policy. 
Abstract : Policy instruments on passenger vehicle emissions 
aim at reducing negative externalities on the environment from 
vehicles use. To regulate CO2 emissions fuel economy standards 
have been put in place in Europe and in the US. These standards 
are made more stringent over time. This thesis analyzes how 
automotive firms anticipate and prepare their future technology 
portfolio to comply with expected future standards. To do so, we 
develop a model of optimal technology choices that captures 
technology diffusion constraints. 
 
With this framework, this thesis investigates three policy 
questions. First, we ask how the type of anticipation of the future 
can affect near term and long term  technology choices. We find 
that an anticipation of the future focused on near term objectives 
can lead to failure to comply with a long term target. Meeting the 
short term target is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
satisfy long term compliance. Moreover if the anticipation of the 
future is not perfect, technology choices will be stuck with low 
abatement technologies creating a path dependency that limits 
long term abatement potential. 
  
Second, we ask how much does the fuel economy standard index to 
mass change the optimal technology selection criteria. We show that 
there is no significant difference in the cost of usage and technology 
for an average vehicle between two mechanisms of the fuel economy 
standard with and without mass index for the same emission target. 
Thus a heavier vehicle fleet has the same cost than a lighter fleet. 
However the technology choices are different, the mass index fuel 
economy standard neglects lightweight technologies in all cases.  
   
 Third, we ask how does technology choices change when policies 
overlap with each other to answer multiple objectives. We focus on 
two dimensions of vehicle emission externalities: CO2 emissions and 
air pollutants. We show three type of effects of overlapping policies. 
First, a technology specific policy such as the Zero Emission Vehicle 
Mandate in combination with a fuel economy standard develops more 
costly green technologies and prevents cheap dirty technologies to 
disappear compared to the case of a fuel economy standard alone. 
Second, the combination of policies can produce very high costs when 
technologies adapted for each policy are very different. Third, 
overlapping policies can improve or deteriorate the performance of 
one dimension of vehicle emissions from the cases of policy alone 
applications.   
 
 
